Why force fails against fundamentalism

The recent events surrounding the protests of the Jerusalem Faction, the calls to “remove all restraints,” and the discussions about the mass surrender of draft evaders in order to overwhelm the prison and enforcement systems should concern every citizen of Israel. Not only because of the roadblocks and disruption to public order, but because they expose a deeper phenomenon: the emergence of a fundamentalist worldview that sees the state as a foreign entity, and at times even as an adversary.

The state’s instinctive response to such situations is usually one of force: more arrests, stricter enforcement, harsher penalties. There is a certain logic to this. No state can tolerate organized lawbreaking. Yet history teaches us that when dealing with fundamentalist movements, force alone rarely solves the problem. In some cases, it actually strengthens it.

Fundamentalism feeds on a sense of siege. It requires an enemy to justify its existence. Every image of a police officer dragging away a protester, every highly publicized arrest, every heated confrontation immediately becomes proof that the entire world is at war with the group, and that its extremist leaders were right all along. Thus a vicious cycle is created: the state increases pressure, and the extremists increase their appeal.

The real question, therefore, is not how to punish extremists more severely, but how to reduce the social base that enables them to grow.

A wise policy must be built upon a clear distinction between belief and civic responsibility. The state has no interest in fighting the Haredi way of life, Torah study, or religious identity. On the contrary, it must respect and protect freedom of religion. At the same time, however, it must establish that every citizen and every institution benefiting from public resources is expected to participate in the shared effort of Israeli society.

In practical terms, this means moving from a policy of coercion to a policy of responsibility. Not the revocation of rights, but the creation of a clear link between rights and participation. Institutions seeking public funding should be required to teach core skills. Young people should be offered a variety of military, civilian, and community service tracks compatible with their way of life. Communities that choose integration should receive increased investment in vocational training, employment opportunities, and higher education.

At the same time, the state must be uncompromising when red lines are crossed. Blocking highways, violence, incitement, and organized lawbreaking are not legitimate forms of protest, but an infringement on the rights of the broader public. Enforcement should be firm, but directed at those committing offenses rather than at an entire community.

The greatest mistake would be to view the Haredi public as a single, uniform group. Most Haredim are not members of the Jerusalem Faction. Many work, study, serve in various frameworks, and seek to be part of Israeli society without giving up their identity. Any policy that pushes them into the same corner as the extremists would be a gift to fundamentalists.

Israel now stands before a strategic choice. It can continue down the path of recurring confrontations, arrests, and angry headlines, or it can formulate a long-term policy that strengthens partners and weakens extremists.

The struggle against fundamentalism will not be decided on Highway 4 near Bnei Brak, nor at the entrance to Jerusalem. It will be decided in classrooms, workplaces, national service frameworks, human encounters, and the creation of a shared future. A strong state is not merely one that knows how to enforce the law. A strong state is one that knows how to inspire the vast majority of its citizens to want to be part of it.