Wan-I Yang Interview | Alexandre Gilbert #278.1
Wan-I Yang, Taiwanese professor at the Institute of Philosophy, National Sun Yat-sen University, participates in the International Colloquium “Current Readings of Levinas’ Otherwise than Being, or Beyond Essence,” held at Sapienza University of Rome from May 28 to 31, 2025.
The Idea of Thing and Ethicality of Chuangtzu and Heidegger, from the perspective of Ereignis (Part 1)
Introduction
This essay attempts to discuss the relation between Chuangtzu and Heidegger from the perspective of the “great usefulness of uselessness” and the “thinging (transformation) of things”. But why we chose to carry out the issue from this dimension? In addition to the idea of “great use of worthless tree” from the chapter entitled In the world of Men in Chuangtzu as well as the article written by Heidegger in 1945 entitled Evening Conversation: In a Prisoner of War Camp in Russia, between a Younger and an Older Man, we are also influenced by the articulation of the Thing (Ding) from the Ereignis in the work entitled Heidegger and Christianism: Silent explication (Heideger et le Christianisme : l’explication silencieuse) written by Didier Franck. In addition to connecting the signification of “transformation of things” with Heideggerian interpretation of the “thing” (Ding) summarized by Didier Franck, this essay also attempts to connect Chuangtzu with Heidegger, regarding their discussion of uselessness and their relation between the uselessness and the “thinging (transformation) of the Thing. Accordingly, this essay also intends to respond to the “uprooting” problem of modernity, and thus to bring out the ethicality of Chuangtzu and Heidegger.
I. Idea of Thing from Heidegger and Chuangtzu: The Thing things.
What is a thing? In The Thing (Das Ding) Heidegger said:
But what the vessel of this aspect is as this jug, what and how the jug is as this jug-thing, something we can never learn—let alone think properly—by looking at the outward appearance, the idea. That is why Plato, who conceives of the presence of what is present in terms of the outward appearance, had no more understanding of the nature of the Thing than did Aristotle and all subsequent thinkers. Rather, Plato experienced (decisively, indeed, for the sequel) everything present as an object of making. (Heidegger, 2000:170; Heidegger, 2001:166)
By posing the question like “What is the jug as this jug-thing?”, other than the traditional way since Plato that represents what is present as an object through its outward appearance, Heidegger intends to manifest another way of inquiring about the nature of Thing. With such intention Heidegger also realized:
Because the word Thing as used in occidental metaphysics denotes that which is at all and is something in some way or other, the meaning of the name “thing” varies with the interpretation of that which is — of entities. (Heidegger, 2000:178; Heidegger, 2001:166)
According to Heidegger, trying to explore the Thing outside the Platonic tradition means trying to rethink the Thing beyond the occidental metaphysical tradition. That is to say, in addition to changing the explanation of the beings (the ontology), Heidegger attempts to rethink the meaning of the Thing. In this sense, except that the Aristotelian ontology will be challenged, the tool (being-handy) that is different from the being-on-hand proposed in Being and Time‘s existential-ontological structure, is it just one of the changes of the meaning of the Thing in the metaphysical tradition?1
It is believed that since Plato, occidental philosophy did not reflect on the nature of the thing. We can still find this thinking in modern philosophy after Plato and Aristotle. Descartes treats body as a physical entity under the mind-body dualism. When it is compared to a mechanically controlled and mentally controlled thing, it is not so much a body but more like a corpse. Just as it is difficult for us to simply coincide the body with the combination of various organs in anatomy, the difference between the body and the corpse is self-evident, even though epistemology is still difficult to explain exhaustively. And if we do not think about body in the way of presenting it as an object through its outward appearance, how do we think about the meaning of it by quoting Heideggerian way of asking that what is a jug as a jug-thing? And what exactly is the jug-thing? Let us first look at Didier Franck’s interpretation of the Thing in Heideggerian thoughts:
The jug is jug in and by the offering where the capacity and the emptiness gather, the offering is offering in and through the dwelling-together (séjourner ensemble) of sky and earth, divinities and mortals. All that brings together the altruistic pouring and which is the jug itself is thus gathered in and by the appropriate stay of the fourfold (quadrat). “This simple gathering in multiple form is the essence (l’essence) of the jug” and if, to designate the gathering, the old High German had the word thing, it is then possible to name Ding, thing, the jug is thus understood. “The jug’s presencing is the pure, giving gathering of the onefold fourfold into a single time-space, a single stay. The jug presences as a thing. The jug is the jug as a thing. But how does the thing presence? The thing things. Thinging gathers. Appropriating the fourfold, it gathers the fourfold’s stay, its while, into something that stays for a while: into this thing, that thing.” What, then, is the difference between the Thing and that which presences (le présent), if one is at each time the stay, and the other is lingering awhile (das Je-Weilige)? The Thing receives its way of stay from the dwelling-together (séjourner-ensemble) of fourfold, that is from Ereignis, that which presences (le présent), derives its dwelling character from the unconcealment (l’alètheia) as it comes from the concealment (la lèthè). The stay of the Thing is appropriate to the thing, the stay of that which presences (le présent) and the beings (l’étant), is indebted to the presence (la présence), to Being (l’être).2
The “thinging” (物化流行) stays in the gathering, appropriating and dwelling fourfold as “this thing” or “that thing”, as if the emptiness of the jug is the pure gathering for the dwelling of the fourfold. It is also like the body is as the region (Gegend) and the emerging nature (physis). The living body is full of vitality, as though the emerging nature (physis). As an occurring field, this body or nature appears as an open region (Gegend) that is full and at the same time, empty. Speaking its brimmingness from the occurring nature; and speaking its emptiness from the perspective of letting event occur, this relation between the nature and region reminds us of Huzi whom Chuangtzu has mentioned in the “Competent Emperors and King”. Liezi took Jixian to see Huzi, the first time Huzi appeared to him with the Pattern of Earth, the second time he appeared as Heaven and Earth, the third time appeared as an abyss, the fourth time he came at him empty, wriggling and turning, not knowing anything about “who” or “what”. As both the nature and the region, Huzi is as flexible as the authentic transformation gathered the abyss of Heaven and Earth. Huzi in Chuangtzu, was making the region through manifesting its emptiness by voiding himself and coping the things; was making the emerging nature through manifesting its brimmingness with its flexible transformation.
In the same way, in Didier Franck’s interpretation of Heidegger, the jug symbolizing the dwelling-together of sky and earth, divinities and mortals, manifests as the emptiness in the gathering of this selfless, altruistic fourfold. Emptiness, is the gift/offering of the “thinging” (物化流行). As the gift of the gathering of sky and earth, divinities and mortals, the jug appears itself as the emptiness of the jug. This emptiness manifests the “forgetting the self” and selfless altruism of the fourfold. Their dwelling-together not only opens a region (Gegend) which conserves everything, but also brims over the emptiness with its “thinging”. Instead of Being (ousia), this absent presence designates “there is…” (il y a). With its conceiving and conserving emptiness, the “thinging” is thriving and flourishing. The Thing things. This Thing (Ding), in each stay awhile, gathers the fourfold and stays in something (quelque chose); with its “thinging”, it mobilizes this something, as if the emptiness of the selfless altruistic fourfold makes the jug into a jug. The “thinging” makes a Thing into a Thing because of its selfless emptiness. Therefore, this responds to the western tradition that, to bring out a Thing cannot simply be coincide with Being of an entity or be regarded as visible, unchanging or self-sustaining phenomenon. The thing, which is neither Being nor phenomenon, makes something as an entity, phenomenon, or tool. But it is not ultimate to equalize the Thing with the existence of an entity, a phenomenon, or a tool, as if the void emptiness (of the Thing) makes the jug into a jug. But people interrogate the meaning of the jug from the existence of the entity, the phenomenon, or the tool, and thus ignore the invisible and seemingly useless emptiness, which is, on the contrary, the key to the former interpretation. From this point of view, the “thinging” of the Thing involved with the void emptiness and the invisible uselessness, makes the jug into a jug.
Interpreting the jug from the perspective of the “thinging” concerns with the dwelling of sky and earth, divinities and mortals. This fourfold paradoxically achieves its self-realization while serving altruistically for others, as though the jug achieves itself while serving for others (for holding water). The “thinging” gathers the fourfold in something, each time its dwelling has already opened and manifested the self-realization of something. The Thing obtains its way of stay from the dwelling of the fourfold, that is to say, from the Ereignis itself, liberates something from the limitation of ontology or phenomenology. In this sense, the Thing conceives and conserves this something, as if the emptiness conceives and conserves Being (ousia), also like the invisibility conceives and conserves the visibility.
If we interpret Huzi in “Competent Emperors and King” in view of Didier Franck, we could find that, Huzi in the writings of Chuangtzu also symbolizes the occurrence (Ereignis) itself, just as the jug mentioned by Heidegger. Huzi is authentically selfless, but he would also like to transform into something, and thus appear the differentiation between Heaven and Earth, and the indiscrimination of abyss. Huzi, both as something (quelque chose) and as the Thing (Ding), shows that the interpretation of the Thing in Daoism has already surpassed (dépasser) the traditional context of the Thing such as ontology or phenomenology. Hence he can find out the vitality of thinging from this “something”. From void emptiness (Huzi) we can discern the possibility of transformation, and thus will not be limited by something’s visibility. Therefore, the vitality that invisible thing could transform into visible something could break through the limitation of the traditional thinking of Being, therefore we can experience the principle of mutualistic symbiosis of nothingness (無) and existence (有), and the significance of the Nothingness (“the usefulness of the uselessness”). In this way, the Heideggerian interpretation of “the Thing things” also manifests a unique Taoist atmosphere.
II. The Usefulness of Uselessness, the Nature of Thinging
Benefitting from the relation of the Thing and something involved with the mutual symbiosis of nothingness and existence from Didier Franck’s interpretation of Heidegger, we now would like to interpret Chuangtzu’s following discourse quoted by Heidegger, from Heidegger’s article entitled Evening Conversation: In a Prisoner of War Camp in Russia, between a Younger and an Older Man:
The one said: “You are talking about the uselessness.”
The other said: “A person must first have recognized the uselessness before one can talk with him about the necessary. The earth is wide and large, and yet, in order to stand, the human needs only enough space to be able to put his foot down. But if directly next to his foot a crevice were to open up that dropped down into the underworld, then would the space where he stands still be of use to him?”
The one said: “It would be of no more use to him.”
The other said: “From this the necessity of the uselessness is clearly apparent.” (Heidegger, 1995:239; Heidegger, 2010:156, translation modified)
It will be found that, what makes the usefulness useful is the uselessness, just as the emptiness and nothingness of the Thing conceives and conserves something’s existence (有), the uselessness, as the occurrence (Ereignis) itself accomplishes the usefulness, but uselessness itself is selfless and thus altruistic, concealed and undisclosed. The passage in the citation is Heidegger copied from historiological account of Chinese philosophy during his college. And this touching passage, intriguingly appeared in this article, based on the background of collapse of the Third Reich and the announcement of surrender.3 And does it signify that, even it is concealed and undisclosed, the thinking the uselessness from Chuangtzu, still can conceive and conserve Heideggerian understanding as though the thinging of the Thing?
As a matter of fact, the Chapter entitled In the World of Men also talked about the meaning of the usefulness of uselessness. Carpenter Shi carped and criticized the broad oak tree for being a loose, worthless tree, and therefore it gained its longevity because of its uselessness. Then the oak tree appeared to him in a dream and accused him of comparing it with those good, useful trees whose utility makes life miserable for them. As for the oak tree, it has been trying a long time to be of no use. Moreover, the oak tree pointed out that they are both of them things. What’s the point of things condemning things? The Carpenter himself, is also just a despondent, worthless man about to die. And how does a lifeless man know it is a worthless tree?
In the accusation of the oak tree against Carpenter, we could see the difference between the uselessness of thinging, and the usefulness of the tools. The oak tree accused the Carpenter that the reason why he was using utility for human beings, that is, the tools, as a standard for his criticism, is because the carpenter himself is weak and lifeless. In fact, they are both the things of thinging. Because the Carpenter is weak and lifeless, he comprehends the oak tree as a tool, and therefore cannot see that it is lush and exuberant. The useless broad tree cannot be included in the instrumental sequence, making it invisible for an instrumental genealogy. However, the oak tree therefore gained its longevity in the nature. This story made us find out the characteristic of the Thing from the great use of the useless broad tree, besides the jug-interpretation of Didier Franck. Therefore, we can now comprehend the Russian forest mentioned in the article Evening Conversation: In a Prisoner of War Camp in Russia, between a Younger and an Older Man, from the point de view of the thinging of Thing.
Older Man: The healing expanse is not that of the forest, but rather, the forest’s own expanse is let into (eingelassen) what heals.
Younger Man: But the forest does not become a mere symbol of the healing expanse; it is probably also something other than what merely occasions its appearing, although the enigma of the occasioning which allows for something to happen (Veranlassung) does indeed give enough to be thought, so as to keep us from all too rashly explaining such experiences in terms of what is commonplace. Indeed, I cannot say what was experienced otherwise than in view of what the forest occasioned. (Heidegger, 1995:239; Heidegger, 2010:133)
The forest mentioned above is not a phenomenon (the forest does not become a simple sensory image of this healing expanse). In addition to the initiator of this healing expanse, the forest can be something else. This forest described in this passage, is just like the Thing which Didier Franck has mentioned, each time it stays awhile, it gathers the dwelling of the fourfold into something in this thing, in that thing. The forest of the thinging initiates the occurrence (Ereignis) itself, that is, the healing expanse. And the latter is simultaneously conceiving and conserving the forest regarded as a phenomenon or something. And when Heidegger indicates that he cannot say what was experienced otherwise than in view of what the forest occasioned, that is, in view of Ereignis itself to say what was experienced. From this dimension of interpretation that he offered us, the possibility of interpreting the experience from the nature as Ereignis itself. As Didier Franck puts it:
“…The talk of ‘being’ drives representation from one perplexity to another, without the source of such being at a loss becoming manifest.” And a little further, always thinking from Ereignis without naming it ever, Heidegger will propose the abandonment of the word “Being” because it “isolates and separates”.4
Heidegger put forward the verbalization of the noun “Being”. By means of the thrownness of Dasein, this mode of existence broke through the subjective Cogito with the ability of representation in Kantian philosophy. Although the relation between Being (être) and the world, has overcome the rootless representational world constructed by Cogito, it also at the same time makes subjective ability of appearance obscured. Being no longer has the possibility of self-emergence as if a dead creature stripped off the occurrence (Ereignis) itself. Unlike the things that are nourished by the thinging, Being seems to be isolated and separate like a dead object. From this perspective, the seemingly useless broad tree avoids the fate of “being” as a tool, and therefore maintains the possibility of causing the healing expanse of Ereignis itself. It opens up a region allowing the natural occurrence. The dwelling of this selfless, altruistic fourfold realizes a seemingly empty brimmingness, it is the gift/offering of the thinging. It allows the occurrence (Ereignis), it allows things to return to their occurrence (Ereignis) itself, back to the conservation and preservation of the thinging. This useless nature that may not be regarded in the instrumental sequence, conserves and heals the isolated and separate Being with its endless vitality. Just like what Heidegger has understood:
We are those who wait when we let things return to themselves. Out of such a return to themselves, they bring their own presence [Gegenwart] from themselves toward [entgegen] us; so in advance they fill out the emptiness that seems to gape around us when we wait on the pure coming, and do not just now and then await something that comes. (Heidegger, 1995:228; Heidegger, 2010:149)
If we let things return to themselves, that is to let things return to the thinging. In this state, we will not encounter any objective things, but the things which return to Ereignis itself bring the nature toward us, so that we will be emplaced in the thriving and void brimmingness, in the prosperous and invisible fulfillment. In this sense, the thinging appears itself as “the pure coming”, hence the relation between the things and “I” will be different from awaiting something that comes. The pure coming manifests as care for the thinging, that is the care for the things returning back to its proper state, that is, the awaiting nature that was left behind in the attention to Being.