Thirty-Five Years of Self-Government and the Unfinished Question of Somali Unity
The Reality the World Must Confront
The question of Somaliland’s international status is one of the most persistent unresolved political issues in the Horn of Africa. For more than three decades, the Republic of Somaliland has maintained its own government, security institutions, currency, electoral system and public administration, while the Federal Republic of Somalia has continued to struggle with political divisions, insecurity and disagreements over the distribution of power between Mogadishu and the federal member states.
This contrast raises a fundamental question for the international community: should Somaliland’s future be determined primarily by political declarations made in Mogadishu, or should it be examined through its history, the wishes of its people, its functioning institutions and the political realities that have developed over the past thirty-five years?
Somaliland’s position is clear. Its people argue that they are not seeking to create an entirely new country from an arbitrary boundary. Rather, they seek the restoration of the sovereign status they achieved in June 1960, before entering into a union with the former Italian-administered territory of Somalia. That union, they maintain, failed to deliver the equitable partnership they had anticipated.
The international community may disagree over the legal implications of these historical events. Nevertheless, it cannot reasonably address Somaliland’s future without examining them seriously.
On 26 June 1960, the former British Somaliland Protectorate achieved independence and became the independent State of Somaliland. Five days later, on 1 July 1960, it united with the former Trust Territory of Somaliland, administered by Italy, to establish the Somali Republic. These dates are documented in the historical records of the United States Department of State.
The union reflected a powerful aspiration among Somalis: the dream of national unity and the establishment of a common state. Somaliland’s leaders and people participated in that historic project with the expectation that unity would bring equality, shared political responsibility and a stronger future.
However, the political arrangements that followed generated serious dissatisfaction in the former British Somaliland. Concerns arose over representation, the concentration of political authority in Mogadishu and the constitutional framework governing the new republic.
The 1961 constitutional referendum became an important expression of this discontent. Although the constitution received an overall majority across the Somali Republic, historical accounts record substantial opposition in the northern territory. The precise percentage varies according to the source and the method of calculation; therefore, claims about the referendum should be assessed using the original voting records rather than political slogans
The central issue is not simply whether the two territories initially desired unity. Historical evidence shows that they did. The more important question is whether the political and constitutional arrangements that followed adequately protected the interests and expectations of both sides.
A union entered into with the expectation of equality cannot be judged solely by the aspirations that inspired it. Its subsequent performance, the experiences of its people and the legitimacy of its institutions must also be considered.
For Somaliland, the collapse of the Somali state in 1991 marked the end of an already deeply troubled political relationship. At a conference in Burao in May 1991, Somaliland’s representatives resolved to reassert the independence the territory had attained in 1960. Somaliland has since developed its own institutions and administered its affairs separately from Mogadishu.
This historical sequence is essential to understanding Somaliland’s position. Its claim is based on the combination of prior independence, the experience of union, the collapse of the Somali state and the subsequent exercise of self-government.
Somaliland has held presidential elections, parliamentary elections and local council elections. Its political system has included peaceful transfers of presidential power, competitive political parties and public participation in choosing leaders.
Its presidential elections in 2003, 2010, 2017 and 2024 illustrate the continuation of electoral competition over successive administrations. These achievements should be understood alongside the wider development of its legislative and local government institutions.
Democracy is not established by holding an election alone. It requires credible electoral processes, independent institutions, respect for civil liberties, accountability and the peaceful resolution of political disputes. Somaliland, like other political systems, must continue working to strengthen these principles.
Yet its record deserves evaluation on its own merits.
The people of Somaliland have invested decades in constructing a political order that they believe reflects their collective aspirations. Their experience cannot be dismissed simply because their government lacks widespread formal international recognition.
Nor should recognition be treated as a prize that can be awarded only after a territory has achieved political perfection. International diplomacy should assess evidence, institutions, popular aspirations, regional stability and the practical consequences of alternative policies.
The relevant question is whether continued diplomatic isolation helps or hinders the objectives that international actors claim to support peace, democracy, accountable government and stability in the Horn of Africa.
If Somaliland’s institutions can contribute to these objectives, its status deserves serious, evidence-based international consideration.
The Federal Government of Somalia faces a fundamental challenge: establishing an agreed and effective system of governance across a country marked by competing political authorities, security threats and disputes over constitutional powers.
The federal model was intended to provide a framework through which different regions and communities could participate in national government while exercising constitutionally defined powers at the regional level. In practice, disagreements between Mogadishu and federal member states have repeatedly complicated this objective.
Political disputes involving Puntland and Jubaland have illustrated the difficulties of securing consensus on constitutional arrangements, elections, federal authority and relations between regional administrations and the central government. Tensions involving other federal member states have also highlighted the fragility of political agreements.
These disputes must be understood in their proper context. Federalism necessarily involves disagreements over power, and political opposition does not automatically mean that a government has ceased to function. Nor does the existence of insecurity in some regions prove that the central government exercises no authority beyond the capital.
Nevertheless, when political disputes repeatedly undermine cooperation between federal institutions and regional administrations, serious questions arise about the strength of the national political settlement.
A president’s constitutional title and the practical reach of the administration are not the same thing. A government may enjoy international recognition while still struggling to exercise effective authority throughout its claimed territory. Conversely, an administration with substantial local control may lack international recognition.
This distinction is central to the debate over Somalia and Somaliland.
Somalia’s internationally recognized government has legitimate responsibilities to its citizens. It also faces the difficult task of reaching political agreements with regional authorities, strengthening security and establishing durable constitutional arrangements. These responsibilities require dialogue, compromise and institutional legitimacy, rather than reliance on declarations of sovereignty alone.
A caretaker President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud and other Somali political leaders should therefore be judged not simply by their claims to represent the Somali nation, but by their ability to build institutions that can command political cooperation, provide security and deliver effective public administration.
The same standards of accountability should apply to political leaders throughout the region.
Somalia’s difficulties do not, by themselves, settle Somaliland’s legal status. However, they demonstrate why the international community must distinguish between formal diplomatic recognition, constitutional claims and the realities of political authority on the ground.
One of the central disagreements between Somaliland and Mogadishu concerns the nature of Somaliland’s political status.
The Federal Government of Somalia generally regards Somaliland as part of Somalia’s sovereign territory. Somaliland, by contrast, maintains that it restored its independence in 1991 following the collapse of the union and should be recognized as a sovereign state.
These positions are fundamentally different. They cannot be reconciled merely by repeating them.
The international community should recognize that Somaliland’s case raises questions of self-determination, historical statehood, the consequences of the former union and the balance between territorial integrity and the expressed political aspirations of a population.
These questions are complex, and there is no single historical fact that automatically resolves every legal issue. Nevertheless, their complexity is an argument for serious examination, not indefinite avoidance.
Somaliland’s case should be evaluated through a transparent process that considers the relevant historical record, the views of its population, the development of its institutions, the applicable principles of international law and the implications for regional peace.
International recognition is shaped by law, diplomacy, regional politics and the decisions of individual states. It does not always follow a uniform process, and practical effectiveness alone does not guarantee recognition.
However, neither should diplomatic convention become an excuse for refusing to examine changing political realities.
For more than thirty-five years, Somaliland has demonstrated a sustained capacity for self-government. Its people have participated in elections, developed public institutions and maintained a political identity distinct from that of the Federal Government of Somalia.
These facts warrant a more serious international discussion than Somaliland’s status often receives.
Governments that promote democracy should be prepared to examine Somaliland’s electoral record. Governments that emphasize stability should assess their contribution to the security of the Horn of Africa and the Gulf of Aden. Governments that defend self-determination should explain how that principle applies to Somaliland’s historical experience and present political aspirations.
This does not mean that recognition must be granted automatically or that the concerns of Somalia and other regional actors should be ignored. It means that the issue should be addressed according to evidence and consistent principles, rather than political convenience alone.
The African Union and other relevant international institutions have an important role to play in encouraging a structured, peaceful and historically informed dialogue. Such a process should consider the African context, existing borders, historical records, regional stability and the expressed wishes of Somaliland’s people.
The objective should not be to create unnecessary confrontation between Somaliland and Somalia. It should be to establish a realistic framework for addressing a dispute that has persisted for decades.
Conclusion:
The question of Somaliland is not going to disappear through diplomatic silence. Thirty-five years of separate administration have created a political reality that deserves serious attention from governments, international organizations, researchers and policymakers.
Somaliland’s independence on 26 June 1960, its subsequent union with Somalia, the problems surrounding the constitutional settlement, the collapse of the Somali state and the restoration of self-government in 1991 form an essential part of its historical case.
Its record of elections and institution-building adds a further dimension to that argument. Although its democratic institutions must continue to develop, their existence and evolution are relevant to any serious assessment of Somaliland’s future.
At the same time, Somalia’s federal political difficulties demonstrate the continuing challenge of building an inclusive and effective national settlement. Those difficulties should be examined honestly, without exaggeration and without treating political disagreement as proof that an entire state has ceased to exist.
The international community now faces a choice. It can continue treating Somaliland’s status as an issue to be deferred indefinitely, or it can support a serious diplomatic process that examines the historical record, the political aspirations of Somaliland’s people, the relevant legal principles and the implications for peace in the Horn of Africa.
The latter approach would not predetermine the outcome. It would, however, acknowledge that a longstanding political dispute deserves more than repetition of opposing declarations.
Somaliland’s future should not be determined by rhetoric alone, whether in Mogadishu, Hargeisa or international diplomatic forums. It should be addressed through history, law, democratic principles, evidence and meaningful engagement with the people whose future is at stake.
After more than three decades of separate self-government, Somaliland’s status is not a question that responsible diplomacy can indefinitely ignore. It is an issue that deserves a serious, peaceful and historically informed response.
