US unveils Maritime Action Plan to restore sea dominance

The United States is turning the reconstruction of its maritime power into an integrated strategy of national interest, industrial policy, and economic security — aimed at restoring sea dominance as a pillar of great-power competition. Following an April 2025 executive order, the document released in February 2026 marks the shift from diagnosis to action: a whole-of-government roadmap to rebuild commercial shipbuilding, the maritime industrial base, and the American maritime workforce.

The Maritime Action Plan (MAP), published by the White House this month, begins with a historical premise: sea power has long been a cornerstone of U.S. global leadership — not only through naval strength, but through the ability to move goods across oceanic routes and safeguard critical commercial connectivity.

In the twentieth century, dominance in shipbuilding and shipping, combined with an unrivaled navy, proved decisive in securing Allied victories in both World Wars. Today, however, the landscape has changed dramatically. The United States builds less than 1% of the world’s commercial vessels, while a growing share of global ocean trade depends on ships built, flagged, and often crewed abroad — primarily in China. This dependence has evolved into a structural strategic vulnerability.

The MAP responds with a coordinated, whole-of-government approach built around four pillars: rebuilding shipbuilding capacity, reforming maritime workforce training, protecting the maritime industrial base, and strengthening national resilience. The premise is clear: with only a marginal share of global production and China dominating much of the integrated maritime supply chain, industrial erosion has become a national security concern.

One of the plan’s most consequential geoeconomic tools is the creation of a Maritime Security Trust Fund (MSTF), financed through a fee on foreign-built vessels entering U.S. ports — up to 25 cents per kilogram of tonnage. Access to the American market is thus transformed into an instrument of industrial policy, channeling global trade flows into resources for domestic shipbuilding revival. Such a measure, however, may generate commercial friction with affected partners and raise questions about compatibility with multilateral trade rules.

Alongside fiscal leverage, the plan introduces Maritime Prosperity Zones (MPZ), inspired by Opportunity Zones, designed to attract private capital — including investment from allied nations. The objective is to incentivize the onshoring of critical production and components to the United States, tying supply chain security to a network of trusted partners. In this framework, economic security becomes structurally embedded within alliance policy.

Another central pillar is the creation of a Strategic Commercial Fleet (SCF) — a U.S.-flagged, domestically built commercial fleet intended to guarantee the transport of essential goods in times of crisis or conflict. Reducing reliance on foreign vessels for strategic sealift is seen as essential to preventing hostile powers from constraining or disrupting American trade during periods of heightened geopolitical tension.

Technological transformation is equally central. The MAP prioritizes Robotic and Autonomous Systems (RAS) and the integration of artificial intelligence into the maritime domain. More affordable, modular, and “attritable” platforms allow for flexible production, including in smaller shipyards such as those in the Great Lakes or along inland waterways. Competition is thus shifting from the sheer number of hulls to technological superiority: software integration, sensor networks, and cybersecurity capabilities become decisive strategic multipliers.

The document also dedicates a specific chapter to the Arctic, described as a new frontier of great-power competition. As ice retreat renders northern routes increasingly navigable, their commercial and strategic relevance grows. Washington intends to expand icebreaker capacity, strengthen infrastructure in Alaska, and deepen cooperation with partners such as Greenland, aiming to protect freedom of navigation and counter what it regards as excessive maritime claims. Control over emerging Arctic routes and critical infrastructure is now firmly embedded in the broader strategic contest involving the United States, Russia, and China.

Finally, the MAP calls for regulatory reform to reduce burdens on American shipyards, including streamlined environmental and procurement procedures. Selective deregulation is presented as necessary to make domestic production competitive with foreign cost structures. In this sense, “America First” acquires a procedural dimension: removing bureaucratic constraints to accelerate industrial revitalization.

The so-called “bridge strategy” completes the framework. Initial vessels under new contracts may be constructed in allied shipyards while investment simultaneously builds capacity within the United States, allowing for a gradual transfer of production. This model of international public-private partnership enables industrial reinforcement without abandoning cooperation with advanced partners.

Taken together, the Maritime Action Plan marks a conceptual shift: maritime policy is no longer a logistical function but a central instrument of systemic competition. For Israel — positioned at the crossroads of the Eastern Mediterranean and near the Red Sea’s critical sea lines of communication — the significance lies not merely in the number of ships the United States may build, but in the integration of industrial resilience, technological superiority, and maritime security within a shared strategic framework.