The Peace Everyone Could Have, but only without the Ideology No One Will Give Up

For all the noise, fury, and tragedy that define the current Middle East landscape, the path to a calmer future is not as mysterious as it sometimes appears. There is a workable arrangement in which every side, Iran, Lebanon, Gaza, Yemen and Israel could benefit, and in which the region could finally exhale. But that future depends on a single, immovable condition: the rejection of an Islamic fundamentalist ideology that elevates the destruction of Israel above the welfare of the very societies these regimes claim to take responsibility for. This ideology has shaped their choices for decades, not the pursuit of Palestinian statehood, not economic development, not regional stability. Instead, it has fueled proxy conflicts, empowered militias, and destabilized neighbors. Peace cannot emerge while that ideological engine endures, because its followers are locked into a worldview that cannot coexist with it. Western pragmatism, effective in many Western disputes, is ineffective when confronted with dogmatic Islamic fundamentalism.

Iran:
Before 1979, Israel enjoyed warm relations with Iran. After the Islamic Republic seized power, however, the regime adopted an uncompromising fundamentalist agenda. Internally, the well-being of its citizens has long been subordinated to the regime’s overriding priorities: preserving its grip on power while also advancing its radical external policy. Externally, its policy is aimed at exporting its revolution across the region, destabilizing pro‑Western governments, and rejecting Israel’s right to exist. To advance these goals, Iran built and funded a network of armed proxy groups, including Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Houthis, each responsible for severe harm, loss of life, and human rights violations. Iran itself is linked to violent attacks and widespread abuses, including the estimated killing of more than 900 Americans, the highest U.S. death toll attributed to any state sponsor of terrorism since 1979. Beyond seeking control over the strategic international Strait of Hormuz, Iran has also pursued two especially dangerous capabilities: one of the region’s largest offensive ballistic‑missile arsenals, with ambitions to eventually reach U.S. territory, and a military nuclear program it has refused to abandon.

Whatever idealistic hopes Iranians or Western observers may have held in 1979, it is now evident that Iran’s revolutionary Islamic fundamentalism has hardened into a rigid form of fanaticism, an intolerant religious ideology fused with unchecked political power, as history has repeatedly shown when religious extremism merges with unrestrained political authority.

Lebanon:
Israel has never pursued territorial expansion into Lebanon as a primary goal or challenged Lebanon’s sovereignty; its concern has only been Hezbollah’s use of Lebanese territory above and below ground to launch attacks. In fact, before Hezbollah’s rise, Israel and Lebanon were close to a peace agreement. Founded in 1982, Hezbollah began as a local political movement but, with extensive Iranian funding and military support, evolved into a heavily armed independent Shiite militant organization wielding more firepower than the Lebanese Armed Forces. Its aims include advancing Iranian regional interests, dominating Lebanon’s political landscape and destroying Israel. It is responsible for loss of life, and human rights violations, including the killing of nearly 400 Americans leading the US to designate it as a terrorist organization. From the perspective of Israel and the United States, if Hezbollah disarmed, renounced its commitment to Israel’s destruction and functioned solely as a political party, there would be no strategic dispute and no reason for military engagement in Lebanon. Israel has no interest in Lebanon’s internal affairs except when they pose a direct military threat.

Hamas:
Hamas has controlled Gaza since 2007. When refraining from attacking Israel, Israel coordinated the steady flow of concrete, fuel, food, and other essential supplies into Gaza. Every major Israeli military operation, and the war beginning in October 2023, followed Hamas attacks on Israel. Despite a ceasefire brokered in 2025, Hamas has stubbornly refused to disarm and continues to repress its own population. If Hamas renounced its commitment to Israel’s destruction, disarmed, and functioned solely as a political body focused on the welfare of Gazans, Israel would have no strategic dispute with it and no reason for military action.

As a footnote, Gaza’s Hamas‑run economy, marked by high unemployment, poverty, corruption and a dependence on aid, is not inherently destined to be poor. A glimpse of what could have been comes from the flower‑export industry experience. Before Israel’s 2005 disengagement, Israeli agricultural settlements had built a thriving, export‑oriented flower sector generating tens of millions in annual revenue and employing thousands of Palestinian workers. After the disengagement, the greenhouses transferred to Palestinian control were looted and destroyed within days, and the land repurposed for rocket‑launching sites aimed at Israel.

The Houthis (Yemen):
The Houthis regime in Yemen employs political intimidation, religious persecution, gender‑based restrictions, the use of child soldiers and widespread human rights violations to maintain power. Backed by Iranian weapons, training, and intelligence, the regime adheres to Iran’s “Axis of Resistance” ideology, adopting an explicitly anti‑US and anti‑Israel posture. They have attacked commercial shipping in the Red Sea, launched more than 70 missiles toward Israel from roughly 2,000 kilometers away, and carried out drone and missile strikes against Saudi Arabia and the UAE. They too are unsurprisingly designated by the United States as a terrorist organization.

All the while, Yemen’s economy has been described by the World Bank, the UN, and the IMF as one of the most devastated on earth. The country is on the brink of economic collapse, leaving it dependent on humanitarian aid and remittances for basic survival. If the Houthis were to redirect their resources inward, prioritizing civilian needs and cooperating with Yemen’s internationally recognized government, the country’s economic prospects and the daily well‑being of millions of Yemenis would almost certainly improve.

The Axis of Resistance:
Regarding Israel, the Axis of resistance form of Islamic fundamentalism is not a reaction to Israeli policies or to whichever government happens to be in power. It is a wholesale rejection of Israel’s existence and of any future in which it lives alongside a potential Palestinian state. This leaves no room for a coexistence solution.

To be sure, there are specific historical, religious, and national elements related to Israel and the Jewish people that feed into the Axis’ hostility including Israel’s Jewish and Western presence in the Middle East. But these are only part of the ideology’s hostility. Their deeper animus is directed against pluralistic, liberal, and open Western societies as a whole. As this ideology pushes outward, those in the West who excuse it, minimize it, or assume it has nothing to do with them, may eventually find themselves drawn into the very confrontation they once believed belonged only to others.

People unfamiliar with the history may inadvertently reach the wrong conclusions.  However, when informed voices refuse to acknowledge the ideological nature of the threat, the result is not neutrality but wilful distortion or bias. This is unfortunate and not how it is viewed from within Israel. The criticism Israel receives from Western commentators when it has responded to violent fundamentalist aggression, whether from Hamas, Hezbollah or Iran, often evokes an unsettling parallel: the rape victim condemned for fighting back against the rapist. It is a metaphor that is both figurative and unfortunately tragically literal in the case of the Nova festival on October 7 in which deliberate widespread rape and often subsequent murder occurred and was camcorded by Hamas itself showing their open glee at the atrocity they caused. As a footnote, similar detailed plans were later discovered in Hezbollah bunkers outlining a coordinated, even larger assault on northern Israeli communities, an operation that, fortunately, never materialized.

In terms of the conflict today, the changes sought by the United States and Israel concern only foreign policy. Neither country is trying to force Iran or its proxies to adopt internal reforms such as a free press, independent courts, or equal rights for women. However beneficial such changes might be, Washington and Jerusalem treat them as domestic matters and limit their demands to policies that threaten regional or international security.

This analysis helps explain why Iran and Hezbollah remain unwilling to back down or disarm, especially when the United States lacks strong backing from its allies. It also clarifies why President Trump’s firm refusal to yield is often underappreciated in Western discussions. Given the ideological rigidity of the Iranian regime and its proxies, it is unlikely that either will accept a deal requiring meaningful change, and the United States acting alone, may find its leverage insufficient to compel them.