A Fall From Grace: Syria’s Alawites

Introduction:

Alawites are a religious minority that lives substantially in Turkey, Syria, and Lebanon. “Once elevated under the Assad regime, Syria’s Alawite community now bears the burden of revenge killings driven by decades of sectarian tension. These tensions recently culminated in a massacre, and its consequences will be examined in this article.

The Alawites:

The Alawites, also referred to as the Nusayris, are named after the founder Muhammad ibn Nusayr. While Alawism is sometimes regarded as an offshoot of Shia Islam, the scarcely known religion retains a more complex relationship with its position amongst other Muslim sects. While Alawites do sometimes consider themselves as Muslim, others do not. Alawism is a secretive religion whose beliefs and practices are known only to a select number of individuals. From what is known, the sect deviates significantly from the core tenets of Islam. Beliefs that are considered foreign include the transmigration of the soul, drinking alcohol as part of religious rituals, discouraging head coverings for women, and, perhaps most importantly, the sanctity of Ali. Nusayris believe in a trinity of the Meaning, Veil, and Gate, which has manifested seven times, most recently through Muhammad (the Veil), Ali (the Meaning), and Salman al-Farsi (the Gate). While exact practices are still a mystery, Ali is regarded in some ways as the manifestation of God. While Muhammad is still regarded as a prophet and the Quran as a holy text, it is interpreted differently. Alawites are forbidden from proselytizing, and only a select few leaders know the true meaning of their religion. When discussing Alawite political identity, it is important to acknowledge the role of taqiyya, a practice of hiding religious beliefs to avoid persecution, possibly encouraging outward conformity to dominant Sunni practices to reduce the risk of persecution. According to Ibn Kathir of the 14th century, where Muslims say “There is no deity but God and Muhammad is His prophet,” Alawites assert, “There is no deity but Ali, no veil but Muhammad, and no bab but Salman.”

Past Discrimination:

Alawites historically were periodically persecuted for their beliefs. It is believed that the first Alawites fled from Iraq into Syria due to persecution and were forced out of the main cities in the Levant region. In the 14th century, Ibn Taymiyyah (died 1328), arguably the most important Muslim scholar of the Mamluk dynasty, declared a fatwa against the Alawites. This reduced Alawite practices to heresy, not protected by the Dhimmi status that Christians and Jews had. Not only did the fatwa hurt Alawites in his era, the fatwa is still adopted by radical Sunnis as justification of sectarianism. Alawites continued to suffer under the Mamluks, and later under the Ottomans, who constructed mosques in Alawite-majority areas and attempted to impose Sunni religious norms on the population.

Rise to Power in Syria:

After the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, the Syrian territories came under the control of the French. The French originally began a positive turn in Alawite history, which had previously been full of violence and discrimination. The French administration established political autonomy for both the Druze and Alawites, forming them each a state. Importantly, this newfound autonomy was not a reflection of an innate Alawite desire for independence but rather the ‘divide and rule’ strategy France employed. As pan-Arabism spread, and the autonomous Druze and Alawite states were pushed to unify into the territory of modern Syria, the Alawite community was divided. Some in the community were apprehensive of the future intolerance they may receive at the hands of a Sunni majority, and there was a request to join the Lebanese territories instead of what would become future Syria.

Although there was no consensus about joining or remaining separate from the Syrian territories, a group of pragmatic religious Alawite representatives declared every Alawite a Muslim. Whether this was a genuine reflection of their faith or exercising taqiyya remains unclear, but it was followed by an unprecedented decree by the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem in 1936, Husayni, declaring all Alawites Muslims. With newfound confidence in being accepted in a future Syria, the Alawite state officially merged with the Syrian state in 1937. As Alawites became involved in their new state, many sought the military as stable employment. By 1963, Alawites made up a large portion of the military and Ba’ath Party ranks, a secular pan-Arabist political organization in Syria. As Hafez al-Assad, an Alawite in the Ba’ath Party, seized power and established himself as president, a position meant for a Sunni Muslim, protests erupted against him, shattering the illusion of acceptance. In power, the Assad dynasty assigned key positions of the government and military to loyalists, family members, and members of the Alawite sect. Hafez al-Assad kept consolidating his power, fighting through an insurgency in Hama that culminated in a massacre of 10,000-25,000 civilians being killed. He was succeeded by his son Bashar, who remained in power until late 2024, when he was deposed by rebels after a civil war that lasted nearly 14 years.

Why were Alawites attacked?

Alawites have been seen as complicit in the Assad regime long before the civil war. In the 1970s, the Syrian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood conducted various assassinations and targeted violence against those whom they saw as regime allies and members. While originally beginning as a non-violent opposition group, by the 1960s, some extremist members split to form the Fighting Vanguard. The Fighting Vanguard conducted various attacks, culminating in the 1979 attack on an Aleppo military school, which killed 43 Alawite cadets. It is important to understand that although the Muslim Brotherhood targeted regime members, attacks were also conducted against families, religious leaders, and more who were only associated with Assad’s government. In the beginning of the civil war, approximately 80% officers in the army were Alawites, and they were generally overrepresented in the Syrian Arab Army. Bashar al-Assad surrounded himself with family loyalists, and not all Alawites necessarily benefited from his rule. However, to extremists, this reality did not matter.

The Attack Timeline:

While low-scale retributions were consistent before, tensions exploded on March 6, when Alawite militias attacked Syrian government forces. The Alawite militias consisted of many former Assad supporters, joined by economically frustrated and desperate young men. It was also possible that they wanted to set up an autonomous Alawite zone on the coast. By the evening of March 6th, the government had mobilized its forces and descended upon the Alawite areas. While some were not official government forces, government forces also participated in the killings. A Reuters investigation found that in one village, one quarter of the population was wiped out by the morning of March 7th by mass executions of the adult male population. Sonobar, another village, reported the same morning that it came under seemingly random retribution attacks. The militia that was accused of atrocities in these areas was part of the SNA, a Turkish-backed anti-Assad faction in the civil war, recently rebranded as the 62nd Division of Syria’s army. Eyewitnesses confirmed that other militias took part in the attacks on Sonobar, some of whom could not speak Arabic, implying that some of the attackers may have belonged to foreign jihadist factions. In the morning of March 8th, the attacks escalated. In the village of Al Rusafa, mass killings included dragging out random men from their homes, and in verified videos, forcing them to bark before executing them. Some Sectarian messages were left on the walls: “Sunni men passed through here. We came to shed your blood.” In the town of Qurfays, more reports of random killings and field executions of innocents persisted. Eyewitnesses also confirmed the beating of worshipers in an important Alawite shrine. The seemingly random killings continued everywhere, even through March 9th, when the Syrian government and international community already knew abuses were taking place. 

The Government’s Responsibility and Assigning Blame:

It is important to acknowledge that placing blame is difficult; there is an astonishing number of regular civilians who are armed. Furthermore, the nearly 14-year civil war led to numerous loosely aligned militias that have a limited chain of command. One of the only in-depth investigations into massacres was conducted by Reuters, and it is difficult to verify specifics. The new Syrian Government’s forces previously fought not only Assad but also one another. Turkish-backed militias, formerly part of the opposition group SNA, were identified in the massacres and have since been integrated into the Syrian army. Specifically, Sultan Suleiman Shah Brigade and the Hamza division were sanctioned by the EU, but wider repercussions remain elusive. Reuters report, that HTS units, which form the basis of the Syrian army, participated in attacks where atrocities were identified. However, it is difficult to assign strict blame or to establish a clear chain of command. An NYT investigation identified at least some instances where government forces participated in the killings. The government, in response to international pressure, introduced a commission of inquiry, which reported that more than 1,400 people were killed in sectarian violence, but did not find that the government ordered the attacks. 

Actions since the attack:

The EU and Europe: 

The EU has been largely supportive of the government, giving it diplomatic backing and legitimacy after the massacres. Since the massacres, the EU has lifted most of its sanctions on Syria, except for those placed on security grounds. It has also sanctioned some militias that it blamed for the massacres, as mentioned above. Notably, several leading European countries such as the UK and France have strongly and personally supported Ahmed al-Shaara, Syria’s leader, even as violence was happening. After the events on the coast, Macron invited al-Shaara to a state visit, while the UK’s foreign minister Lammy, met with Syrian officials and gave them his support. 

US:

The US administration has largely remained supportive of the Syrian government, taking actions similar to the EU regarding the removal of sanctions and expanding potential avenues for economic cooperation and aid. 

Israel:

While Israel is likely one of the reasons the Assad regime fell in the time frame it did due to its war with Hezbollah, since the rebel offensive, it has taken a hawkish stance on Syria’s new leaders. It conducted mass strikes across Syria targeting strategic weapons and has kept wary. Israeli officials have been critical of al-Shaara’s Islamist past, and doubt his intentions to build a nonradical society. The seizure of a small buffer zone across the Israeli-Syrian border and verbal attacks enhanced the already hawkish Israeli position. Syria is viewed dually as a new Turkish proxy and also a possible new front for radical Sunni Islam. Israel has also focused on positioning itself as the protector of the Druze minority in Syria rather than protecting Alawites, for both practical and political reasons.

Minorities in Syria: 

Since the attack, some minorities feel more apprehensive about trusting the transitional government. Since the attack, Alawite militias have greatly reduced their attacks, while the Alawite people still reel from the massacres. The Supreme Alawite Council has rejected the Syrian Inquiry and its findings, accusing the government of diverting blame. The Kurdish-led SDF, a US and Europe-backed militia, has taken a pro-integration stance while remaining firm on a few demands which have stalled negotiations with the Syrian Government. Another emerging player is the Druze militias in Sweida, South Syria. The anti-government camp led by al-Hijri, one of the three spiritual leaders of the Syrian Druze community, has rejected integration without retaining their independence to hold weapons. After a terror attack in a Syrian church, one of Syria’s leading Christian figures berated al-Shaara and his government over his failure to prevent the attack and his dismissive behavior after it. 

Recent Developments:

In response to escalating violence between the Druze and Bedouin communities of South Syria, the Syrian government sent its forces into Sweida, with their declared intention to deescalate the situation. Over the next few days, the death toll would climb to over 800, according to SNHR, although other estimates put it over a thousand. Verified footage documented field executions and other war crimes committed by men in military uniforms, among them reportedly unarmed Druze civilians. In response to the Syrian Army’s actions, Israel threatened and then struck Syrian forces in Sweida, culminating in a strike in Damascus on the Defense Ministry. With two minorities already antagonized, the Kurdish-led SDF may be less willing to give up their arms to integrate into a Syrian state. 

Analysis of the Near Future:

While a fragile ceasefire maintains Druze control over most of Sweida, violence seems likely to return. In the Alawite front, sectarian violence has remained low intensity but consistent. A series of kidnappings targeting Alawite women has raised concerns about their possible sectarian nature, and limited actions taken by the government to prevent them. Publicly, Al-Shaara’s allies continue to offer strong support, even as tensions with the Druze erupted. The government is intent on integrating all factions into a united Syria, and it may resort to force. Israel’s air support was critical in preventing a government takeover of Sweida, and Israel may not intervene again. The massacre on the coast has left deep scars within the Alawite community, and many fear it will continue to hinder integration efforts for years to come.

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