Trump’s Middle Eastern Opportunity

Trump’s first trip abroad during his second presidency (aside from attending the funeral of Pope Francis in Rome) is crucial for Trump and for us in Israel, even though he will not visit here.

The visit has the potential to influence the future of the futile war in Gaza and the Israeli aspects of the Palestinian and regional issues.

Bottom line: Trump’s aspirations to promote glory for himself and business for the U.S. economy during his visit to the Arabian Gulf (referred to as the Persian Gulf), if they also include a joint effort toward advancing a two-state solution, align with Israel’s interests but contradict the ideological and mainly political interests of Netanyahu’s government. We must hope that Trump comprehends the implications and remains unaffected by Netanyahu’s allies in Washington.

Three countries that Trump will not visit influence the trip – China, Iran, and Israel. The goal of preventing China’s influence in the region is a bipartisan objective in the U.S. and one of the reasons why the Biden administration has dramatically changed its stance toward Crown Prince MBS from hostility to an attempt to upgrade bilateral relations.

The U.S. negotiations with Iran also influence the visit due to the need to coordinate with the GCC (Gulf Cooperation Council) on the U.S. demands from Iran, as the October deadline for the possibility of snapback sanctions approaches. Contrary to the spin spread by the right in Israel, the Sunni countries in the Gulf are interested in a U.S. agreement with Iran and are very concerned about an Israeli or American attack that could lead to a war that would severely impact them.

Ending the war with a deal that will release the hostages is in the interest of the three countries Trump will visit – Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates – and it is also an immediate and clear Israeli interest. Netanyahu might argue that the threats of intensified IDF action in Gaza led to Hamas’s capitulation; however, it is evident that the key to the deal lies in Jerusalem and depends on Trump’s pressure on Netanyahu, which is essential for the visit’s success.

Promoting the normalization of Saudi Arabia and, along with it, most of the Sunni Muslim world with Israel, and including additional countries, especially Saudi Arabia, in the Abraham Accords is a crucial goal, but very difficult to achieve due to the current government in Israel. Fortunately, today the fantasies of another bypass of the Palestinians, as was the case with the Abraham Accords, cannot materialize, given the clear stance of all the countries in the region, whose citizens watch Al Arabiya or Al Jazeera daily for the horrors from Gaza and cannot ignore the Palestinians.

The main goal of Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the Emirates is to upgrade their bilateral relations with the U.S. economically and security-wise, and Trump sees these three wealthy countries as potential for economic improvement, which will help him advance his domestic American agenda, especially in light of the crisis that arose after the tariff announcements.

Trump is mainly interested in business and the fame that would bring him closer to the Nobel Peace Prize, which he thought he deserved after signing the Abraham Accords. In bilateral aspects, it seems there is a high chance of announcements regarding investments and technological collaborations that are beneficial for both sides.

Regarding fame, it is difficult to evaluate, but there are certainly actions Trump can take that would benefit him while also supporting Israel’s interests in regional integration and the advancement of the two-state vision.

Riad is interested in a civil nuclear cooperation agreement, the details of which seem to have mostly been finalized, but it requires sufficient support in Congress to prevent a vote against the agreement according to the rules in the U.S. Atomic Energy Act Section 123 regarding nuclear cooperation. Saudi Arabia is also interested in purchasing weapons systems and munitions, and Trump would be pleased with sales that are beneficial for the American economy. Saudi Arabia is also interested in an American commitment to its security, but the chances of securing the 67 votes needed in the Senate to approve a defense alliance without an Israeli and Palestinian component are not high, so they might settle for less.

In order to overcome the fact that Netanyahu’s government is unable to provide any political horizon for the Palestinians that would satisfy Saudi Arabia, Trump could announce American recognition of a Palestinian state and a willingness to change American laws that prevent UN aid if Palestine is recognized as a member state and that prevent bilateral American aid to the Palestinian Authority. Such a move could enable Saudi Arabia to take steps toward normalization and dramatically influence Israeli and Palestinian public opinion to support a two-state solution within a regional alliance.

Doha already has significant security relations with the U.S. Qatar hosts the largest U.S. base in the region and has the status of a Major Non-NATO Ally (MNNA). Beyond Qatari investments in the U.S., it is important for Trump to use the visit to enlist Qatar’s help in establishing a Palestinian technocratic government to replace Hamas in Gaza. It is important that Qatar leverage its influence over Hamas not only in the context of the hostage deal but also regarding the day after the ceasefire, when Hamas will not be in control but will still impact the future of the Strip and the future of the arrangement.

The Qataris will certainly try to influence Trump to prevent Israel from continuing to sow discord between them and Egypt in a way that harms the hostage deal and also the reality in Gaza after the fighting, where Qatari and Egyptian coordination is of great importance.

In Abu Dhabi, there is immense economic potential for the USA and for the Emiratis in terms of access to American technologies, especially in the field of AI. The Emiratis, who took pride in the Abraham Accords for preventing de jure annexation, as planned by Netanyahu and the then-American ambassador Friedman, need to send a clear message that they oppose de facto annexation, which is happening in the West Bank on steroids.

The Emiratis have no influence over Hamas but a lot of potential to influence Fatah and support the secular opposition to Abbas. The Emiratis can influence who will head the Palestinian technocrat government, as they have prevented any involvement from Abbas and his people so far, and they must be part of the agreements regarding the demands from the Palestinian Authority to support the move.

The three countries expect Trump to persuade Israel to avoid actions that could jeopardize the positive changes they perceive in the diminishing Iranian influence in Lebanon and Syria. It is crucial for them to clarify their expectation that Trump will facilitate the establishment of a Palestinian state, which aligns with clear Zionist interests.

As usual, in Trump’s case, it’s very difficult to predict what he will do, but there is definitely potential for a positive regional shift if Trump frees himself from the influence of the hawks and Netanyahu’s allies in American politics.