What Arab leaders must say out loud for their Gaza plan to work

Last week, after initially dismissing the Arab League’s plan for Gaza as “delusional,” Steve Witkoff, the US Special Envoy, reversed position. Praising it as “a good faith first step,” he invited “more discussion about it.” Predictable Israeli rejection, initially sporting US backing, remains firm, as Jerusalem sticks with the Trump “Gaza Riviera” though Washington has already moved on.

It seems that in seeking a broad consensus among the 22 League members, elements critical for a US engagement – let alone endorsement – were diluted to the point of obscurity, particularly those related to post-war security. But if Arab leaders wish to enlist US support and encourage the administration to stand up to the extremists dictating the Israeli position, they must demonstrate that the Netanyahu government’s rationale for rejecting has more to do with internal politics than security.

While the Arab plan deals extensively with civil matters of Gaza governance and demonstrates how rehabilitation does not require cleansing the Strip of its population, it falls short in spelling out how it addresses Israel’s legitimate security concerns. Israel requires assurances that Hamas will not control the population, possess weapons, or potentially resurge as a military threat.

To its authors, the Arab plan and joint communique imply all of this. They consider the very absence of Hamas from the communique’s 22 clauses as a clear signal. Others, however, would need an Enigma Code Breaker to decipher intentions. It is time for those leading the Arab effort to come clean without mincing words: The resolve to deprive Hamas of any involvement in future governance must be made explicit.

Likewise, the plan’s assigning the Palestinian Authority exclusive responsibility for Gaza is no substitute for making clear that Gaza’s future excludes any armed militia. A straightforward commitment to disarm Hamas and all other terror organizations is essential. True, Arab leaders expect to overcome resistance to disarmament only gradually and over time. Nonetheless, it is incumbent upon them to make that commitment firm and spell out benchmarks for its attainment.

The last and possibly most glaring omission relates to the role of Arab countries. Several Arab leaders have informed Washington that they are prepared to shoulder responsibility for Gaza security, including “boots on the ground.” Neither this intent nor their requirements for undertaking that responsibility are found in the Arab League documents. In discussions with the US and with others, Arab officials spelled out those conditions. They include the obvious prerequisite of ending the war while coordinating with Israel the phasing out of IDF presence while phasing in the Arab force. They involve ensuing modes of operations, including deconfliction mechanisms, real-time communication, protocols for dealing with rogue breaches of the ceasefire, and other security measures. 

To avoid the appearance of occupying Gaza, they insisted on implementing their operation only at the invitation of the Palestinian Authority and making clear that their engagement is temporary, until the PA undergoes reforms and new recruits augment its security agencies. Finally, to reduce prospects of their – and others’ – investment in Gaza reconstruction going up in the flames of another war, they offered to contribute to an eventual resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. 

With the exception of the UAE, Arab leaders have conveyed these commitments tentatively and privately. Making their position firm and public could accomplish two objectives. First, it would provide President Trump with a reason to engage on an issue that frustrated his predecessors. By spelling out their resolve to undertake much of the heavy lifting, they would deliver a game-changer not available to previous presidents (with the exception of George H. W. Bush, whose formidable Secretary of State, James Baker, secured Arab support for the Madrid Process well over three decades ago).

Second, a serious attempt to address Israel’s legitimate security concerns could expose its hardline government’s rejectionist and expansionist policy for what it is, a cover for its concealed annexationist ambition. This, in turn, might energize domestic opposition to its policy as it invigorates American efforts to change it.

Should Arab leaders heed the Trump challenge to rise to the occasion, and should Washington reciprocate with a sustained engagement, they can jointly turn the corner on the Gaza crisis. They can prevent Israel from ending the ceasefire, accelerate the return of the hostages, ease the pain of the Gaza population, and usher in reconstruction while contributing to regional stability. The door will thus reopen on Trump’s ambition to bring about Saudi-Israeli normalization and Israel’s integration into a regional security structure serving to check Iran’s violent meddling.