A Blueprint for the International Stabilization Force in Gaza 

How can an international peacekeeping force in Gaza be effective in the absence of U.S. ground forces? Political leaders continue to grapple with the practicalities of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2803 that established the mandate for the International Stabilization Force (ISF) in Gaza. The ISF is the centerpiece to security and training of Palestinian police forces as part of a broader path towards peace in Gaza. However, the fragility of the ceasefire and its risks to being undone can quickly place the region into a well-worn cycle of conflict. For the first time in generations, security in Gaza has a promising mandate to unstick itself from perpetual violence. The ISF can learn four valuable lessons from the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) Sinai as it prepares to serve a critical component of President Donald Trump’s 20-Point Peace Plan.

But first, what is the MFO? Very briefly, the MFO is an international force located on the Egyptian Sinai comprised of 14 nations that successfully navigates the elements of peacekeeping between two former wartime combatants, Israel and Egypt. It was created outside the framework of the U.N. due to threats of veto by the USSR. Established after the 1973 War and via subsequent peace agreements, the MFO serves as the gold standard of a neutral force able to facilitate peace through multilateral efforts while leveraging a combination of military, diplomatic, and informational means. It differentiates in uniform from the traditional U.N. ‘blue helmets’ by wearing orange.

Demonstrating a neutral approach is the first and most vital lesson for the ISF. Yet, how can the ISF operate to ensure it is neither perceived as a proxy to Israel or a shield to Hamas? A vast majority of Muslim populations view a leader’s posture toward Palestine as a crucial litmus test for their broader foreign policy towards Israel. ISF intervention against Gazans is a challenge for troops originating from countries that support Palestinian causes. The ISF can learn that a key strength of the MFO is its ability to rely on an allied coalition overcoming bilateral differences. The MFO operates in one of four security zones that is further divided into three sectors. A selected international partner is placed in charge of each of the sectors. Incorporation of similar sectors for the ISF offers leaders operational flexibility in addressing tensions. The U.S. can facilitate while being proactive with the Israeli Defense Forces to alleviate concerns of Muslim troops. Additionally, Israel has viewed U.N. peacekeepers with skepticism. Therefore, the ISF could adopt a unique color from the traditional U.N. blue to offset initial perceptions. The MFO gained legitimacy by demonstrating an unbiased approach to security. The ISF must do the same.

The second lesson is an ability to arbitrate peace while preventing unilateral action. The MFO facilitates peace via the synergy of observers that ensures adherence to the Peace Accords. They are complimented by dedicated liaison teams that are critical to settling disputes at the lowest levels, often preventing tactical issues or miscalculations from becoming a strategic problem. In doing so, MFO is inherently building and strengthening relationships. The ISF can take cues in its initial steps to advance stabilization efforts and build bilateral and trilateral trust that mitigates either side from unilateral action.

Sources of sustainable funding is the third lesson for the ISF. Much as with the initial funding of the MFO, the U.S. is driving international efforts with a specific pledge of a $10 billion initial contribution to the Board of Peace (BoP). As the Chairman of the BoP, President Trump wields unprecedented personal diplomacy with its members. This rapport can manifest into sustainable lines of resourcing. Only after the MFO demonstrated its practicality did non-treaty countries pledge financial support. To this day, the MFO receives resourcing from nations such as South Korea and Denmark, although neither contributes troops. For transparency and accountability, the MFO utilizes an external auditor providing routine reports. The ISF can similarly model its resourcing strategy to ensure its financial legitimacy.

The final lesson is the significance of the U.S. as the center of gravity in the ISF’s initial stages. An absence of U.S. leadership in the critical first steps will result in fracturing and mistrust. The U.S. was instrumental in facilitating the creation of the MFO. Although the U.S. will not send troops to Gaza, it must shape outcomes through diplomacy and military coordination. U.S. influence on the ISF must match or surpass its MFO impact. The U.S. can bolster established capabilities such as the Office of the Security Coordinator (OSC) and the Civil Military Coordination Center (CMCC) in Israel. The OSC has established relations between Israeli and Palestinian Security Forces and the CMCC is spearheading efforts to establish the ISF’s operating parameters. Only the U.S. has proven it can bring Israel and regional powers to the negotiating table so it must stay engaged.

The MFO is a proven blueprint of a successful peacekeeping operation capable of uniting forces of different cultures and political backgrounds. It consistently demonstrates capacity to function effectively within shared resource arrangements and neutral command frameworks that foster trust and enhance legitimacy. U.S. military and diplomatic leadership are critical to successfully cementing the ISF’s first steps and establishing trust in a region that is skeptical of international involvement. By examining the MFO, the ISF can gain insights that are vital to facilitate the next phases towards peace in Gaza.