US-Turkish Rapprochement: A Sign of an Impending Attack on Iran?

Since President Trump began his second term, US-Turkish relations have improved significantly. In just a short span, there have been at least two phone calls between President Trump and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, and Erdoğan is expected to visit Washington, DC, in the near future.

The first of these calls was described by Steve Witkoff, the president’s foreign envoy, during a March 21 interview with Tucker Carlson: “The Erdoğan–Trump conversation has been underreported; the call was transformational, and a lot of good will come out of it in the near future—everyone will see it.” According to informed Turkish sources, Trump expressed strong support for Erdoğan’s policies during that initial exchange.

Additionally, Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan visited Washington on March 25 to meet with US officials regarding several strategic issues. Reportedly, these included efforts to remove barriers to defense procurement, initiate the lifting of CAATSA sanctions, reconsider Turkey’s return to the F-35 program, and address developments in Syria.

The current US administration’s measured stance toward widespread demonstrations in Turkey against Erdoğan’s policies may further suggest a deepening thaw between the two sides.

According to Turkish sources, two key factors are driving the Trump administration’s push for a rapid and visible rapprochement with Ankara. The first is the prospect of a military strike on Iran. The second involves the situation in Syria—specifically, US efforts to mediate a rapprochement between Turkey and Israel to minimize the risk of direct confrontation between the two countries on Syrian territory. Following the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime, Turkish-Israeli competition for influence in Syria has emerged as a potential flashpoint.

In the event of a possible US or joint US-Israeli strike on Iran, Turkey is seen as playing a significant role, particularly due to its influence over Iran’s Azerbaijani population. Iranian Azerbaijanis, who make up roughly 20–25% of Iran’s population, are the country’s second-largest ethnic group after Persians. As part of the broader Turkic ethnic family, they maintain strong ethnic, cultural, and historical ties with neighboring Azerbaijan—a close ally of Turkey and a longtime rival of Iran.

Through its alliance with Azerbaijan, Turkey may be able to exert influence on Iranian Azerbaijanis, a group that could be mobilized in the event of a conflict. Unrest among this population could place significant internal pressure on Tehran, potentially limiting the regime’s ability to respond to external military action. In a worst-case scenario for the Iranian government, widespread unrest could contribute to internal destabilization.

Iranian Azerbaijanis also occupy prominent positions in Iran’s political, military, and economic institutions. This makes them a potential source of valuable intelligence on Iran’s military capabilities and nuclear program—information that could be passed to the US via Turkey. Moreover, the geographic proximity of Azerbaijani-populated regions in Iran to both Turkey and Azerbaijan offers strategic advantages, including ease of cross-border communication, enhanced intelligence-gathering, and the potential for covert operations aimed at weakening the Iranian regime from within.

Given the ongoing US strikes against the Houthis in Yemen and the weakening of Iran’s regional axis—particularly along Israel’s borders in Gaza, Lebanon, and Syria—it would be increasingly difficult for Tehran to ignite a broader regional war in response to a potential US-Israeli attack. This significantly reduces Israeli and American concerns about Iranian retaliation. At the same time, the rapid improvement in US-Turkish relations—described by informed sources as linked to preparations for a possible US strike—suggests a coordinated geopolitical shift. In short, most indicators now point toward a looming, large-scale US-Israeli military operation against Iran.