When “Values” Become an Instrument of Power
To paraphrase the remark commonly attributed to Hermann Göring, whenever I hear the word values, I feel inclined to reach for the revolver within arm’s length. Anyone who invokes this term immediately arouses my suspicion. I invariably wonder what is expected of me by those who brandish “values” as a banner. What are their hidden intentions? Are they seeking to persuade me—or to manipulate me?
One revealing fact deserves attention. A Google search yields no encyclopedic entry devoted to the generic concept of values. By contrast, it returns numerous references linking the term to religious themes, such as Jewish consciousness or a return to religion. Is this really a coincidence?
Over the past several decades, the term values has become one of the most pervasive expressions in political discourse. In the mouths of those who employ it, it functions as an unquestionable badge of legitimacy and presents itself as the natural foundation of public debate and the justification of normative positions. Yet there is no reason why this notion should be exempt from philosophical or sociological scrutiny. The issue is not merely to question one particular value or another, but to challenge the very use of the concept itself, its ideological implications, and its claim to universality.
The term values is by no means a neutral category. It is a historical construct, inherited from earlier moral systems and shaped by the transformations they have undergone over time. In contemporary language, it frequently serves as a rhetorical substitute for moral judgment, ethical reflection, and the exercise of critical reason.
In Israel, one constantly hears references to “the values of the State,” “Jewish values,” “the values of the IDF,” “Zionist values,” or “family values.” The formula defining Israel as a Jewish and democratic state, now enshrined in a Basic Law, perfectly illustrates the difficulties generated by this kind of political language. The expression is deliberately ambiguous and lends itself to contradictory interpretations. It represents an attempt to define supposedly consensual normative values, even though many regard its constituent principles as fundamentally incompatible and incapable of genuine reconciliation.
These “values,” therefore, do not provide the foundation for authentic moral reflection. Rather, they function as a means of justifying political decisions after the fact. It is no longer actions that are evaluated according to moral principles; instead, moral principles themselves are invoked to legitimize actions that have already been decided upon.
Values do not serve merely an ideological function. They also constitute a powerful rhetorical instrument for consolidating collective identities and transforming them into political forces directed against those excluded from the sphere of legitimacy. Values thus become an all-encompassing concept capable of unifying diverse positions under a single emblem presumed legitimate by definition. Politics grounded in values consequently tends to demonize opponents, transforming political conflict into an absolute confrontation.
Beyond Values: Responsibility, Judgment, and Ethics
The roots of the concept of “values,” and indeed the very use of the term value, may well lie elsewhere in history—in mercantilism. Under early mercantilism, every object was assigned a monetary value, an economic value, or an exchange value. Such value, however, is never neutral or absolute.
The logic inherent in this approach does not remain confined to the economic sphere. It extends into other domains, imposing upon them the same framework of evaluation and quantitative measurement. Thus we begin to speak of “values” in moral, cultural, and spiritual contexts, as though these dimensions could be assessed by means of the same instruments.
Herein lies a fundamental paradox: that which ought to be absolute, beyond numerical measurement, and literally priceless becomes enclosed within a system of evaluation, comparison, and even exchange. In other words, the very use of the term values reveals a process by which what is inherently incommensurable is translated into the language of measurement and commerce, thereby losing its singular and absolute character.
“Values” have never truly resolved moral conflicts; rather, they have tended to obscure them. Values do not lend themselves to compromise. Whoever opposes a value is quickly cast as an enemy. Because it carries an implicit form of moral absolutism, the concept of value tends to radicalize conflicts and intensify them, often leading to the demonization of the other.
My critique is not nihilistic. On the contrary, it seeks to strengthen more rigorous approaches to moral reasoning in the sphere of ethical judgment. Declarations of principle should give way to the demands of reasoned argument. Identity should yield to responsibility. And a politics grounded in clan-based or tribal identities should be replaced by an aspiration toward a shared and genuinely public responsibility.