Why U.S.-Iranian Negotiations Will Not Succeed
Since the first negotiations between the second Trump administration and Tehran concerning Iran’s nuclear program began in April 2025, both sides have continued to view each other’s conditions as non-starters. Washington has continuously demanded that Iran commit to zero enrichment, forfeit its entire stockpile (440kg) of 60 percent enriched uranium, terminate its ballistic missile program, and relinquish its support for regional proxies. Despite President Trump’s claims of U.S. military success or that Iran is conceding or “begging for a deal,” the Iranians have not only continually rejected all of the original U.S. demands, but have effectively demanded the opposite.
Even Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu subtly admitted in a May 10 interview with 60 Minutes that the U.S. and Israel did not accomplish their military objectives when asked about the status of the conflict. Netanyahu said that despite making significant progress, the war was not over due to the enriched uranium buried in Iran, enrichment facilities that remain intact, Tehran’s continuous support for regional proxies, and the ballistic missiles that are still being produced. All of which are conditions that Iran will not acquiesce to.
Operation Epic Fury did not pressure Iran to bend the knee on any of the aforementioned issues, but resulted in another consequential and contentious issue: freedom of movement in the Strait of Hormuz. Iran will only reopen the Strait on the condition that it splits control with Oman and can charge a toll to ships requesting passage. Continuous demands have also been made for the U.S. to lift sanctions and release frozen assets, pay reparations for starting the war, withdraw its military from Iran’s periphery, end the naval blockade, and ensure that any permanent end to hostilities includes the Israel-Hezbollah war in Lebanon.
Where do things stand now?
On May 24, the United States and Iran agreed to a potential deal that would have the latter reopen the Strait of Hormuz and turn over its stockpile of highly enriched uranium in exchange for the U.S. lifting its blockade on Iranian ports. Iran also demanded that the U.S. lift some sanctions to ease its ability to sell oil and release $12 billion in frozen assets, half of its estimated total. On the enrichment issue, Iranian mediators proposed diluting its stockpiles of uranium enriched above 20% under regional supervision, but want to suspend uranium enrichment on a shorter timeline than the U.S.’s demand of twenty years.
Concurrently, President Trump is encouraging Arab nations to join the Abraham Accords, the normalization agreement brokered in 2020 by the first Trump administration between Israel and several Arab countries. Although the Iran hawks in Washington are opposed to a cessation of hostilities, advancing the Accords would be seen as a step in the right direction to continue its long-term goal of isolating Iran under a regional security framework that is centered around Israel.
The Gulf countries, meanwhile, have urged President Trump to pursue a diplomatic off-ramp, largely to avoid future Iranian strikes on oil and gas infrastructure. While the Gulf states are concerned with being exposed to future attacks, Israel would be more inclined to see the conflict resume. Since a deal would take the economic and military pressure off Tehran, Israel will likely attempt to pressure the Trump administration to resume hostilities against the regime it considers to be an existential threat, which it also believes to be at a historic weak point.
The wild card of the entire peace process is Israel. Its role as America’s military partner against Iran, ever since the Twelve-Day War, means that it also has a say when it comes to negotiations, and Netanyahu knows this. One of Iran’s major demands is that any permanent peace deal include a cessation of hostilities on all fronts in the region, particularly in Lebanon. Israel could sabotage progress on U.S.-Iranian peace talks if it continues striking Hezbollah, which has rejected direct negotiations with Israel and calls for its disarmament. Netanyahu’s order to intensify IDF operations in southern Lebanon, following sporadic Hezbollah drone attacks, will undoubtedly complicate diplomatic efforts for the entire region.
If diplomacy succeeds, the current ceasefire would be extended for another sixty days, and the priority would shift to reopening the Strait of Hormuz, while setting up future talks on Iran’s nuclear program in the interim. The lack of clarity on the second stage of negotiations suggests that the unresolved issues will be intentionally postponed. If there are any lessons from the previous negotiations, the mutual unwillingness to compromise on non-negotiable conditions will inevitably lead both sides to focus more on rearming for the next round of hostilities rather than achieving a diplomatic breakthrough.
Running out the clock
Washington and Tehran know that the ceasefire can not go on in perpetuity, as both sides believe they have the upper hand and are playing to run out the clock. The Trump administration believes that the blockade on Iranian ports will bleed its economy enough to force concessions, despite U.S. intelligence claims that Iran could potentially survive the blockade for more than 120 days. From Iran’s perspective, keeping the Strait of Hormuz closed increases pressure on the global economy and, therefore, on the U.S., to end the conflict.
Even if the price of crude oil starts to decrease, or the Iranian economy continues to regress from the U.S. blockade, it will not affect Iran’s nuclear and missile capabilities. The regime will likely continue spending a sizeable portion of its GDP on its military, as recent trends suggest. If Iran is not being engaged in hostilities, it can shift its focus to replenishing its missile and drone arsenal. This was the case made by President Trump in December 2025, when he threatened Iran with further military action if it began rebuilding its nuclear program or restocking its missile capacity, contradicting his original claim that Iran’s nuclear facilities were “obliterated” during Operation Midnight Hammer.
If the U.S. withdraws from the conflict now, the cost of reentry will only increase. This is why Washington must conclude a long-term peace deal in its favor. If Tehran is not restrained, it will likely immediately begin replenishing its missile and drone arsenal, rebuilding its nuclear facilities, and recovering its buried stockpiles of enriched uranium, all while likely accelerating enrichment to better prepare for the next round of hostilities. Future U.S. attacks without Iranian concessions will guarantee another shutdown of the Strait of Hormuz, and Washington will find itself in the same trap once more, regardless of what it strikes inside Iran. For these reasons, the U.S. can not walk away without a deal that would see Iran give up its enriched uranium stockpile and cease enrichment for a prolonged period of time.
If the conflict resumes, Iran believes it can endure, and with good reason. Not only has its regime survived, but so have 30 out of 33 of its coastal ballistic missile launch platforms, and 70 percent of its prewar missile stockpiles, while remaining unchallenged by an internal opposition group, and retaining its stockpile of enriched uranium. Tehran is expecting hostilities to resume and believes that another round of escalation will only strengthen its hand. Its ability to close the Strait will put pressure on the U.S. from its worried allies in Europe and Asia, who rely on oil from the Persian Gulf, to force an end to the conflict, regardless of which side can gain more from negotiations.
Short of military escalation, there is little the U.S. can do to weaken Iran further under the current conditions. Its economy is already disastrous, the regime has been unpopular, and it has arguably received as much international condemnation as both the U.S. and Israel. President Trump’s threats to escalate the conflict are part of his belief that if the U.S. drops enough bombs, the Iranian regime will be compelled to concede on certain demands that are good enough for the U.S. to withdraw, claim victory, and refit to fight another day. Yet, his willingness to negotiate suggests he is aware of the consequences of military escalation and the war’s effect on his growing unpopularity at home.
As the Prussian military strategist Carl Von Clausewitz once said, “War is a continuation of politics by other means.” If both the U.S. and Iran are unwilling to give ground on the nuclear question, a long-term peace deal will not be reached, and the likelihood of renewed military action will only increase.
