The Whole-of-Society Era

In a message published by Decode39 on the occasion of Italy’s Republic Day, Admiral Giuseppe Cavo Dragone, Chair of the NATO Military Committee, paid tribute to the Italian Armed Forces and to the bond connecting the military, democratic institutions and civil society. He highlighted Italy’s contributions across the Balkans, the Mediterranean and NATO’s eastern flank, noting that the country is deeply respected by its partners not only for what it does, but for the way it operates.

Yet one passage stands out as particularly significant because it goes well beyond the June 2 celebrations and offers a useful lens through which to understand the evolution of security in the twenty-first century. “Security is not built solely in military bases and headquarters,” Cavo Dragone writes. It is built in the daily life of a society that understands the risks it faces, trusts its institutions and knows how to respond when challenges arise. This is the principle NATO describes as a “whole-of-society approach”: the idea that national security depends not only on military capabilities, but on the overall resilience of a community.

Ukraine has arguably provided the clearest demonstration of this concept. When Russia launched its full-scale invasion in February 2022, many observers expected Kyiv to collapse within weeks. The opposite happened. Beyond the performance of Ukraine’s Armed Forces, what proved decisive was the continuity of institutions, the functioning of local administrations, the mobilization of civil society and the population’s ability to adapt to extraordinarily difficult conditions.

Even under sustained attack, Ukraine continued to govern, produce, educate, heal and communicate. The lesson of the war is that a country’s resilience cannot be measured solely on the battlefield. A society capable of maintaining cohesion and functionality under pressure becomes a deterrent in itself, making it far more difficult for an aggressor to achieve political objectives through coercion.

Israel adds another dimension to this discussion. Studies conducted after Hamas’s October 7 attacks have recorded a significant increase in indicators of National Resilience compared to previous crises and conflicts. Researchers have linked this phenomenon to the concept of “Collective Post-Traumatic Growth” — the possibility that a society exposed to collective trauma may develop stronger levels of solidarity, mutual trust and shared identity.

In this perspective, resilience is not simply about surviving a shock. It can become a process of collective strengthening. Israel has long served as a laboratory for this approach, supported by a culture of preparedness that involves institutions, local communities, civic organizations and citizens alike. This dimension complements military security and contributes to the overall robustness of the national system.

The same logic is increasingly visible in the Indo-Pacific, particularly in Taiwan. In recent years, organizations such as the Kuma Academy have developed programs focused on civil resilience, emergency preparedness, first aid training and counter-disinformation efforts. The objective is not to prepare citizens to fight, but to continue living and functioning during a crisis.

During a briefing in Taipei, academy officials explained that one of the key lessons drawn from Ukraine is the importance of preventing panic and preserving a degree of normality even under pressure. Alongside civil defense training, considerable attention is devoted to so-called cognitive warfare — attempts to manipulate public perceptions, undermine trust in institutions and fragment the social fabric. For Taiwan, which has lived for years under constant military and informational pressure from China, psychological resilience is now regarded as being just as important as material resilience.

It is no coincidence that these issues are increasingly present in NATO’s dialogue with its Indo-Pacific partners — Australia, Japan, South Korea and New Zealand — as well as with Ukraine and Israel. While operating in different geographical contexts, these like-minded actors face remarkably similar challenges: disinformation campaigns, cyberattacks, threats to critical infrastructure, economic coercion and pressure in the so-called grey zone below the threshold of open conflict. In this environment, the concept of a whole-of-society approach takes on a strategic significance that extends far beyond traditional civil defense.

Viewed through the experiences of Ukraine, Israel and Taiwan, the passage contained in Cavo Dragone’s message appears less ceremonial and more programmatic. Security in the twenty-first century will not depend solely on the ability to win a war, but on the ability of a society to absorb its impact without losing cohesion, trust and functionality.

When the Chair of NATO’s Military Committee writes that Italy possesses everything it needs to become a model in this field, the reference certainly includes the Armed Forces. But it also speaks to something broader: the capacity of a democracy to prepare for an era in which strategic competition begins long before tanks cross borders and is increasingly fought through the resilience of institutions, communities and society itself.