Will NATO Deter the Next War—or Prepare for the Last One?

NATO’s greatest achievement has never been measured simply by the military operations it has conducted. It has been measured by the major wars it has helped prevent.

For more than seventy-five years, the Alliance has convinced potential adversaries that aggression against its members would fail. That deterrent has been one of the great strategic successes of the postwar era.

The real question before the governments gathering this week in Ankara is whether they will give NATO the means to ensure that deterrence remains as credible in a rapidly changing strategic world as it has been for the past seventy-five years.

That question matters not only to Europe.

It matters profoundly to Israel.

For more than seven decades, NATO has been far more than a military alliance. It has been the cornerstone of the transatlantic strategic architecture through which American leadership has preserved peace in Europe while helping sustain the broader stability upon which democratic nations—including Israel, the Middle East’s only democracy—have depended.

Israel’s security has never rested solely on its own remarkable military capabilities. It has also benefited from the credibility of a wider Western security order in which the United States, supported by strong democratic allies, has remained the indispensable strategic power.

As they meet in Ankara, NATO’s member governments should not lose sight of what a strong and credible Alliance means beyond Europe. It remains a vital pillar of the Western strategic architecture that has helped underpin the security of Israel, the Middle East’s only democracy. Preserving that credibility is therefore not only a European responsibility. It is an investment in the broader security of the democratic world.

Military leaders are often accused of preparing to fight the last war.

The responsibility now rests with governments to ensure that they do not make the same mistake.

If NATO’s members invest primarily in yesterday’s threats, they risk creating the conditions for tomorrow’s conflicts.

Those conflicts are no longer theoretical.

Ukraine has demonstrated that industrial resilience, intelligence, cyber capabilities, technological innovation and the capacity to sustain military operations have become integral to credible deterrence. Israel’s experience points to the same conclusion. Hamas’s October 7 attack, Iran’s direct missile assaults, Hezbollah’s growing capabilities and the Houthi campaign against international shipping in the Red Sea have shown how conventional warfare is increasingly intertwined with cyber operations, intelligence, advanced technologies, proxy warfare and attacks on the economic arteries that sustain modern societies.

These are not separate lessons.

They are different manifestations of the same strategic transformation.

The character of conflict is evolving.

Deterrence must evolve with it.

That does not mean weakening NATO’s traditional strengths.

Quite the contrary.

Conventional military power remains indispensable.

American leadership remains indispensable.

That leadership requires sustained political commitment and the continued willingness to provide the military, technological, industrial and financial resources that have made NATO the world’s most successful deterrence alliance.

As Washington reviews its global military posture and considers how best to allocate its forces and resources, one principle should remain paramount: America’s contribution to NATO must remain commensurate with the threats the Alliance faces. Those threats are not diminishing. They are becoming broader, more technologically sophisticated and increasingly interconnected.

The purpose of any review should therefore not be to weaken NATO’s deterrent, but to ensure that it remains fully credible against the challenges of the twenty-first century.

Europe’s responsibility is equally clear. Its governments must do more—not to replace American leadership, but to reinforce it by becoming stronger, more capable partners.

Only together can the United States and its allies provide the Alliance with the capabilities, resilience and strategic credibility required to deter the next war rather than prepare for the last one.

For Israel, that distinction is fundamental.

A stronger NATO does not diminish America’s role in the Middle East.

It strengthens the broader Western strategic architecture that enables the United States and its democratic partners to confront simultaneous challenges across Europe, the Middle East and the Indo-Pacific.

The security of Europe and the security of the Middle East are no longer separate strategic questions.

Russia’s war against Ukraine, Iran’s regional ambitions, attacks on international shipping, cyber threats and hybrid warfare are different fronts in the same contest over whether democracies can continue to deter aggression before it spreads.

History will not judge the Ankara summit by the wording of its communiqué.

Nor by a spending target alone.

It will judge it by whether the governments gathered in Ankara leave having strengthened NATO’s ability to ensure that deterrence evolves as rapidly as the threats it is designed to prevent.

NATO’s enduring success has always rested on a simple proposition: convincing potential adversaries that aggression will fail.

The leaders meeting in Ankara cannot determine how rapidly America’s adversaries evolve.

They can determine whether they leave the Alliance with the capabilities, the resources and the resolve to preserve its greatest achievement–deterring the next war—not preparing for the last one.