The What If Scenario: The Tale of Two Elections and the American Jewish Future

The Scenario:

The National Religious Right Wins in Israel and America Experiences a Dual Electoral Outcome, Where MAGA Republicans and Progressive Democrats Win

Its Impact:

These dual scenarios would fundamentally disrupt and transform American Jewish life, ending the political and communal order that has sustained this community for several generations, namely strong identification with American liberal democracy, a broadly bipartisan relationship with Israel, and confidence that Jews have allies in both major parties.

Israel’s election is now set for October 27, 2026. The central issue is not merely whether a “right-wing” government wins, but what it subsequently does—particularly concerning annexation, settlements and settler violence, Palestinian displacement, judicial independence, religious pluralism, and the continuation or conclusion of war.

The likely American Jewish response would be differentiation, not simple abandonment, as many Jews would increasingly separate their attachment to Israel from support of its government. That distinction already exists. In 2024, 89% of American Jews viewed the Israeli people favorably, but only 54% viewed the Israeli government favorably. More recent Pew data put favorable views of Israel among Jewish Americans at 64%—still a majority but no longer overwhelming. Pew’s 2024 findings and its 2026 findings show this widening distinction.

A further-right government would probably produce four effects:

Accelerated Generational Distancing:
Younger, liberal and less religious Jews would find it increasingly difficult to treat Israel as a positive expression of their Jewish values. Some would disengage; others would remain intensely engaged through Israeli opposition groups, human-rights organizations or religious-pluralism movements.

A Crisis for Mainstream Jewish Organizations:
Organizations accustomed to defending “Israel” as a unified cause would face pressure to criticize a democratically elected Israeli government openly. Silence could cost them younger members; outspoken criticism could cost them conservative donors and Orthodox constituencies.

Declining Democratic Support for Unconditional Assistance:
Democratic politicians could continue supporting Israel’s security and existence while placing conditions on weapons, opposing annexation, sanctioning violent settlers or declining to defend Israeli policy diplomatically. The old formulation—supporting Israel means supporting the Israeli government of the day—would become politically untenable.

Greater Internal Jewish Polarization:
Orthodox and politically conservative Jews might move closer to Israel and the Republican Party precisely as liberal Jews move away. This reality would expand the political divide within the American Jewish community.

This would weaken support for a particular Israeli government more rapidly than it would eliminate attachment to Israel. In a 2024 Jewish voter survey, 81% reported some emotional attachment to Israel, while 63% viewed Netanyahu unfavorably. That suggests a substantial capacity to distinguish country from government.

MAGA Republicans and Far-Left Democrats Displace the Political Center:

If these two ideological political forces gained decisive power—not simply additional seats—American Jews could face a more fundamental problem: a far deeper and more challenging state of political homelessness.

The threats coming from the two poles would not be identical.

On the MAGA or Christian-nationalist right, dangers could include the normalization of the image of Jews as “globalists”, a renewed focus on replacement and dual-loyalty conspiracy theories, and a growing toleration and acceptance of white nationalist movements. In addition, such an outcome would likely weaken democratic institutions and minority protections.

On the radical anti-Zionist left, dangers could include treating Zionism as inherently illegitimate; excluding Jews from progressive institutions unless they repudiate Israel; and collapsing distinctions concerning Israeli government policy and Jewish communal identity. This could generate within the campus community further targeting of Jewish students and faculty.

This potential political reality would focus additional attention on the imposition of the “Mamdoni Litmus Test” as suggested previously.

The result of this simultaneous radicalization would likely be the collapse of the bipartisan pro-Israel center and the further loss of trusted political allies. Liberal Jews might feel unwanted by progressives but unable to support an authoritarian or Christian-nationalist right. Conservative Jews might accept MAGA protection because they see the left as the more immediate danger, deepening communal division.

Institutional Withdrawal. Jews might leave universities, professional associations, activist organizations or localities perceived as hostile. But this would probably be selective relocation and institutional rebuilding, not a wholesale exodus from America.

A Narrowing of Public Jewish Expression. Some Jews would hide visible symbols or avoid speaking about Israel or their Jewishness; others would become more assertively Jewish or Zionist in response.

New Political Organizations. Expect efforts to build a liberal-Zionist or democratic-center coalition with moderate Christians, immigrants and other minorities.

These concerns are not purely theoretical. AJC’s 2025 survey found that 93% of American Jews regarded antisemitism as a problem and more than half had altered some behavior because of it. Its earlier survey found that American Jews perceived serious threats from the extreme left, extreme right, Christian nationalism and extremism carried out in Islam’s name—not just from one ideological source.  ADL recorded 6,274 antisemitic incidents in 2025, the third-highest annual total in its records, although definitions and classifications in such audits remain debated.

The Interaction of the Two Scenarios:

The combined scenario is more consequential than either alone. An uncompromising Israeli government would strengthen those American progressives who argue that Zionism itself is irredeemable. The rise of the political left would, in turn, strengthen Israeli claims that diaspora liberalism is unreliable. MAGA politicians could then present themselves as Israel’s only dependable friends, even while tolerating illiberalism or antisemitic rhetoric in their own coalition. American Jews would be pushed to choose between camps that recognize only part of their identity.

In the aftermath of these possibilities, we would likely experience a political recalibration of American Jewish life. What might that mean?  The critical variable for the Jewish  democratic center remains capable of defending three principles: Israel’s right to exist securely, Palestinians’ rights and dignity, and the full equality and safety of Jews in the United States. If that center collapses, American Jews would retain influence, institutions and resilience—but they would lose the political home in which those commitments have comfortably coexisted.