Why anti-antizionists are wrong about the meaning of ‘antisemitism’

Over the last year or so, there has emerged a group of scholars and activists who advocate for a new strategy for responding to the barrage of anti-Israel and anti-Jewish sentiment we’ve been witnessing recently, especially since October 7. Spearheaded by Adam Louis-Klein, Naya Lekht, and others [1], they see this onslaught as driven by a hate movement, which they call ‘antizionism’ (written without a hyphen, to distinguish it from opposition to Zionism expressed by Jews prior to Israel’s founding). Some have dubbed their position ‘the new anti-antizionism’, but I’ll just call it ‘anti-antizionism’.

A main feature of the anti-antizionists’ picture is that antizionism is a distinct form of Jew-hatred, differing from “Nazi-style” or “classical” race-based versions of antisemitism, as well as from earlier varieties of Jew-hatred that targeted Judaism. They maintain that in order to combat antizionism effectively, antizionism must be described and understood on its own terms, rather than through the lens of antisemitism.

While there’s much to admire in all of this, I also believe there are a number of problems with their view, including some confusion. Here I’ll focus only on what I take to be the most serious problem. As my aim is to be constructive, I’ll also suggest a remedy.

What is the serious problem?

The problem is this:

The anti-antizionists restrict the meaning of the word ‘antisemitism’ to mean classical (Nazi-style) antisemitism.

This is illustrated in part B of Image-1. Anti-antizionists take Jew-hatred to be a general, superordinate (higher-level) category, under which fall the three, more specific, subordinate (lower-level) categories—anti-Judaism, antisemitism, and antizionism—where ‘antisemitism’ means classical, Nazi-style antisemitism.

In contrast, the standard arrangement in similar three-way groupings, for people like Bernard Lewis, Jonathan Sacks, and others, places ‘antisemitism’ (or possibly ‘Jew-hatred’) in the superordinate position, but never as any of the more specific, subordinate categories—unless it’s being modified in some way (‘classical’, etc.). This is shown in part A of Image-1.

In what sense do the anti-antizionists “restrict” the meaning of ‘antisemitism’ to mean classical antisemitism? Although they are not very clear on this, there are two claims they might be making:

Claim 1: The meaning of ‘antisemitism’ in contemporary English is classical antisemitism.

Claim 2: The meaning of ‘antisemitism’ in contemporary English ought to be classical antisemitism.

The anti-antizionists have presented arguments for both claims. I’ll try to show why none of them work.

Why is this a problem?

Let’s first ask, What’s wrong with thinking that the meaning of ‘antisemitism’ is or should be classical antisemitism? The problem is that it flies in the face of the facts about what ‘antisemitism’ means in contemporary English.

A word’s meaning in a (living) language at a point in time is determined by how members of the language community—native speakers of the language—actually use the word at that time. It is such patterns of use that lexicographers attempt to describe in their dictionary entries, which is why dictionary entries are excellent indicators of a word’s current usage, and hence current meaning.

If we survey up-to-date entries for ‘antisemitism’ (with or without a hyphen), although they will vary somewhat across dictionaries (like with all words), still they all treat ‘antisemitism’ as a general, superordinate category that applies to all cases of (something like) unjust, discriminatory, or hateful statements or actions directed at Jews as such. We find no definitions that restrict the meaning of ‘antisemitism’ to classical antisemitism.

This also holds for decades of antisemitism scholarship across thousands of articles and books, in “official” definitions (IHRA, JDA, Nexus, etc.), in the titles of dedicated antisemitism journals, conferences, and organizations, and throughout online discourse.

This suffices to show that the claim that the meaning of ‘antisemitism’ in contemporary English is classical antisemitism is false. But what about the claim that ‘antisemitism’ ought to mean classical antisemitism?

Notice first that there’s nothing absurd about this. Word meanings frequently drift and change over time. However, it must be recognized how massively disruptive such a change in the meaning of ‘antisemitism’ would be. It would conflict with all the ways just described of how the current meaning of ‘antisemitism’ is deeply embedded in contemporary usage, and would cause enormous confusion. So if the anti-antizionists really want to push for such a change, they had better have some powerful arguments for doing so. We’ll see, however, that they do not.

Claim 1: ‘Antisemitism’ already means classical antisemitism

Although we’ve seen that Claim 1 is false, the anti-antizionists have nevertheless tried to defend it with arguments. I’ll briefly discuss two of them.

The first argument, which is most often seen, points to the fact that ‘antisemitism’ was coined in 1879 by the German journalist Wilhelm Marr to portray Jews as a parasitic, unassimilable, scheming race, driven to secretly dominate its host nations, and it was this understanding of the term that was later adopted by the Nazis. In light of these origins, the argument goes, that is what the term must be taken to mean today.

The trouble with this argument is that it commits the etymological fallacy, which involves inferring that because a word had a meaning in the past, it must also have that meaning now. But, again, meanings often change over time: ‘nice’ once meant ignorant or foolish, ‘awful’ meant full of awe, ‘clue’ meant a ball of yarn, etc. To infer that because those words had those meanings in the past, they must also have them now, is clearly a mistake. The same goes for ‘antisemitism’. As we saw, what determines a word’s current meaning is current language community use, not the word’s past meaning(s). So this argument fails.

The second argument is superficially like the first, but different. It suggests that because ‘antisemitism’ was coined in the late 19^th century, there couldn’t have been antisemitism before that. So medieval anti-Judaism, for example, can’t be antisemitic. While this argument doesn’t directly imply anything about antizionism, it fits well with the idea that ‘antisemitism’ refers to classical antisemitism, because it distinguishes anti-Judaism from antisemitism.

The error here should be obvious. Terms can refer to things that existed before the term did, like the words ‘star’, ‘fish’, ‘water’, etc. So when ‘antisemitism’ was coined is irrelevant to when antisemitism first occurred.

These two arguments are non-starters.

Claim 2: ‘Antisemitism’ should mean classical antisemitism

Let’s turn now to the argument that the meaning of ‘antisemitism’ ought to be classical antisemitism. This argument is more compelling. The basic idea underlying the argument is that interpreting ‘antisemitism to mean classical antisemitism prevents problems that arise when ‘antisemitism’ is conceived as the superordinate category.

Which problems? The main problem is that responding to antizionist hate by calling it ‘antisemitism’ shifts people’s focus to antisemitism and away from what’s unique about antizionism (e.g., its use of tropes like genocide, settler colonialism, apartheid, etc.). This “privileges” antisemitism, “rhetorically anchoring” people’s attention to it, thus making it harder to fight antizionism.

Antizionists whose attention has been turned toward antisemitism will tend to think they’re being charged with (something like) “hateful or discriminatory statements or actions directed at Jews as such”; or worse, with using stereotypical, Nazi-style tropes and themes. Either way, the critique won’t land because antizionists will struggle to see how it applies to them, giving rise to the familiar response, “I’m not antisemitic, I just oppose Zionism.”

The fix, according to the argument, is to demote ‘antisemitism’ from the superordinate level down to the subordinate level, and make it mean classical antisemitism. There it can take its place alongside the other forms of Jew-hatred, antizionism and anti-Judaism.

But how could that help? The idea seems to be this: If antisemitism is lowered to the same level as antizionism and anti-Judaism, it can no longer be said that antizionism is antisemitism, just as it can’t be said that an apple is an orange when talking about fruit. Instead, one must deny that antizionism is antisemitism. Anti-antizionists often say that antizionism “is its own thing,” distinct from antisemitism. Bringing antisemitism down to the level of antizionism and anti-Judaism makes sense of this, ensuring that antizionism can be addressed on its own terms, as its own kind of Jew-hatred, with the result that it can be more effectively countered.

Assessing the argument for claim 2

What is to be made of this argument? I have two points: First, interpreting ‘antisemitism’ to mean classical antisemitism is unnecessary for achieving the anti-antizionists’ desired result (i.e. a more effective response to antizionism). Second, interpreting ‘antisemitism’ to mean classical antisemitism doesn’t even help with achieving anti-antizionists’ desired result. I discuss these in turn.

First, however, I must briefly mention a misunderstanding that often arises. I’ve been assuming that when someone says that antizionism is antisemitism, they’re saying that antizionism falls under the higher-level, superordinate category of antisemitism. But it’s sometimes thought that saying “antizionism is antisemitism” amounts to saying that the two are equal, or the same thing. This is a confusion, stemming from the fact that the word ‘is’ is ambiguous. ‘Is’ can indeed be used to say that two things are the same (a scallion is a green onion, Superman is Clark Kent). But it can also be used to ascribe a property to something or conceive of something as falling under a category (a green onion is food, Superman is strong).  With this second kind of use, the claim isn’t that the two things are the same (e.g. Superman and strength are “equal”), and it’s the second use of ‘is’ that is in play when it’s said that antizionism is antisemitism (as when it’s said that antizionism is Jew-hatred).

Back now to the first point I want to argue for—that interpreting ‘antisemitism’ to mean classical antisemitism is unnecessary for achieving the anti-antizionists’ desired result.

Recall that what concerns the anti-antizionists about calling antizionism ‘antisemitism’ is that it shifts people’s attention away from antizionism and towards antisemitism, and this hampers efforts to oppose antizionism on its own terms. But there’s a way of understanding all this and dealing with it that requires nothing so radical as removing ‘antisemitism’ from the superordinate category and redefining it as classical antisemitism.

Consider an analogy, shown in Image-2. We have a superordinate category, fruit, along with three subordinate categories of fruit: orange, apple, and coconut. Oranges and apples are prototypical fruit, while a coconut is a non-prototypical fruit.

Now imagine that some people who are unaware that coconuts are fruit are told that they are. Upon hearing the word ‘fruit’ they might think of prototypical fruit like apples, oranges, and bananas, and wonder how coconuts could possibly be fruit, given how different they are. We can even imagine them rejecting the idea that coconuts are fruit and insisting they’re not.

What would be the proper way to deal with this? Clearly, it would be to explain how coconuts fit the biological definition of a fruit as a mature seed-bearing ovary of a flowering plant. Going over the unique features of coconuts in virtue of which they satisfy that definition would take time and effort, but that would be the way to go. The way not to go would be to redefine ‘fruit’ so that coconuts no longer are fruit, just to remove the possibility of people becoming confused when they hear that coconuts are fruit. That, to put it mildly, would be overkill.

Or to take a different scenario, imagine someone telling their friend, “I’m going to the store to buy fruit,” when they plan to buy coconuts. That would likely make their friend think of prototypical fruit like apples or oranges, so it would be misleading. The solution would be to be more specific and say, “I’m going to the store to buy some coconuts.” Redefining ‘fruit’ so as to exclude coconuts would be unnecessary.

All this carries over to ‘antisemitism’. If, upon hearing that antizionism is antisemitism, a person thinks of antisemitism in general, or prototypical Nazi-style antisemitism, and consequently fails to see how antizionism could be antisemitic, the solution is as with the fruit example: simply explain how antizionism in its own unique ways satisfies the definition of ‘antisemitism’, as (something like) unjust, discriminatory, or hateful statements or actions directed at Jews as such. And if the word ‘antisemitism’ would be misleading in some context, don’t use it. Just show how the antizionism in question is discriminatory, hateful, etc. (i.e., antisemitic). This gives anti-antizionists the result they’re looking for: an effective response to antizionism. There’s no need to redefine ‘antisemitism’ to avoid confusing people when they’re told that antizionism is antisemitic. As with the fruit analogy, this also is extreme overkill.

So much for why redefining ‘antisemitism’ is unnecessary for the anti-antizionists. I now want to show why it wouldn’t help.

As we’ve seen, the anti-antizionists believe they can solve their problem by removing ‘antisemitism’ from the superordinate position, replacing it with ‘Jew-hatred’, and redefining ‘antisemitism’ to mean classical antisemitism. But they fail to see that they’ll encounter all the same problems with ‘Jew-hatred’ as they do with ‘antisemitism’.

Like with ‘antisemitism’, upon hearing that antizionism is Jew-hatred, many will tend to think of Jew-hatred in general, or even Nazi-style examples of Jew-hatred, and consequently fail to see how antizionism could be Jew-hatred. Many will deny they hate Jews and insist they only oppose Zionism. The solution must be like before: the anti-antizionist must explain in detail how antizionism in its own unique ways constitutes Jew-hatred. And because ‘Jew-hatred’ and ‘antisemitism’ are near synonyms in contemporary English, that explanation will be essentially the same. It will involve showing how the antizionism involves (something like) unjust, discriminatory, or hateful statements or actions directed at Jews as such. So, all told, there’s no reason to think that calling antizionism ‘Jew hatred’ can buy the anti-antizionist anything at all over what calling it ‘antisemitism’ gives them.

Anti-antizionism going forward

We have seen that ‘antisemitism’ doesn’t mean classical antisemitism in contemporary English, and that there’s no reason to redefine it to mean that. Anti-antizionists believe otherwise because they think that’s needed to focus people’s attention on antizionism itself, in order to effectively combat it. But we’ve seen that that’s a mistake: doing so is unnecessary, and doesn’t help anyway. Instead, anti-antizionists must simply do the work of spelling out why antizionism is unjust or discriminatory or hateful, etc. against Jews, and leave behind all the disruption and confusion that comes with a campaign to redefine ‘antisemitism’. I support the effort to do that work. But it is independent of which superordinate term is chosen to name the category that antizionism falls under (‘Jew hatred’ or ‘antisemitism’).

Note

1. To keep this post simpler, I have not included references. Those familiar with the anti-antizionists’ work will recognize most of what I attribute to them. Interested others should begin by exploring Movement Against Antizionism‘s website, the organization founded by Louis-Klein, and Stop Antizionism, Lekht’s organization. There, much support for the details of my presentation will be found. Far more is discoverable by searching Lewis-Klein’s and Lekht’s published articles, podcast appearances, social media pages, etc.