When Violence Becomes Economic Policy
CETERIS PARIBUS NEVER APPLIED — PART III
How terror destroyed Black wealth, constrained competition and changed the calculation of investment
A business owner deciding whether to expand must consider customers, costs and competition. But what happens when the calculation must also include whether a mob might destroy the business—and whether the authorities would protect the owner or punish the attackers?
That question connects the first two essays in this series to this one. Part I argued that economic outcomes cannot be adequately explained while leaving unequal institutional conditions outside the analysis. Part II examined Black enterprise and the vulnerability of achievements that challenged established relationships of power. Part III considers how violence could change the conditions under which an entire community worked, invested and held property.
American racial violence is usually taught as a moral and political history. Lynching, massacres, arson, forced expulsions and intimidation demonstrate hatred and the denial of civil rights. They also belong in economic history. Violence could destroy assets, displace workers, obstruct commerce and change who could safely own, compete and accumulate wealth.
Calling this “economic policy” requires precision. Not every attack followed a coordinated economic plan, and economic damage alone does not establish economic intent. Violence could nevertheless become an instrument of economic governance when it enforced boundaries around ownership, work or competition—and when public authorities participated, selectively withheld protection or used the aftermath to restrict recovery.
The relevant questions extend beyond what a mob intended. What conduct did violence make dangerous? Whose choices did it constrain? What did officials subsequently permit, prevent or leave uncompensated?
Tulsa makes these questions concrete. Oklahoma’s legislative findings, drawing on the commission’s investigation of the 1921 massacre, recorded the destruction of 1,256 homes and extensive destruction of Greenwood’s institutions and businesses. They also acknowledged evidence that some local officials participated in the violence and deputized and armed white men who joined the mob. Public authority was implicated in the destruction it should have prevented.
But the economic story did not end when the fires stopped.
According to the Oklahoma Historical Society, the Real Estate Exchange proposed converting the devastated neighborhood to industrial use. Realtors sought to purchase Black-owned land at discounted prices. The city applied a fire code that made rebuilding too expensive for many owners. Insurance exclusions for riot damage created another obstacle to recovery. These were distinct decisions by distinct institutions, but together they threatened to extend the injury beyond the initial destruction.
Black residents resisted. Attorneys B. C. Franklin, I. H. Spears and T. O. Chapelle challenged the rebuilding restriction and won. Residents reconstructed Greenwood with little outside investment or support. Their achievement demonstrates agency, legal organizing and determination. It also shows why institutional enforcement matters: an effective legal remedy helped preserve the possibility of rebuilding.
Reconstruction, however, has an opportunity cost. Money spent replacing a destroyed building cannot simultaneously finance an additional business, further education or retirement. Rebuilding can restore productive capacity while leaving an owner behind the position that might otherwise have been attainable. Recovery demonstrates achievement; it does not erase the imposed expense.
Three economic mechanisms help clarify what is at stake. Destruction eliminates assets. Coerced transfer shifts ownership, potentially allowing buyers to acquire property on terms an owner would reject under secure conditions. Suppression of competition can improve the position of businesses or employers whose competitors have been driven away or whose workers have fewer alternatives.
These mechanisms need to be investigated separately. A burned business may leave everyone poorer, while a forced sale may benefit a particular buyer. The economic inquiry must identify the losses imposed, any advantages others secured and the evidence connecting them.
Property rights require the same attention. A deed records ownership; it cannot, by itself, protect the owner. Effective ownership depends on institutions that recognize claims, prevent coercion and provide remedies when rights are violated.
A farmer may legally own land yet be unable to remain on it safely. A merchant may possess a building yet lack dependable protection against its destruction. Formal rights and usable economic security can therefore diverge.
That insecurity changes the calculation of investment. A productive venture may offer an attractive return under ordinary business conditions while becoming much less attractive once the risk of uncompensated destruction is included. Owners may face lower expected returns, additional protection costs or greater difficulty obtaining financing. An explanation centered only on business skill or willingness to invest would miss those conditions.
Violence also communicates beyond its immediate victims. Terror is information.
An attack can reveal that property protections are unreliable, that commercial visibility carries danger or that the authorities will tolerate coercion. People considering whether to buy a home, open a business or remain in a community may adjust their decisions accordingly. The threat need not be carried out against every owner to influence the environment in which ownership occurs.
Research on Tulsa provides evidence that the consequences extended beyond the immediate destruction. In their July 2025 revision of After the Burning: The Economic Effects of the 1921 Tulsa Race Massacre, Alex Albright and coauthors estimate that the massacre reduced school enrollment among Black children ages 7–18 by an average of 2.5 percentage points. Against a pre-massacre enrollment rate of approximately 80 percent, that represents roughly a 3 percent relative decline. The injury reached into children’s opportunities to develop the skills on which future earnings could depend.
The researchers also find adverse effects on Black homeownership and occupational status, increased departure among Black skilled workers and detrimental effects in other Black communities connected to Tulsa through family and kinship networks. Their findings indicate that the homeownership effects persisted for decades.
The historical record establishes destruction and institutional obstruction; the research estimates subsequent economic effects. Together, they support an argument about lasting injury without requiring the claim that fear explains every outcome or that Tulsa explains every later disparity. Displacement, interrupted education, destroyed assets and the departure of skilled workers provide several channels through which violence could alter economic development.
People facing danger also acted to protect themselves. They could relocate, diversify their livelihoods, create mutual-aid institutions, organize politically or challenge restrictions in court. Those responses could preserve lives and property while carrying substantial costs. Leaving might protect a family while depriving a community of skills and investment. Rebuilding might preserve ownership while consuming resources otherwise available for expansion.
This is why behavior must be interpreted in context. A decision to leave, postpone an investment or seek a different livelihood may reflect a judgment about institutional reliability. Looking only at the eventual distribution of businesses or property can conceal the choices that coercion made costly or dangerous.
A defender of markets may reasonably respond that racial terror violated the conditions markets require. Secure property, enforceable contracts and protection against coercion are essential to voluntary exchange.
That response reinforces the obligation to include unequal protection in economic explanation. If institutions failed to secure those conditions for Black owners, the wealth holdings that followed cannot simply be treated as the product of differences in effort, skill or consumer demand.
Stopping the violence improves the prospects of future investment. It does not itself replace a destroyed building, reimburse the cost of rebuilding or restore resources exhausted during displacement. Whether further remedies are justified requires separate arguments about evidence, responsibility and effectiveness. Recognizing the economic injury makes that inquiry possible.
A functioning market cannot guarantee every investment. It must nevertheless distinguish competition from coercion and commercial failure from organized destruction. When protection against coercion is distributed unequally, that inequality becomes part of how economic outcomes are produced.
The economic significance of racial terror therefore reaches beyond the value of what burned. It includes the choices people could safely make afterward: where to live, whether to expand, whom to employ, what to finance and whether ownership could endure.
Economic freedom depends on people being able to retain, use and transfer what they lawfully acquire. Violence that undermines those freedoms belongs at the center of the economic explanation.
What determines whether threatened owners can make institutions protect their rights—and whether those who violate them face consequences?
The next essay turns to an economic asset that conventional wealth tables rarely measure: the ability to vote, organize, govern and make public institutions respond.
Sources
- Ed Gaskin, “The Failure of Color-Blind Markets,” The Times of Israel, November 14, 2026. Part I of this series.
- Ed Gaskin, “When Black Success Became a Threat,” The Times of Israel, November 15, 2026. Part II of this series.
- Oklahoma Statutes, Title 74, § 8000.1, “1921 Tulsa Race Riot—Legislative Findings and Intent.” Legislative findings concerning destruction, official participation and obstacles to rebuilding.
- Oklahoma Historical Society, “The Tulsa Race Massacre: The Aftermath.” Historical account of proposed land-use changes, discounted land purchases, rebuilding restrictions, insurance exclusions and residents’ legal resistance.
- Alex Albright, Jeremy Cook, James Feigenbaum, Laura-Thorne Kincaide, Jason Long and Nathan Nunn, After the Burning: The Economic Effects of the 1921 Tulsa Race Massacre, July 23, 2025 revision. Working paper examining homeownership, occupational outcomes, school enrollment, migration and effects beyond Tulsa.
