Will a weaker EU be better for Israel?
In recent years, the European Union (EU) has come under growing stress. First, Brexit in 2019-20, then COVID in 2020-21, followed by the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022, and finally the return of Donald Trump to the White House in 2025. Structural, political and external forces are gradually eroding cohesion among its member states. What implications do these trends bear on Israel?
First, let’s review the forces that weaken the EU:
External shocks and geopolitical pressures. The ongoing war in Ukraine, tension with the US over Greenland and its demand that the EU will spend more on defense, the EU’s dependency on rare materials supply from China, migration pressures, and energy security are among the issues that challenge the EU’s unity.
Economic divergence and uneven benefits. Growing polarization between richer, Northern/Western states and poorer or more vulnerable Southern/Eastern states fuels resentment or perceptions of unfairness.
Rising nationalism and political polarization. Several member states are experincing a shift of voters from centrist to extreme left or right-wing parties, leading to ever-widening opinion gaps about immigration, national sovereignty, and EU solidarity (e.g., on Ukraine support). These divides make consensus harder and motivate calls for looser cooperation, or even withdrawal from some cooperative mechanisms over time.
Risks of organizational paralysis. As the EU expanded and its membership became more diverse, decision-making via unanimous consent or qualified majorities has become evermore difficult. This often leads to gridlock on major policies (defense, migration, climate, foreign policy), which adds frustration and weakens the sense of a common vision.
Thus, over the next decade, we are likely to see a more fragile, more “flexible” EU — less of a tightly-united super-state, more of a loose cooperation framework. Some countries may opt out of certain shared policies; others might push for reforms. Yet, most will stay in, because the economic, social and security benefits remain substantial.
This could be a mixed blessing for Israel — with some short-term tactical upsides, but meaningful medium- to long-term strategic downsides. On the upside, we are likely to see reduced unified pressure on Israel; more bilateral agreements (e.g., the recent agreements with Greece and Cyprus); security-focused discussions rather than normative or legal frameworks (e.g., the Arrow missile deal with Germany); fewer multilateral initiatives against Israel and reduced ability of the EU to act as a diplomatic counterpart to the US.
On the other hand, a weaker EU means more volatile national policies; greater influence of radical parties (both far-right and far-left); increased opportunities for less friendly actors to fill the vacuum (Russia, Turkey, etc.); and some erosion in Israel’s economic and scientific ecosystem due to more regulatory divergence, reduced research funding and less predictability for Israeli companies.
The biggest swing variable is the US factor. Historically, Israel does best when the US is dominant and Europe is aligned with it (even if critical at times). A weak EU combined with a less engaged US is bad for Israel.