Ed Gaskin

What Would a Truly Free Market Require?

CETERIS PARIBUS NEVER APPLIED — PART VII

A market-based case for repair after market distortion

Two families walk into a bank under the same lending rules. One has spent years saving for a down payment. The other can draw on equity in a home the parents bought a generation earlier. Both families can now apply on fair terms. But if the first family’s parents were shut out of the mortgage market by discriminatory rules, the difference between the two down payments has a history that today’s loan application cannot show.

That is where the previous essay left us. Ending a discriminatory rule changes the terms of the next transaction. It leaves families with the assets they accumulated under the old rules. A serious defense of free markets must ask what to do when those earlier rules still shape who can buy, borrow, invest, or compete.

A commitment to property rights already gives us a way into that question. When someone is wrongfully deprived of property, we ask what was taken, who was responsible, and what would put matters right. The same questions apply when government helped deny qualified families access to a market or stood by while owners lost property to coercion. The answers become harder when the original owners have died, records are incomplete, or an injury affected an entire neighborhood. Those difficulties make it more important to say precisely what a remedy is meant to accomplish.

Consider mortgage lending. Federal Housing Administration underwriting helped institutionalize racial exclusion from federally insured credit. Research on the separate redlining maps drawn by the Home Owners’ Loan Corporation has found lasting effects on homeownership and property values. The history identifies ways public policy could shape who acquired housing and what that housing was worth. A proposal for repair must go a step further and show which effects it can address today.¹ ²

Start with a basic distinction. If a lender discriminates today, enforce fair-lending rules and provide a remedy for those harmed. If records establish that officials wrongfully took a particular property, ask whether the property can be returned or whether compensation is warranted. That inquiry turns on the loss, the responsible institution, and the evidence connecting a claimant to the property. Compensation can be justified by the loss itself. The recipient should have the freedom to decide how to use it.

Now suppose the records clearly document exclusion across a neighborhood, while few surviving files identify individual borrowers who were turned away. A community-wide response would require a different showing. Are households that could sustain the monthly cost of ownership being kept out because they lack money for a down payment or closing costs? What do local lending records and the experiences of prospective buyers show? If the binding constraint is a shortage of homes at prices those households can afford, a down-payment grant may do little on its own. If the upfront cost is what keeps otherwise qualified households from buying, targeted assistance has a clearer purpose.

Eligibility should follow that purpose. A program aimed at a documented neighborhood-wide barrier could define whom it serves using evidence about the area affected, household resources, and the upfront costs applicants face. It should explain why those criteria reach people experiencing the barrier. A household might qualify for that assistance without proving that a grandparent was denied a mortgage. A claim for compensation for a particular family’s loss would depend on a different kind of evidence.

The program should also say in advance what success looks like. Counting grants or closings tells us how much assistance went out and how many purchases followed. The economic question is whether the assistance helped households buy homes they could afford to keep and build equity in. An evaluation should examine how many buyers would likely have purchased anyway, whether participants remain owners several years later, and whether their equity grows after accounting for mortgage debt. If households are getting to closing and then struggling to stay, the program needs to change. If the barrier it was designed to address recedes, there should be a clear point at which to review whether the program is still needed.

That is what it means for a remedy to follow the mechanism of harm. A farmer who lost land, an entrepreneur whose credit application was deliberately delayed, and a homebuyer who lacks a down payment present different facts. The institution responsible will sometimes be clear. In other cases, the evidence may support action on a continuing barrier while leaving the value of an individual historical loss uncertain. The remedy should be as specific as the evidence allows, and the institution administering it should be accountable for the result.

The stakes reach beyond the households directly affected. When a qualified buyer cannot acquire a home, an entrepreneur cannot finance a viable firm, or an owner cannot rely on public institutions to protect property, the loss changes what others can do as well. Workers lose potential employers. Suppliers lose potential customers. Families lose assets they might have put to work again. Fair competition matters in part because none of us knows in advance what people will build when they have a genuine chance to try.

This series began with familiar advice. Work hard. Save. Acquire property. Start businesses. Pass something on. Black Americans acted on that advice. Whether they could keep and pass on what they built depended partly on the rules under which they acquired it and on the institutions charged with protecting it.

All else was never equal. A commitment to free markets requires fair rules today and credible remedies where evidence shows that earlier violations still restrict opportunity. The same respect for property and competition that makes the original injury wrong should guide the response.

Endnotes

  1. Federal Reserve History, “Redlining,” June 2, 2023. The essay documents the Federal Housing Administration’s role in institutionalizing racially discriminatory mortgage underwriting. Federal Reserve History. www.federalreservehistory.org
  2. Daniel Aaronson, Daniel Hartley, and Bhashkar Mazumder, “The Effects of the 1930s HOLC ‘Redlining’ Maps,” American Economic Journal: Economic Policy 13, no. 4 (2021), 355–392. Journal article. www.aeaweb.org
About the Author
Ed Gaskin attends Temple Beth Elohim in Wellesley, Massachusetts and Roxbury Presbyterian Church in Roxbury, Mass. He has co-taught a course with professor Dean Borman called, “Christianity and the Problem of Racism” to Evangelicals (think Trump followers) for over 25 years. Ed has an M. Div. degree from Gordon-Conwell Theological Seminary and graduated as a Martin Trust Fellow from MIT’s Sloan School of Management. He has published several books on a range of topics and was a co-organizer of the first faith-based initiative on reducing gang violence at the National Press Club in Washington DC. In addition to leading a non-profit in one of the poorest communities in Boston, and serving on several non-profit advisory boards, Ed’s current focus is reducing the incidence of diet-related disease by developing food with little salt, fat or sugar and none of the top eight allergens. He does this as the founder of Sunday Celebrations, a consumer-packaged goods business that makes “Good for You” gourmet food.
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