The uncomfortable truth about disarming Hamas

While attention has been focused on the war with Iran and the fragile ceasefire that followed, a parallel test has been unfolding in Gaza. The Board of Peace set a clear deadline: Hamas must agree to disarm or face the consequences. Hamas’ answer has been just as clear: its leaders appear to have rejected the proposal in Cairo, while earlier its military spokesman dismissed it as an attempt to achieve by politics what Israel failed to achieve by force.

Disarmament is not just one issue among many. It is the key that is meant to unlock Gaza’s entire stabilization plan. The Board of Peace proposal ties Hamas’s disarmament to the entry of a new Palestinian governing body – the National Committee for the Administration of Gaza (NCAG) – alongside expanded humanitarian relief, reconstruction, and international oversight. In this vision, progress on all fronts depends on progress on disarmament.

To understand why this effort now hangs in the balance, we need to look beyond the mechanics of the proposal and focus on the politics behind it. The outcome will not be determined by technical design, but by how Hamas – and the actors around it – perceive the question of disarmament.

The proposal presented by the Board of Peace envoy, Nickolay Mladenov, lays out a staged, verifiable process that combines security, governance, and economic incentives. As we argued in a recent report, it follows a Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) model.

The United Nations defines DDR as a process of disarming fighters, dismantling armed groups, and reintegrating combatants into civilian life. It is the only model with a real – if imperfect – track record of dismantling militias, from Northern Ireland, where it was critical to the success of the Good Friday agreement, to conflicts across Africa and Latin America.

Hamas, a hardened terrorist organization, will not readily relinquish its weapons. Doing so would end the movement as it exists today. Its overriding goal is survival. Without clear answers about the fate of its leaders and fighters, its future political role, and its place in a restructured Palestinian system, disarmament is not a transition – it is self-destruction.

For Hamas – whose name literally means Islamic Resistance Movement – armed struggle is core to its identity. And so Mladenov and the Board of Peace must address four challenges to move Hamas toward disarmament.

First, Hamas would have to accept a fundamental transformation – from an armed movement into a non-violent political actor. This is not a tactical shift; it goes to the heart of its identity, strategy, and internal cohesion.

Second, Israel would need to offer some form of amnesty to those who disarm. Without it, or other security guarantees for Hamas leaders and rank-and-file, disarmament will be seen not as a transition, but as exposure to retaliation.

Third, the Palestinian Authority would have to absorb a transformed Hamas. Its rivals – who distrust Hamas as much as Israel does – would need to accept its participation in politics after – and conditioned on – disarmament, rather than seek to exclude or dismantle it entirely.

Fourth, the governing alternative to Hamas in Gaza must be credible. The NCAG cannot simply be installed; it has to function, deliver, and earn legitimacy. That requires sustained political backing, resources, and sustained backing from Israel, regional actors, and the international community.

These are not technical hurdles. They are political decisions – each one difficult on its own, and even harder to align at the same time.

The challenge is not only to get Hamas to disarm. It is also to enable the NCAG – a nonviolent Palestinian leadership – to take hold and endure under the principle of “one authority, one law, one gun.” That requires building it as a legitimate government, with the resources and political backing to compete with armed groups not just by force, but by delivering governance and political relevance – upending the appeal of armed struggle.

All of this must also ensure that the NCAG can deliver for Gazans and, together with a reformed Palestinian Authority, advance their aspirations for statehood, despite strong opposition from the current Israeli government.

A successful DDR process is not a one-step event. The Board of Peace proposal rightly adopts a phased approach. But for it to work, Israel will have to enable the NCAG to operate effectively in Gaza and, over time, allow a reformed Palestinian Authority to return.

The stronger and more credible the NCAG becomes, the more it can generate internal buy-in and external support. That depends partly on Palestinian performance – governance, delivery, accountability – but also on whether Israel and regional actors are willing to back it. Even if Israel’s current government resists, US-led regional support could create initial momentum.

In sum, the challenge is twofold: give Hamas a path to survival so it agrees to disarm, and ensure the NCAG succeeds in stabilizing Gaza. Israel’s legitimate concern about a violent Hamas takeover should be addressed by conditioning any political integration on full disarmament – while building a credible nonviolent alternative.

The uncomfortable truth is this: there is no path to disarming Hamas that bypasses Palestinian politics – or Israeli-Palestinian politics. There is no purely military or technocratic fix. An implementable DDR path ultimately hinges on who leads the Palestinian national movement, how power is redistributed within it, and whether armed struggle remains politically valuable. And that question cannot be separated from the broader trajectory of Israeli-Palestinian relations.

The Board of Peace framework is a serious step forward. But without the political layer – on power, legitimacy, and the future of armed struggle – it will struggle to move from design to reality.

This piece was co-authored by Celine Touboul, co-executive director of the Economic Cooperation Foundation, an Israeli think-tank. Rothem and Touboul authored a recent report, titled Disarming Hamas: A Framework for Lasting Security.