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Nadav Tamir

The Trump Doctrine in Foreign Policy

WASHINGTON, DC - APRIL 23: U.S. President Donald Trump speaks to the media after signing executive orders in the Oval Office at the White House on April 23, 2025 in Washington, DC. The seven executive orders were related to education policy including enforcing universities to disclose foreign gifts, artificial intelligence education and school disciplinary policies. (Photo by Chip Somodevilla/Getty Images)
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Alliance with Reservations: The War with Iran as a Case Study of Trump’s Foreign Policy

The US president oscillates between isolationists and hawks, prioritizing quick wins and cheap victories over values. If Israel does not learn to align with his interests, it will have to manage without him.

Even in his second term, U.S. President Donald Trump continues to confuse commentators regarding his foreign policy doctrine, if he has one at all. Trump is indeed an opportunist—a trait that requires flexibility—but it is still possible to identify some hints regarding his preferences, even if they do not translate into a coherent worldview.

Trump wants to invest fewer American resources abroad than other mainstream voices on both the left or right, whether in money or aid or the flesh and blood of soldiers. He wants to see himself as ending wars rather than starting new ones. Above all, he is eager to sign agreements that will garner him praise, demonstrate his expertise as a negotiator, and advance his pursuit of the coveted Nobel Peace Prize.

But despite all this, when the president identifies an easy and cheap opportunity for military success, his desire to be perceived as strong and to emerge victorious may lead him in a different direction. We saw that with the Soleimani strike and his crowing over the raid that killed Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. The current case study, which concerns whether Trump will join the Israeli attack on Iran by striking the Fordow nuclear facility, is a good example of the tension at the heart of his worldview.

“Nobody knows what I’m going to do,” he told reporters this week. Maybe he doesn’t either.

Trump’s first visit to the region after re-entering the White House stressed that in his second term he intends to focus on the Middle East closely—and perhaps that’s partly due to the focus that wealthy countries in the region have paid to his property developments and crypto schemes. The president was received with tremendous honor in the Gulf states, and he returned the favor by praising Arab culture and leadership and attacking “the people flying in beautiful planes who come to the Middle East to lecture its leaders on how to live and how to govern.”

Trump took advantage of the visit to announce huge deals involving American companies but refrained from any mention of sending troops to Gaza or any other conflict hotspot. The president sees international relations as a tool for strengthening the American economy (and his own financial interests). This is true when it comes to the mineral agreement with Ukraine, and it should also be understood in the context of his musings about the Gaza Riviera, a destination he himself has already realized is unrealistic.

“They don’t want to die; no one wants to die,” Trump said, referring to Iran’s motivations for signing a new nuclear deal, and he’s stressed recently the threat of US strikes in what could be read as an effort to press Iran into a deal. These messages are currently accompanied by a measure of restraint from joining the campaign, but this is a variable that could soon change.

Even at the expense of US values and long-held positions, he is willing to transform the Middle East through deals and commerce. The Abraham Accords represent the pinnacle of his approach—normalizing relations through arms deals and diplomatic side deals without ideological commitments and without engaging in the core of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The Abraham Accords lack a clear vision for the two states involved, and most importantly, they do not include any military involvement.

Fundamentally, I maintain the belief that Trump perceives no value in an expensive and bloody American intervention in a theater beyond his complete control. In his view, Israel knows how to defend itself, and the US is available to offer support from afar when it serves American interests—but not to fight on its behalf. The key question is whether he views US strikes on Iran as a straightforward, one-time action, or if he understands the substantial risks associated with a cycle of retaliation and escalation that could further involve the US.

Perhaps he thinks about his engagement on the Houthi front; he led American airstrikes but also knew when to withdraw when he felt the cost was no longer justified. In his view, he achieved the maximum in terms of American interests, even if the ally in the Middle East is still under bombardment.
We can gain deeper insight into his thinking by examining his engagement with the two types of Republicans surrounding him: the isolationists and the hawks.

Thus far, it appears that the influence of the hawkish elements has diminished compared to his previous term. MAGA supporters reiterate a firm message that the wars of the 21st century will not be decided by marines but by economic agreements, technological collaborations, and regional alliances. Trump believes that ending a war with a ceremonial letter or a public signing ceremony is more effective than sending a battalion of troops.

It is perhaps Thomas Bark, Trump’s ambassador to Turkey, who also serves as the administration’s envoy for Syrian affairs, who best described the isolationist’s perspective. “A hundred years ago, the West imposed maps, mandates, borders drawn in pencil, and foreign rule,” Bark wrote last month on his X account, following his meeting with Syria’s interim president, Ahmad al-Shara. “The Sykes-Picot Agreement divided Syria and the broader region for imperial needs—not for peace. Generations have suffered greatly as a result of this mistake. We won’t repeat it again. The era of Western intervention is over. The future belongs to regional solutions and diplomacy based on respect.”

But in the last few days, a change has suddenly become apparent. Trump seems to be impressed by the flattering words of the ambassador in Israel, the evangelical Mike Huckabee. At the same time, he rebukes Tucker Carlson, the isolationist media figure who is considered one of his staunchest supporters, after he expressed opposition to dragging the U.S. into war. Even the leader of the isolationists in the administration, Vice President J.D. Vance, is surprisingly not ruling out American military intervention in Iran.

America’s partners, especially Israel, must understand that times have changed. In the past, it was clear that American forces would respond to significant escalations, but today that expectation is no longer guaranteed. Trump indeed sees Israel as a strategic partner, but until now he expected it to deal with the threats on its own. He was unwilling to jeopardize American soldiers unless it was an absolute necessity.

Such an approach is not an anti-Israel policy. Trump sees himself as a true friend of Israel, even if he too struggles to distinguish between the good of Israel and the good of its government. But the current relationship is a different kind of friendship than the one that existed between the countries during the times of Reagan, Carter, Bush, Clinton, Obama, and Biden. With Trump, it is a friendship based on transactions. It is not a union of values, nor is it a blood alliance.

Even when it comes to Israel’s security, Trump has preferred so far to exert diplomatic pressure and assist with arms shipments (which were not given for free) and to avoid involving the U.S. military. This is a perception that undermines the strategic alliance as we have been accustomed to thinking about it.

In Israel, people are beginning to experience the same sentiment that Europeans felt during the president’s first term: if they want protection, they must pay for it. Pay up. This is a message that is important for us to internalize, among other things, in preparation for the start of negotiations on the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) that will regulate the continuation of American military aid. Isolationist elements in the administration and advisors from the Heritage Foundation have already hinted that a wealthy country like Israel should not receive American aid for free.

In the end, Trump wants successes. He prefers to see results without paying in dollars or in soldiers’ blood. If he can achieve them through an agreement, accompanied by a glittering signing ceremony with flags in the background and the potential for a Nobel Prize, great. If not, he will only opt for the military option once victory is guaranteed, enabling him to resume negotiations from a stronger stance.

Israel must know how to integrate into the president’s map of interests. If we don’t manage to do this, he might lose interest in us altogether.

About the Author
Nadav Tamir is the executive director of J Street Israel, a member of the board of the Mitvim think-tank, adviser for international affairs at the Peres Center for Peace and Innovation, and member of the steering committee of the Geneva Initiative. He was an adviser of President Shimon Peres and served in the Israel embassy in Washington and as consul general to New England.