What Do the Palestinians Really Want?

The slogan “Two States for Two Peoples” symbolizes a policy perceived as fair, shared by both conflicting factions who insist on adhering to it. According to polls, the majority of Israelis support the two-state solution, a solution also accepted by the Palestinian Authority, the Arab League, and nearly all countries worldwide. Only Hamas and Hezbollah oppose it. Three Prime Ministers have attempted to promote this diplomatic agreement: Ehud Barak in 2000, Ehud Olmert in 2008, and Benjamin Netanyahu in 2009, but without success. No agreement has been reached due to the preconditions set by both sides: on the Palestinian side, the freezing of settlements, the right of return, and the dismantling of settlements; on the Israeli side, the recognition of Israel by the Palestinians as a Jewish state.

Both parties often engage in diplomatic talks with mediators present, without truly believing in their usefulness. In reality, Israelis and Palestinians are not at all interested in the two-state solution. Israel will continue to build settlements and believes that time is still on its side, thinking that reaching an agreement is unnecessary. Moreover, Israelis live in fear that Arabs want to destroy them. They are ready to retreat behind concrete walls and electrified fences, enclosing themselves in a Jewish ghetto, thus preserving the nation from foreign influences. Some express their opinions more harshly: “Give them a state and let them perish, as long as we don’t have to see them anymore.”

On the other hand, the liberal left shows signs of concern and despair. Many seek foreign citizenship “for the future of our children.” Some are plunged into an almost psychotic pessimism that hinders their ability to face reality and pushes them to flee before disaster strikes. They openly state that Israel’s very existence is in doubt and that, in fact, its existence was only a fleeting adventure. These alarming observations are characteristic of an intellectual bourgeoisie with the means to integrate into developed countries. They justify their decisions by pointing to the political and moral decline of the ruling class, its corruption, and its desire to dominate another people.

It is this atmosphere, in my opinion, that has spawned a kind of “plebeian revolt.” The disadvantaged classes, for whom the option of leaving Israel for new countries is not feasible, feel betrayed by the elites. At the same time, opportunistic politicians have cynically exploited this phenomenon and mobilized it to strengthen their power. They have reinforced the dangerous dichotomy between Mizrahim (Eastern Jews) and Ashkenazim and imposed it as a defining factor in political and social discourse. Today, the media is so saturated with identity politics that it is impossible to escape. Everything is perceived through the lens of ethnicity. We are all defined by our ethnic origin rather than our positions, ideas, or actions.

The plebeians have reacted in their own way. Their social marginalization has bred a hateful nationalism toward the elites. These plebeians have developed an aggressiveness toward culture and knowledge. They often fall into mysticism, irrational beliefs, and conspiracy theories. Discouraged, the intellectual elite feels cut off from the people who “stole the country from us.” The phenomenon of those always ready to pack up and leave emerges after every political disappointment: “If this is what the people want, I have no place in this country.” The term “hamutzim” (the bitter ones) is often used by the right to describe this group. The populism in power has led some elites to think: “We should never have brought them here,” referring, of course, to the “Easterners.” This is how the intellectual elite has lost its credibility.

Beyond diplomatic contacts in politics, it becomes crucial to ask: What do the Palestinians really want? To answer this, we can refer to the statements of the Prime Minister of the Palestinian Authority, Abu Ala (Ahmad Qurei), during an informal conversation with Ehud Dekel, director of the Institute for National Security Studies, who has participated in numerous mediations during peace talks with the Palestinians. Dekel, questioned by his interviewer, the YouTuber Alex Tseitlin (“Let’s Visit the Professors”), about the Palestinians’ desires beyond their official positions, reported Abu Ala’s words with great precision, as they shared coffee in a relaxed atmosphere: “Everything is fine. We are here. We are not going anywhere. We are all in favor of one state. Demography is a fait accompli. In one state, we have a nuclear power plant in Dimona. We have a state specialized in advanced technologies. We have desalinated seawater. We have the most powerful army in the Middle East. Why should we rebuild everything? You want one state? You are welcome. We prefer one state.” Dekel, shocked by the Palestinian sincerity in considering Israel as their own state, was left speechless. He understood that this was the Palestinians’ desire and even regretted that some Israelis shared it. Faced with this integrationist approach, the Israeli diplomat retreated into the conventional narrative: Israel must remain a Jewish and democratic state, based solely on Jewish ethnic identity. Any other solution is dangerous and undermines Zionist ideology.

Abu Ala’s viewpoint is not unusual. During my discussions with Palestinian intellectuals, I was struck by their resolute willingness to integrate naturally into Israeli society. With Alex Tseitlin, we addressed delicate questions: What do Israeli Arabs think about their potential recruitment into the army and the opening of Hebrew schools in their communities? Most of our interlocutors were torn between the desire to identify as Israelis and their commitment to the hypothetical Arab consensus they are expected to adhere to.

Since its creation, Israel has refrained from recruiting Arabs into the army, claiming it did not want to force them to fight their brothers in neighboring Arab countries. However, in September 1954, Defense Minister Pinhas Lavon, contrary to Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion, decided to issue a decree aimed at recruiting minorities into the army to free them from the feeling of apartheid and grant them the same rights and duties as other citizens. This order was very well received by young Arabs who rushed to register in their localities to be incorporated by recruitment offices. The authorities, alarmed by the considerable number of applications, quickly closed these offices.

Today, the issue of universal military service and the recruitment of Orthodox Jews and Arabs into the army has lost its importance. Israel’s security, in my opinion, depends less and less on uniformed soldiers and more on highly skilled professionals in advanced fields of knowledge. After September 7, 2013, barbed-wire camps, tanks, and planes no longer strengthen our security. The scientific, educational, and moral level of young Israelis is the guarantee of our security. The nature of the education the state provides to all its citizens in the era of knowledge democratization will determine our future in the face of sophisticated terrorism threatening the world. Is it desirable for the state to prevent some of its citizens from training for professions that would allow them to achieve their ambitions? Is it desirable for the state to prevent some of its citizens from studying in the dominant language that would allow them to access high-level positions? This is not about imposing Hebrew on Israeli Arabs but rather not depriving them of an education system in Hebrew that would enable social mobility. Many would prefer Hebrew to a language that limits their professional opportunities. In fact, Palestinians admire Israel, a reality that Israelis have not yet fully grasped. Israeli intelligence agents often testify that women from the bourgeoisie in Ramallah ask their husbands to buy only products with Hebrew labels.

The bloody events in Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Algeria, and Tunisia have shaken Arab nationalism. When a Palestinian was warned that he risked living in an “apartheid state” in a citizen state, he replied: “I prefer to be a second-class Israeli citizen rather than live in a corrupt and underdeveloped state.” Admiration for Israel has long been felt in countries like Morocco and is increasingly evident in other Arab countries. From this perspective, Israeli leaders could have reached an agreement with Iraq, the most developed and secular country in the region, before it was devastated by the Americans.

Israeli Arabs have evolved significantly. If cinema reflects a certain reality, a shift in trends can be observed among the younger Arab generation, as evidenced by the works of Israeli Arab filmmakers. Their films primarily express the aspiration for a better life. They address topics such as sexual identity or the creation of music groups, and there is less focus on nostalgic symbols of the past, such as the village olive tree, the key to the abandoned house, or the image of the oppressive Israeli soldier. However, these same Arab filmmakers, whose films are funded by the Israeli government, are forced to present themselves as Palestinians at international festivals, as this is what is expected of them and is politically correct. The poet Mohammed Hamza Ghanayem from Baqa al-Gharbiya once confided to me that in Tel Aviv, he felt “like a suspicious object.” Yet, he prefers to live in this city rather than in his hometown.

It is necessary to consider our future in this world and in Israel in particular through a long-term historical perspective. In ancient times, great empires such as Assyria, Babylon, Persia, Greece, Rome, Byzantium, and the Arab empires were composed of citizens regardless of origin. Today, national borders are gradually fading due to economic, ecological, and especially cyber globalization. Thanks to the democratization of knowledge and the communication revolution, we live in the best of worlds compared to the past. The world’s population lives in states that are increasingly consolidating based on citizenship, without distinction of ethnic or religious origin. The five major powers of our world are, in fact, supranational entities such as GAFAMI (Google, Apple, Facebook, Amazon, Microsoft, Twitter, Instagram, and Intel) or NATU (Netflix, Airbnb, Tesla, Uber), which operate beyond territorial borders and easily cross national and religious barriers.

No country in the world is composed exclusively of a single ethnic origin. Today, all developed countries are, in fact, countries of immigration. The greatest adventure Europe experienced in the 20th century is the result of ethnic mixing and the contribution of Arab, Chinese, Indian, and Afghan immigrants to the development of these countries. Israel’s ethnocentric policy stems mainly from the fear of being invaded by “Eastern culture,” that is, the fear that an Arab minority will impose a subculture and Islamic Sharia law on us. These apprehensions are not rational. Palestinians, as described by Abu Ala, prefer to become Israelis not to impose Islam on us but to adopt the achievements of Israeli culture and progress. Is there a case in the world where the masses have successfully imposed an inferior culture on a country’s cultural elite? Elites are the main drivers of evolution in the world. Will Israel survive as an ethnically homogeneous state based on a single religion? The barriers separating us are destined to fall. Will Arabs help dispel the false ideas prevalent in Israeli society? Will they free Israeli society from ethno-religious apartheid?