Trump’s Iran Deal, the H3+ problem and South Asia security
The agreement signed between the United States and Iran may succeed in achieving one immediate objective: reducing the risk of a wider regional war and reopening the Strait of Hormuz. Yet even if the ceasefire holds, a highly uncertain prospect given the history of US-Iran relations, the deal could generate a new set of security challenges extending far beyond the Middle East.
Critics of the agreement have focused on a simple question: what happens when Iran regains economic breathing space?
According to the broad outlines that have emerged, the agreement creates a pathway toward sanctions relief, the return of frozen Iranian assets, and acceptance of some aspects of Iran’s civilian nuclear activities. It also appears to place less emphasis on Iran’s ballistic missile program than many of Tehran’s adversaries had demanded. Critics argue that these concessions could leave Iran in a stronger strategic position than it occupied before the conflict. Some security analysts have warned that an influx of resources could allow Tehran to rebuild military capabilities, expand its missile and drone programs, and re-establish support networks throughout the region.
The concern is not merely theoretical. For decades, Iran has maintained relationships with a network of armed non-state actors stretching from Lebanon to Iraq, Syria, Yemen and beyond. While supporters of the agreement argue that diplomacy offers the best chance of moderating Iranian behaviour, critics note that previous periods of sanctions relief did not permanently end Tehran’s support for regional proxy organizations.
For Europe and North America, the implications are significant. The H3+ problem (Hezzbollah, Hamas, Houthi etc), is a global issue, from Europe to India, Africa to the Middle East. Hezbollah remains one of the most sophisticated non-state military organizations in the world. The Houthis have demonstrated their ability to disrupt international shipping. Hamas was originally responsible for the 7/10 terrorist attack which spiked this spiral.
Iranian-backed militias continue to influence events in Iraq and Syria. If financial restrictions are eased without robust and enforceable mechanisms preventing support to proxy organizations, Western governments may find themselves confronting a revitalized network of actors capable of projecting instability well beyond the Middle East. Several reported versions of the agreement have already generated concern because they lack clarity regarding how released assets would be monitored and whether funds could indirectly strengthen groups aligned with Tehran.
The consequences are equally relevant for South Asia.
Iran and Pakistan share a long border and occupy a pivotal position in the strategic geography linking the Middle East, Central Asia and the Indian Ocean. Any increase in Iranian regional influence inevitably affects the wider security environment in which Pakistan operates. Iran does not have to make nuclear devices, it has a broke, nuclear power which shares a land border with it and has a history of nuclear and arms proliferation.
Pakistan’s military establishment has long faced accusations from India, Afghanistan and numerous Western analysts of maintaining relationships with Islamic extremist terrorist groups that it views as strategic assets. Islamabad rejects many of these allegations and points to its own substantial sacrifices in counterterrorism operations. Nevertheless, concerns persist about the continued existence of extremist infrastructures directed against neighbouring states. By using Pakistan’s Field Marshal to broker the peace, the US is also automatically handing him the keys to Pakistan’s government, a thought the Sharif family and civilian government should be worried about. The Islamabad Memorandum, puts first Pakistan’s civilian entities, government and politicians under threat as this makes the army chief invincible.
A stabilized and economically strengthened Iran could unintentionally reduce international pressure on broader regional security questions. The diplomatic focus of major powers may shift toward preserving the US-Iran understanding rather than confronting the complex ecosystem of militant networks that continue to operate across South Asia. In that scenario, Pakistan’s security establishment could calculate that global attention has moved elsewhere.
Another factor deserves attention. Pakistan played an important role in facilitating communication between Washington and Tehran during the recent crisis and has publicly highlighted its mediation efforts. While this diplomatic role has enhanced Islamabad’s international standing, it also increases Pakistan’s strategic relevance to the United States at a moment when Washington may be reluctant to jeopardize regional stability by applying sustained pressure on contentious security issues.
The broader lesson is that peace agreements are not judged solely by whether they stop wars. They are judged by the incentives they create after the guns fall silent.
If the Trump administration succeeds in preventing a renewed US-Iran conflict, it will have achieved a significant diplomatic accomplishment. Yet if sanctions relief, asset releases and reduced pressure on Iran’s military capabilities ultimately enable the revival of proxy networks, the agreement may merely exchange one security crisis for another.
The danger is not that the deal immediately unleashes terrorism. The danger is that it creates conditions under which state sponsors, proxy organizations and extremist actors gradually recover strength while the international community congratulates itself for achieving peace. The last time a peace deal was signed at Versailles it laid the foundation for the most bloody war humanity had seen. We can just hope history does not repeat itself.
History suggests that the absence of war does not automatically produce security. Sometimes it merely creates the space in which the next conflict is prepared.
