When Black and White Workers Found Common Cause
Ceteris Paribus Never Applied to Black Economic Development
What the 1892 New Orleans general strike reveals about the economics of racial division
A companion essay to Ceteris Paribus Never Applied
In the fall of 1892, the New Orleans Board of Trade offered to settle with two unions and leave a third out. It would deal with the white scalesmen and packers. It refused to bargain with the teamsters, whose ranks included Black workers. The white unions could have taken the offer and returned to work. Instead, they stood with the teamsters. A dispute among three trades became a general strike.¹ U.S. Department of Labor
The three trades did different jobs in the same port economy. Scalesmen weighed freight, packers prepared cotton for shipment, and teamsters hauled goods. A merchant could make arrangements to replace workers in one trade and still have trouble moving a shipment if the other trades stayed out. The Board of Trade’s offer gave two unions a reason to resume work and would have left the third to bargain with less leverage. It also put a question to the white unions. If they accepted a separate deal today, what could they expect from the teamsters the next time their own wages or hours were at stake?
How workers learned to share the work
Black workers had helped build the organizations that made a joint response possible. On the waterfront, they formed unions of their own that gave them a way to defend their jobs against exclusion by white workers as well as pressure from employers. By organizing enough workers to bargain collectively, Black unions gave white unions a practical reason to reach agreements with them. Each side had members who could do the work, and employers could use competition between them to push down wages. A promise to honor the same rate would be easier to keep if each group had a dependable share of the jobs.² govinfo.gov
Some waterfront unions worked out arrangements known as half-and-half, under which Black and white workers sought equal wages and equal shares of available work. In 1886, the Cotton Men’s Executive Council backed a successful strike to enforce an equal division in hiring. The rules varied by trade. White cotton screwmen, the skilled workers who packed bales tightly into ships’ holds, restricted how many Black crews could work each day. Both arrangements governed access to jobs, and their different terms show why the details mattered. An equal share gave Black workers a claim to the work as it became available. A ceiling on Black crews reserved an advantage for white workers.² small-resistance.tulane.edu
The Triple Alliance of 1892 was a separate coalition with its own demands. The earlier waterfront agreements help explain what workers needed from any such alliance. A man who gave up several days’ pay to honor a strike needed some assurance that his allies would stand with him when the dispute ended and employers began hiring again. From the employer’s side, the ability to choose among competing crews gave management room to reward one group or seek a lower rate. Agreements over the distribution of work could limit that discretion. For Black workers, who faced organized exclusion in parts of the port, a dependable share of the work was itself an economic gain.
The price of a separate deal
W. E. B. Du Bois later described the public and psychological wage that even poorly paid white workers received. It included the deference white people could expect in public and the advantages they enjoyed in public institutions. In New Orleans, the Board of Trade gave racial preference an immediate value at the bargaining table. The white scalesmen and packers had a chance to end their loss of pay on terms unavailable to the teamsters. Du Bois’s account helps explain the value of the option the Board put before them, even though the offer alone tells us little about how individual workers weighed it.¹ ³ U.S. Department of Labor
Taking the offer would have meant giving up something the white unions had helped build. Their own ability to win a future dispute depended in part on whether workers in other trades would honor a walkout. The scalesmen and packers had reason to doubt that the teamsters would take that risk again if they were abandoned. By staying out, the white unions preserved their claim on the teamsters’ support in a future dispute. That decision carried a present cost in forgone pay, and the protection it offered depended on whether the unions could keep working together.
James E. Porter, a Black longshoreman, served on the board of the Workingmen’s Amalgamated Council, which coordinated the wider strike. When a newspaper portrayed him as calling for violence, he publicly repudiated the allegation. Porter’s response shows what Black leadership required during the dispute. He had to help hold a labor coalition together while defending his own conduct in a press environment where allegations against Black organizers could make it easier to portray a dispute over working conditions as a threat to public order. The Board of Trade appealed to Governor Murphy Foster for militia intervention as the walkout spread.⁴ knowledge.uchicago.edu
The council called a citywide strike in November. The walkout disrupted streetcar service and deliveries, bringing the effects of the dispute to residents and businesses far from the docks. That reach was possible because workers in other trades were willing to stop work over terms that directly concerned the Triple Alliance. The same decision was being made on a wider scale. Workers elsewhere in the city were giving up wages to defend the coalition’s capacity to bargain.¹ U.S. Department of Labor
Who would get hired when work resumed?
On November 12, the Board of Trade agreed to a ten-hour day, overtime pay, and adjusted wage scales. Employers retained the open shop, leaving them free to hire workers without requiring union membership and to deal with them individually. Tulane’s account of the strike records that employers subsequently blacklisted strike leaders and activists. The distinction mattered immediately. A shorter day changed the terms for a worker called back to the job. An organizer kept off the payroll could lose more in missed work than a revised wage scale could deliver.¹ |
The strike also had a legal afterlife. In March 1893, a federal court granted an injunction under the Sherman Antitrust Act even though the strike had ended and work had resumed. The federal government had challenged the coordinated interruption of interstate and foreign commerce. The unions had gained leverage by stopping work across trades. The injunction showed that organizing on that scale could also expose them to federal intervention.⁵ law.resource.org
The depression that followed the Panic of 1893 put the waterfront agreements under further pressure. As work grew scarce, white workers attacked Black dockworkers in 1894 and 1895. A National Park Service labor history traces the breakdown of the waterfront alliance alongside falling wages and the loss of union work rules. Black workers bore the direct cost of the attacks and exclusion. White workers who sought a greater share of the available jobs also weakened the coalition that had helped them bargain over the terms of those jobs. Waterfront unions rebuilt interracial cooperation after the turn of the century, eventually extending equal work sharing to cotton screwmen. They had to negotiate those rules again.² govinfo.gov
Part IV of Ceteris Paribus Never Applied asked what political power enabled Black communities to protect. New Orleans shows how Black workers built some of the power they needed to protect a livelihood. A wage schedule tells us what a worker was supposed to be paid for a day’s work. To understand what that worker could earn over a season, we also need to know how often he was called, whether he could keep working after speaking up, and whether other workers could help enforce the terms. Those conditions were shaped by the hiring arrangements, the unions’ ability to bargain, and the employers’ power to exclude. They could change even while the posted wage stayed the same.
Common interests gave workers a reason to bargain together. The test came when some were offered a deal they could take alone.
Endnotes
- David Montgomery, “Labor in the Industrial Era,” U.S. Department of Labor, on the employers’ offer and the response. Tulane University’s General Strike 1892 exhibition panel covers the walkout, the November settlement, and the blacklisting. U.S. Department of Labor · Tulane exhibition panel
- National Park Service, Labor History in the United States: A National Historic Landmarks Theme Study, pp. 229–231, on independent Black unions, variations in work sharing, the violence of 1894–95, and the later Dock and Cotton Council. Tulane’s exhibition panel documents the 1886 enforcement strike. National Park Service study · Tulane exhibition panel
- W. E. B. Du Bois, Black Reconstruction in America (1935), pp. 700–701. See also Cheryl I. Harris, “Reflections on Whiteness as Property.” Harvard Law Review Forum
- Dominick Rosse, The Rise and Fall of Biracial Unionism in New Orleans (University of Chicago master’s thesis, 2023), drawing on contemporary newspaper coverage of Porter’s council role, his public response, and the Board of Trade’s appeal to Governor Foster. University of Chicago thesis
- United States v. Workingmen’s Amalgamated Council of New Orleans, 54 F. 994 (C.C.E.D. La. 1893). Federal Reporter opinion
