The Post-Election Conundrum: What About a Plan B?

Israel’s election has produced what might commonly be called a hung parliament: a deeply divided Knesset in which no established political grouping holds an outright majority. According to the official final results published on 30 October 2026, the parties aligned with Benjamin Netanyahu’s outgoing government won 53 of the Knesset’s 120 seats. Yashar!, Be’Yahad, HaDemocratim and Yisrael Beitenu together hold another 48, while the Joint List and Ra’am hold the remaining 19. Neither of the two principal groupings has an outright 61-seat majority. Likud, with 27 seats, remains the largest single party.

If neither side succeeds in forming a government, Israel faces the worrying prospect of an extended period under a caretaker government. While such a government continues to exercise governmental authority, the geopolitical exigencies ahead could at any time demand difficult and consequential decisions. Confronting them without the additional political authority and stability afforded by a parliamentary majority risks making those choices still harder. Nor is waiting for another election necessarily a solution, as it could produce another inconclusive result and further extend political instability.

This is the conundrum: each side may continue to hope for the bloc majority it wants, but sooner or later will have to confront the cold reality that it is unattainable. Wishful thinking cannot change that reality.

If so, perhaps it is time to consider a paradigm shift to Plan B: rather than either bloc continuing to strive for dominance, the two sides could collaborate in a broad national unity government. A Plan B would not be without precedent: in 1984, Israel responded successfully to electoral deadlock by forming an unlikely national unity government between political adversaries Shimon Peres and Yitzhak Shamir.

If all four opposition parties entered a unity government, their 48 seats combined with Likud’s 27 would create a 75-seat majority. If the opposition parties remained sufficiently unified not to break ranks, rather than being absorbed individually as defectors into a Netanyahu government, they could form a cohesive political counterbalance.

This would be a government born of necessity, a mutual least-worst alternative rather than anyone’s preferred outcome. Its starting point would be that the new government would pursue only matters on which its members can agree, while putting contentious but less urgent issues on hold. In addition to providing a substantial parliamentary majority, such a government would represent a broader swathe of Israeli society.

A collaborative unity government’s approach would change from “How do we get what we want in an intractable political quandary?” to “What are we prepared to give up in return for meaningful, albeit partial participation in a potentially functioning government?”

What would this look like?

For Likud: Let us assume that Likud remains firmly behind Netanyahu and will not accept a unity arrangement that removes him from the premiership. That would leave the four opposition parties facing an extraordinary concession: accepting as prime minister the very leader whose continued premiership they had opposed.

On the other hand, accepting Netanyahu as prime minister would not mean accepting a continuation of his previous governing style. A cohesive opposition bloc would require a fundamentally different type of leadership, constraining his ability to pursue his own bloc’s program uncontested and requiring him instead to govern collaboratively with his former opponents.

It would also require reciprocal concessions of comparable political significance from Likud. The objective would not be to match concession for concession, but to accommodate each bloc’s fundamental requirements sufficiently to achieve a political balance that allows the opposition parties to tell their supporters that they had neither abandoned them nor capitulated, even while making significant compromises.

For the opposition bloc, the first precondition, sine qua non would be a commitment to establish a state commission of inquiry into the events leading up to and surrounding 7 October 2023. This is not simply a bargaining demand. Although Israelis differ over precisely what form such an inquiry should take, the fundamental expectations are for answers and, with those answers, accountability. The inquiry should establish, as objectively as possible, what failed, where responsibility lies, and most importantly, what lessons must be learnt. Quite apart from its place in the opposition parties’ political programs, the affected families in particular, and the country more broadly, deserve answers, accountability and, ultimately, some measure of closure.

The second precondition relates to Haredi military or national service. The legal starting point is the Supreme Court’s June 2024 ruling that there was no legal framework permitting a blanket distinction between yeshiva students and others liable for military service, and that the state could not simply refrain from applying the conscription law to them as a group. Given both the legal starting point and the acute demands on Israel’s military manpower, the opposition parties will not agree to an across-the-board exemption for Haredi men. However, in the spirit of establishing a functioning unity government, the opposition could limit its immediate insistence to agreement on the principle of broadly shared national responsibility, while leaving the details of its implementation to be worked out later.

Likud would benefit from a unity government by retaining the premiership and leadership of the government while presiding over a stable parliamentary majority. The opposition would gain substantial governing influence and agreement on the principles it regards as vital.

A unity government could also allow the smaller coalition parties to join and continue promoting the interests of their constituencies, while no longer holding the balance of power on which the government’s parliamentary majority depends.

What should be left unresolved? What would be put on hold?

There is the question of changes to the judicial system. The outgoing coalition and opposition hold profoundly different positions. Broadly speaking, one side wishes to continue such changes, while the other wants to prevent further changes and, in some cases, reverse measures already enacted.

Rather than risk destabilizing a unity government from the outset by attempting immediately to resolve this dispute, both sides could agree temporarily to do neither. The government would not pursue further contentious judicial changes, while the opposition would not insist upon immediately reversing those already enacted. The issue could be put aside for an agreed period, perhaps six months.

That would not make the issue unimportant. The future relationship between the judiciary, the Knesset and the government is a fundamental strategic question. But something can be profoundly important without requiring immediate resolution.

The same principle could apply to other irreconcilable ideological disputes. The objective would be to meet the country’s present needs by prioritizing stability and effective governance over futile attempts by either bloc to implement its ideological program without the parliamentary majority to do so.  Israel has more than enough security, diplomatic, economic and social challenges to occupy a government without immediately reopening every ideological battle.

The blocs would therefore not need to agree on everything. What they would need instead is a workable modus vivendi: an agreement on which pressing issues must be addressed, and which controversial but less urgent issues can temporarily be left unresolved.

Beyond the parliamentary arithmetic, in contrast to the intense polarisation that exists today, this new modus operandi could itself become an organizing principle, with political adversaries demonstrating through their own collaboration that a more conciliatory national political environment is possible. By acknowledging the legitimacy of working with opponents who are themselves making painful compromises, they could show that profound disagreement need not make cooperation impossible. Over time, such cooperation might even contribute to healing some of the country’s deep political divisions.

And the Arab parties?

There remains the important question of the political role of Israel’s Arab citizens, a community comprising approximately one-fifth of the population, and of the Arab parties, particularly Ra’am. The Joint List holds 11 seats and Ra’am eight, giving the two parties 19 seats, a significant parliamentary presence.

Their possible participation in government deserves consideration on its own merits, not just arithmetically. A government, especially one founded on the principle of national unity, need not close the door on their participation merely because its parliamentary arithmetic does not require it. At this juncture, however, an already precarious Plan B may simply be unable to accommodate the additional political, ideological, strategic and emotionally charged questions their participation would introduce. That question, however important, may also need to be left for a later stage.

So, what about Plan B?

While none of this is easy, Plan B offers the possibility of a stable majority national unity government. Consequently, that possibility deserves serious consideration before being rejected.

When voters deny competing political camps the ability to impose their preferred programs, pragmatism may sometimes require compromise rather than another attempt at dominance. In that context, compromise and collaboration need not betray the election result. It may be the most honest response to it.