We Need More of Trump’s Unprecedented Diplomacy

Is the Muslim Brotherhood from Qatar and Türkiye Going to Take Over Gaza?

Many Israelis are fearful that the multinational stabilization force for Gaza will be formed mainly of military personnel from Türkiye and Qatar. The mouthpieces of the Netanyahu government are already screaming that the Turkish and Qatari supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood will keep Hamas in power in Gaza through the American-planned stabilization force in Gaza. While it is true that the United States utilized the close relations of President Trump with Qatar and Türkiye and their close relations with Hamas in order to leverage pressure on Hamas to agree to the 20-point Trump plan and the agreement to end the war and to return all of the hostages, the United States has no intention to allow Hamas to continue to control Gaza and to regain its military strength.

First of all, it is entirely not clear that Turkish and Qatari troops will be part of the multinational stabilization force for Gaza. That is yet to be decided. But even if they are, they will be among many other troops from many other nations, including those in the region (Arab countries), from Asia, and hopefully from Europe as well.  The creation of the multinational mechanism in the end of the war agreement made up of Egypt, Qatar, and Türkiye was done to ensure the maximal return the hostages. This mechanism was created to ensure that Hamas continues to make 100% effort to find and to return the deceased hostages and to provide technical support in that effort.  It has been reported that Israel has limited and prevented the entrance of Egyptian, Qatari, and Turkish personnel and machinery into Gaza. If this has not been resolved, it must be resolved, because those personnel and machinery are part of the process to locate and to return deceased hostages.

Israel claims that it has the most technologically advanced team and machinery to find bodies in a war zone.  If that is the case, Israel should be using them in the 53% of Gaza which is under the full military control and occupation of the IDF. Perhaps that is being done, and if not, it must be done. One of the objective limitations on Hamas in locating deceased hostages is that Hamas only has access to less than half of the Gaza Strip. Other limitations include the reality that thousands of Gazans may be buried underneath the rubble of buildings bombed by Israel. There is good reason to believe that Israeli hostages may also be underneath the rubble as well. Many of the Hamas commanders who were in charge of the burial of deceased hostages were killed by Israel and most Hamas commanders did not have this information.

Unprecedented Trumpian Diplomacy

In the process of reaching the end of war deal, following the failed Israeli attack on the Hamas leadership in Doha, not only did President Trump force Netanyahu to apologize to the Qatari Prime Minister, on the phone, on camera, the United States also signed a mutual defense treaty with Qatar.  This is unprecedented in US foreign policy. President Trump, Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner enjoyed very close relations with the Qataris even before the negotiations between Israel and Hamas went into high gear under Trump. Those relations became even closer after Trump needed to disassociate himself from Israel’s bombing in Doha. The mutual defense treaty between the US and Qatar is not the only unprecedented US policy shift that has taken place. Kushner and Witkoff admitted on the US TV program 60 Minutes that they met directly, face-to-face with the Hamas chief Khalil al Haya. These two US businessmen/diplomats understand the essential element of the personal touch when making difficult deals. It was that face-to-face contact that ensured that Hamas said yes to the deal.

Witkoff had arrived to the decision to make personal contact before the Doha attack. We were working on organizing a meeting between Witkoff and the Hamas negotiators in Istanbul to agree to the 8-point document that was worked out by Ghazi Hamad and myself with the direct input of Witkoff in the end of the first week of September. Witkoff proposed that the Hamas leadership come to Istanbul to meet with him and to sign the eight-point document. Witkoff had received the greenlight from the President to meet directly with the Hamas negotiating team. That meeting didn’t happen and shortly afterwards, on September 9, Israel attacked the Hamas leadership in Doha.

Also in the context of unprecedented diplomacy under President Trump, on October 9 at 2:00 in the morning the delegates from Qatar, Egypt, Türkiye, Hamas, and Israel signed the document “Implementation Steps for President Trump’s proposal for a Comprehensive End of the Gaza War”. What was unprecedented is that the four member Hamas negotiating team sat in the same room across from the Israeli negotiating team.  This has never happened before. In my 18 years of contacts with Hamas I proposed many times to the Israeli officials that I dealt with to speak to Hamas directly, instead of going through me or through the Egyptians or others. No one ever agreed. There were even situations when I sat with the Israeli team in the Ministry of Defense headquarters in Tel Aviv and in the presence of Israel officials, I was asked to call Hamas and speak with them. I did this also from the offices of several ministers in Israel’s past governments.  For President Trump there are no diplomatic red lines if crossing them helps to reach a deal.

Türkiye and Israel

Going back to the multinational stabilization force, I would like to propose to President Trump that he uses his personal relationship with Turkish President Erdogan and his leverage on Türkiye to reach a deal I which in exchange for Turkish involvement in the stabilization force and in the reconstruction of Gaza, Türkiye should be required to reconcile with the State of Israel – including the renewal of full diplomatic relations, the re-instatement of flights between Tel Aviv and Istanbul for both Israeli and Turkish carriers, the return to two-way commerce between both countries and the renewal of military-intelligence cooperation between the two militaries. Türkiye must also be required to agree that it will take no part in trying to re-establish Hamas’s control of Gaza or support Hamas or any other group in the Palestinian territories, including Gaza to threaten Israel in any way.

Ending the War Should Also Mean Ending the Economic Blockade on Gaza

According to the agreement to end the war, the Rafah crossing was supposed to open today for the movement of people in both directions. Israel has prevented that which is a substantive breach of the agreement.  The agreement to open the crossing should have been similar to what was agreed to in 2005 with a more robust European inspection mechanism on the Gaza side of the crossing.  The following is what was agreed to in 2005 and worked until 2007.

The Agreement on Movement and Access (AMA) was an agreement between Israel and the Palestinian Authority (PA) signed on 15 November 2005 aimed at improving Palestinian freedom of movement and economic activity within the Palestinian territories, and open the Rafah Crossing on the Gaza–Egypt border. AMA was described as “an agreement on facilitating the movement of people and goods within the Palestinian Territories and on opening an international crossing on the Gaza-Egypt border that will put the Palestinians in control of the entry and exit of people.” Part of the agreement was the Agreed Principles for Rafah Crossing.  According this agreement the Rafah Crossing was to be operated by the Palestinian Authority on its side, and Egypt on its side. Only people with Palestinian ID, or foreign nationals, by exception, in certain categories, subject to Israeli oversight, were to be permitted to cross in and out. The PA should notify the Israeli authorities 48 hours in advance of the crossing of a person in the excepted categories.

Rafah was supposed to be used for export of goods from Gaza to Egypt, subject to rigid control. Imports were cleared by PA customs officials at Kerem Shalom under the supervision of Israeli customs agents.

Now, we need to return to this agreement with several important amendments. The Rafah crossing must be used for people and goods in both directions. The Egyptians should treat the Palestinians crossing from Gaza into Egypt in the same way that Egypt treats all foreign nations wishing to enter Egypt. The goods crossing into Gaza from Egypt must go through a robust EU based inspection preventing smuggling of weapons and materials for producing weapons. The EU should treat this crossing as if it was an entry gate into Europe.  There is no reason why goods going into Gaza or exiting Gaza should be under the discretion of the State of Israel. With the end of the war in Gaza, it is essential that the economic blockade on Gaza come to an end – if not, we will return to fighting in the future.

The Mandate for the Multinational Stabilization Force

Last, in order for the Trump Administration to create the multinational stabilization force there is a need for a UN Security Council Resolution and a UNSC mandate for the force. This is the demand of many countries willing to send personnel to the force.  The force established could be a UN Blue Helmet Force, which is generally military, police, and civilian staff provided by UN member states and are deployed on peacekeeping missions to help countries transition from conflict to peace. Their core purpose of a UN Blue Helmet Force is to support political solutions, protect civilians, and help establish conditions for a sustainable peace. But, Israel is likely to oppose a Blue Helmet Force.

Another solution could be a UN mandated multi-national force similar to the Multinational force in Sinai created after the Israeli Egypt peace agreement. The multinational force in the Sinai is a non-UN peacekeeping organization established in 1981 to oversee the terms of the 1979 peace treaty between Egypt and Israel. Its mission is to supervise the security provisions of the treaty, monitor compliance, and ensure freedom of navigation through the Straits of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba. The force is made up of military personnel from various countries and has a civilian and military presence in the Sinai Peninsula. The MFO is funded by Egypt, Israel, and the United States, along with financial contributions from other donor countries. The MFO is headed by a Director-General and a Force Commander, who is often from a non-U.S. contributing country. The Director-General is almost always from the United States. The U.S. Army colonel in charge of the American contingent also serves as the MFO’s Chief of Staff, a key leadership position. The U.S. provides the single largest military contingent to the MFO, including an infantry battalion and logistics support. This exact model does not have to be copied and pasted for the Multinational Stabilization Force in Gaza but it does need a direct US leadership role – both to create confidence for the Israeli side, but also to ensure that all of the participating countries fulfill all of their responsibilities, especially when and if the situation begins to deteriorate.