The Two-Legislature Solution vs. The “Decisive One Hope Plan”
In my reviews of the various models and plans that have been suggested for resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, I must admit that I have been negligent in not including the Decisive One Hope Plan presented by Minister Bezalel Smotrich in 2017. I only recently reviewed this plan in detail and I must admit that having previously gained knowledge of it only from reviews by others, I was not prepared for how farsighted and benign it could be.
The “One Hope” from the title is that of realizing the dream of peace and coexistence between Jews and Arabs in the complete land of Israel, as opposed to the Palestinian “hope” engendered by separation into two separate states.
Much of the plan consists of a rejection of the Two-State Solution, Palestinian “hope” for which the plan describes as perpetuating the conflict. The plan is based on achieving the complete eradication of this “hope” through settlement expansion and military victory, which will then return the Arabs to a condition of peace under the Jewish regime, in which it is claimed they resided within the Green Line from 1948 until the 1990s.
In a previous post, I explained why I thought the Two-State Solution would not satisfy either Palestinians, due to the lack of return of Palestinian refugees to within the Green Line, or Israelis, due to restrictions on settlement within Judea and Samaria. I posited that as these two aspects are fundamental to the aspirations of both peoples, continued conflict would be inevitable. While I disagree with some of the arguments that support rejecting the Two-State Solution in the Decisive One Hope Plan, I agree with this conclusion.
Accepting that the creation of two independent states is off the table, the rest of the Decisive One Hope Plan is interesting in that it calls for peaceful coexistence between Israelis and Palestinians, living together within the area between the Jordan River and the Green Line. In this plan, after this area is annexed to Israel:
“The Arabs of Judea and Samaria will conduct their daily lives on their own terms via regional municipal administrations lacking national characteristics. Like other local authorities, these will hold their own elections, and will maintain regular economic and municipal relations between themselves and authorities of the State of Israel. In time, and contingent on loyalty to the state and its institutions, and on military or national service, models of residency and even citizenship will become available.”
For those Arabs of Judea and Samaria who do not wish to live under such a system, the plan calls for providing aid to emigrate to other countries. For those who choose to stay, the plan calls for them to have “the maximum of democratic rights: life, liberty, and property; a life of freedom of religion and expression…the right to vote for the system which runs their everyday lives …freedom of movement and the right of entry – for work and for humanitarian reasons – into Israeli settlements in Judea and Samaria and the State of Israel…but not the right to vote for the Knesset at the first stage.”
This is not dissimilar to the Reservation System of the late 1800’s in the United States, which eventually resulted in all Native Americans receiving full citizenship (as explained in a previous post about the “Puerto Rico Model”).
The plan is commendable in that it envisions an Israel where Arabs and Jews can, eventually, over time, in the long term, live together in complete equality. It does not address directly; Gaza, return of Palestinian refugees in Judea and Samaria to areas within the Green Line, return of Palestinian refugees from outside of Judea and Samaria, or the potential demographic problem when Arabs who achieve full citizenship outnumber Jews within Israel. (On this last point, the plan relies on increasing Jewish birthrates, increasing Jewish immigration, declining Arab birthrates, and increasing Arab emigration to solve the problem.)
The difficulties I see with the Decisive One Hope Plan are threefold. First, it is based on the idea that Palestinian “hope” is for a geographical sovereign state. While the popularity of the Two-State Solution has been higher among Palestinians in the past, only about one third of Palestinians in the West Bank and East Jerusalem support it as of September 2025. (See: Peace Still a Distant Prospect for Israelis, Palestinians).
In his book, “Can We Talk About Israel?”, Daniel Sokatch, CEO of the New Israel Fund, tells of a conversation he had with an ardent anti-occupation Palestinian named Bassem Tamimi who lives in the village of Nabi Salih in the West Bank. He asked Mr. Tamimi what it is that he wanted. Tamimi responded, “I want to take my children to the beach. And I want to vote.” It is clear that the “hope” of Palestinians is not dissimilar from that of Israelis. They just want to go home.
Second, my concern about the plan is that it would take so long to reach the same point that can be reached through the Two-Legislature Solution within a few years. In England, it took 200 years for the Anglo Saxons to be included in the government of their own country. In the United States it took 100 years for people of color to gain equal rights. Is there really any reason for Palestinians to wait so long?
Lastly, it should be remembered that the Two-Legislature Solution addresses and solves the problems of return of Palestinian refugees and the potential demographic problem which the Decisive One Hope Plan does not.