The Other Front: Iran’s War on Israel’s Allies
By Jeff Parsons and Asher Stern
For decades, Iran has sought to isolate Israel politically and weaken its relationships abroad. The most recent conflict created an opportunity to pursue that objective more aggressively. While missiles, drones, and military operations drew global attention, a parallel effort unfolded elsewhere. Through embassies, proxies, and information operations, Tehran pursued these objectives through different means.
This was not a distraction from the war, it was part of the war around the war.
Throughout the conflict between Israel, Iran, and their respective allies, Iranian embassies spent weeks talking about President Trump, Jeffrey Epstein, Congress, anti-war protesters, and American taxpayers.
At roughly the same time, court filings and law enforcement investigations continued, highlighting Iranian interest in Jewish targets outside Israel. Across Europe, Jewish communities and institutions continued appearing in investigations tied to Iranian-linked actors and networks, while filings in the United States pointed to similar ambitions directed at Jewish targets at home.
None of those developments occurred on the battlefield. Yet they pointed in the same direction.
Across different countries and audiences, Iranian messaging sought to shape how responsibility for the conflict was understood. Sometimes the focus was Israel. Sometimes it was Washington. Sometimes it was the relationship between them. The route changed. The destination rarely did.
A recurring feature of these campaigns is the distinction Iran and its proxies attempt to draw between Judaism and Zionism. Formally, many actors insist they are targeting Israel or Zionism rather than Jews. In practice, however, Jewish institutions, community organizations, and individuals frequently find themselves caught inside the same pressure campaigns. That tension would reappear repeatedly throughout the conflict.
One of the clearest examples of this effort emerged through Harakat Ashab al-Yamin al-Islamiya (HAYI). In a video posted online shortly after the commencement of military operations, the group announced its intention to start “military operations” worldwide. In the following two months, it claimed responsibility for approximately 18 attacks, most of them directed at Jewish institutions, including synagogues, charities, community organizations, and medical centers.
The Federal Bureau of Investigation determined that HAYI was the brainchild of Mohammad Baqer Saad Dawood al-Saadi, associated with the Iraqi militia group Kata’ib Hizballah (KH). The militia was formed in part to advance the interests of Iran, and it received extensive training, funding, logistical support, weapons, and intelligence from the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). From the first day of the conflict, al-Saadi signaled his intentions, posting a call for followers to “Kill everyone who supports America and Israel…”
As HAYI’s campaign unfolded across Europe, the attacks were accompanied by messaging explaining why the targets had been selected. Following the March 15th attack on the Bank of New York Mellon, al-Saadi posted a propaganda video including a message of “…To all peoples of the world, especially in the European Union, immediately distance yourselves from all American and Zionist interests, facilities, and what is affiliated with them.” A subsequent April 4th propaganda video posted by HAYI on Telegram included a warning to “distance yourselves from Zionist and American interests.” Following two attacks in London on April 15, al-Saadi posted propaganda videos explaining the targets had “financial ties with Israel and Saudi Arabia.” Similar statements were posted following later attacks, explaining the targets had connections to the Israeli Army or were “…centers of Zionist influence in the British capital.” As the conflict continued, HAYI expanded operations to include Jewish Centers because they were “a beacon for solidarity and support to Israel and its Zionist objectives.”
The campaign extended into the information environment as well. Iranian embassy social media accounts dramatically increased their volume after the onset of military operations. The Iranian Embassy in the United Kingdom increased its output more than twenty-sevenfold. Several embassies in Africa that had been largely inactive before the conflict suddenly became prolific. Whatever else this campaign was, it was not passive.
One Iranian embassy account argued that America had abandoned “America First” in favor of “Israel First.” The Iranian Embassy in South Africa pushed the idea even further, portraying President Trump as having moved from “Make America Great Again” to “Make Israel Great.” Other accounts focused on taxpayer costs.
Others amplified anti-war demonstrations or portrayed American policy as serving Israeli interests rather than American ones. Across multiple accounts, governments were depicted as making the decisions while ordinary citizens absorbed the consequences.
In the United Kingdom, embassy messaging repeatedly emphasized that Britain should resist being drawn into conflict on Israel’s behalf, portraying alignment with Israel as both strategically and morally costly.
Jewish communities thousands of miles from Israel have repeatedly found themselves pulled into conflicts they did not start, cannot control, and often have little ability to influence.
A synagogue in Europe is not the Israeli government. A Jewish community center in North America does not determine Israeli policy. Yet across multiple conflicts, Jewish institutions, community organizations, cultural centers, and diaspora communities have repeatedly found themselves treated as extensions of the Jewish state, held responsible for its actions, or pressured as stand-ins for Israel itself. The pattern predates the current conflict and is not unique to any one country. The distinction matters. Under the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance working definition of antisemitism, holding Jews collectively responsible for the actions of the State of Israel is recognized as a contemporary form of antisemitism. Jewish communities do not make Israeli policy, yet they are repeatedly treated as though they do.
References to Congress, taxpayer spending, anti-war protests, foreign aid, and domestic priorities were the core messaging targeting the United States. Several accounts portrayed Washington as acting on behalf of Israeli interests rather than American ones, repeatedly linking domestic frustrations to support for Israel.
The “Israel First” framing was especially notable because it did not attempt to create a new political argument. Rather than creating new grievances, the messaging inserted Israel into debates that already existed: Washington dysfunction, government spending, foreign wars, and political distrust. In Kenya, one embassy account reduced the argument to a simple image: Netanyahu asking who would bomb Iran on Israel’s behalf, while Trump eagerly volunteered.
The European messaging looked different. It focused heavily on humanitarian responsibility, legal accountability, allegations of war crimes, and international institutions. This was not because Tehran had suddenly become committed to international law. These were simply the arguments most likely to resonate in an environment where debates surrounding the International Criminal Court, the International Court of Justice, and Israel’s conduct in Gaza were already prominent.
The African-focused accounts prioritized circulation over persuasion. Themes of solidarity, injustice, and collective struggle appeared more frequently than legal arguments or policy discussions. The goal was less to win a debate than to expand the audience.
The arguments changed because the audiences did. The target was often not a country or community in isolation. It was the relationship between them.
Notably, the campaign did not appear to be centrally scripted. Embassy accounts varied in tone, emphasis, and execution, yet the same themes surfaced repeatedly across countries and audiences. The embassies were not reading from identical scripts. They were pursuing similar objectives through different registers.
Many accounts explicitly distinguished Judaism from Zionism and rejected accusations of antisemitism. Yet some of the same accounts repeatedly returned to themes involving political capture, outside influence, and governments acting on behalf of interests other than their own. Others portrayed Zionists as uniquely manipulative or malevolent while insisting their objections were political rather than ethnic or religious. The tension emerged when rhetoric directed at Zionists began reproducing narratives historically directed at Jews.
Criticism of Israel and antisemitism are not the same thing. The overlap becomes relevant when arguments begin revolving around hidden control, political capture, or outside manipulation. Those themes have historically provided pathways through which antisemitic ideas enter mainstream political discourse.
The campaign appears less focused on building support for Iran than on making support for Israel harder to sustain. These narratives help shape how audiences understand pressure and where they assign responsibility when it arrives, particularly when viewed alongside the operational activity directed at Jewish communities and institutions during the same period.
The significance of this campaign was not simply who it targeted.
The target was often the relationships around Israel: governments, publics, institutions, and Jewish communities that had no role in shaping Israeli policy but found themselves treated as extensions of the Israeli state.
Iran was not only contesting Israel on the battlefield. It was contesting the relationships that make Israel resilient. The governments that support it. The public that tolerates that support. The institutions associated with it. The communities are perceived as connected to it.
The battlefield mattered. The relationships surrounding it mattered just as much.
Jeff Parsons is a Senior Research Fellow at the Program on Extremism at the George Washington University, where his research focuses on extremists networks and the jihadist threat. He previously served for 20 years as Special Agent with the Federal Bureau of Investigation where he investigated counterterrorism and counterintelligence threats. He holds degrees from the United States Naval Academy and Georgetown University.
Asher Stern is a researcher at the Program on Extremism at George Washington University, where his work focuses on extremist networks, ideological mobilization, radicalization dynamics, and emerging threat ecosystems. He previously served as a project manager and researcher at the International Institute for Counter Terrorism, as head of operations at the International Legal Forum, and in a combat role in the Israeli Air Force on active and reserve duty. His writing has appeared in The Hill, New York Daily News, City Journal, Homeland Security Today, The Jerusalem Post, JNS, and Israel Hayom; he has also served as a teaching assistant for BA and MA courses on psychological warfare and new trends in online terrorism at Reichman University, and holds an MA in international relations from the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and a BA in government, strategy, and diplomacy from Reichman University.
