Addressing the Elephant in the Room

In early January, the Islamic Republic was reeling. It was attempting to survive a burgeoning protest movement emanating from Tehran’s bazaar, partially a result of the E3’s activation of the 2015 JCPOA’s “Snapback” Sanctions, and had seen its military capabilities degraded following Israel’s air campaign seven months prior. Fast forward to June, and Tehran has reasserted itself as a capable regional actor; inflicting asymmetric damage upon its adversaries whilst also proving itself capable of absorbing and sustaining heavy damage to its infrastructure and command and control personnel. But the Mullahs’ regime did not achieve its wartime objectives thanks to the capabilities that it brought to bear, but rather thanks to its judicious reading of its most powerful foe. Indeed, it understood that amongst the three belligerents, it was in fact President Donald J. Trump’s United States which could be considered the standoff’s weakest party.

In contrast to an Islamic Republic fighting for its survival against conventionally superior forces, factors such as the strategic elite’s reticence towards the potential for further protracted conflict in the region, Congressional wavering, and the administration’s need to contend with a souring public opinion which harbours hostile attitudes towards regime change efforts while also abhoring the possibility of sustaining casualties, ultimately meant that Washington could not endure in the drawn-out campaign that would have been necessary to precipitate the Regime’s collapse. In sum, Iran engaged its ‘Force morale’ as described by Marshal Ferdinand Foch against a similarly motivated Israeli adversary, which despite its resolve would be undermined by its ally’s lack of strategic patience.

This was predictable: why else would Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and former Ramsad David Barnea have reportedly stressed the brief nature of the campaign to the administration officials on the 11th of February? Whilst Israel entered this war as the Middle East’s preeminent power then, its decision to finally attempt regime change alongside a hesitant US partner has resulted in the delay of the erection of the new regional landscape that Israel hoped to establish. Through the closing of the Strait of Hormuz and its threats to shutoff commerce through the Bab el-Mandeb, its leveraging of Gulf States’ reluctance at absorbing short-term damage, and its appeal to US public opinion’s inflationary fears as well as its rejection of the prospect of yet another “forever war,” Tehran has highlighted its staying power in spite of what its axis has endured since October 7th, 2023. Certainly, this war has been less a confirmation of Israeli hegemony and more of an ultimate test to see whether Jerusalem as a rising power is capable of imposing unquestionable defeat upon a local powerbroker whose remaining capabilities may have been underestimated at the oustet of Operation Roaring Lion. To be blunt, the war has compelled Israel to address the Elephant in the room: can it assert itself as an independent power capable of seeing through wars that concern its vital interests?

It seems that Iran today offers the Jewish State the opportunity to establish a new equation and set such a precedent of indepedence as Tehran shows signs of hubris, informed by an appraisal of its moral vitality relative to that of its adversaries. Its insistence on linking bilateral negotiations with Washington to the fate of its beleaguered proxy in Lebanon provides Israel with the option to escalate in Beirut should it ever feel the need to undercut ongoing negotiations or even a done deal.

The equation that the Prime Minister described as “Unacceptable” in a recent address to the nation could be a boon to Israel’s war efforts as it can use Tehran’s changed strategic calculus against it at will. If the risk is the unraveling of Peace talks with Lebanon, one of the war’s only clear successes thus far, an escalatory option that can lead to the resumption of hostilities is of arguably more importance in the near-term. Besides, a sustainable Peace is not the objective of the IDF’s current ground offensive; but rather the alleviation of Northern communities’ exposure to threats through the degradation of Hezbollah’s raw capabilities. The achievement of face-to-face negotiations with the Lebanese State is merely a byproduct of the campaign and a conduit to Hezbollah’s disarmament should the LAF and General Haykal prove willing to do so.

If Israel’s response to Sunday’s attacks could have been more aggressive with regards to the Dahiyeh then- with a forceful retaliation potentially signalling the failure of those attempted strikes, Iran’s launches intended as they were to deter such targeting of its proxy’s urban stronghold- its targeting of Iranian military assets proved to the broader region that Israel remains a sovereign power with the intent to maintain the initiative and pursue its own interests. As Israel and Iran provide military academies and University students across the globe with a contemporary case study in wartime strategy, Jerusalem can only hope that the IRGC continues to overplay its hand with its bet on limited engagements in the Gulf and throughout the broader region whilst it continues to push Tehran’s red lines in an attempt to bode it into a conflict requiring a forceful response, with or without US backing. Maintaining the initiative vis-à-vis both Iran and the US through Beirut could prove decisive as a first step in addressing the Elephant.

More broadly, this set of circumstances calls for a recalibration in Israeli strategy. After Operation Midnight Hammer, I wrote that the IDF should prosecute the rest of the campaign independently, in pursuit of Israel’s interests and in preservation of the United States’. President Trump prevented that from happening, only delaying the next round of fighting. Following Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s elimination, I again argued that should President Trump pre-emtively declare an end to hostilities, Israel would have to pursue the remainder of the war alone. Israel cannot live on the rythym of cyclical escalatory processes with a teetering Islamic Republic in perpetuity. It must finish the job- and prepare for a future without the United States at its side. As former officials such as Andrew P. Miller argue for an end to the “Exceptional Relationship” and thinkers like Stephen M. Walt lament that relationship’s partisans’ role in triggering another Middle Eastern war at the expense of US global force posture, heeding Raphael BenLevi’s recommendations on weaning off US aid is becoming all the more necessary as even established voices plead for a reevaluation of ties.

If antagonizing the administration accelerates this inevitable process, and complicates efforts to renew the bilateral Memorandum of Understanding, then so be it. Post-October 7th Israel cannot shirk away from a strategic reality where its retaliation and determination would remain unquestionable, where key operations would not be sabotaged by doubtful foreign Vice Presidents, where inimical forces in Ankara and Doha would not be given a say on the Gazan dossier, and where strikes in Qatar or elsewhere would not result in the issuance of an apology to the Muslim Brotherhood’s patrons. In short, the administration’s comprehensible adherence to the US national interest as outlined by Leon Hadar in his March piece for the National Interest has accentuated the need for Israel’s adoption of a strategy which likewise ensures adherence to foundational Zionist principles of independence and sovereignty.

However dear America may be, decisions regarding the fate of our people must be made in Jerusalem. Not in Washington. Should one seek to draw-out any positive ramifications of the war so far then, it is that the Israeli strategic elite has finally begun to address the Elephant in the room that has invited itself to every Security Cabinet meeting since 1967. It is beginning to acknowledge that not only is US support frail and that existential choices must not depend on Pennsylvanians’ or Michiganders’ views of the Jewish State (or Jews as a whole depending on their appreciation for Nick Fuentes and other figures of the new “America First” movement), but also the immutable fact that two States’ core interests will never fully overlap. Even if President Trump puts a halt to discussions and resumes intensive kinetic operations then, Israel must not fall for the same trap twice. It will have to remain resolute in the achievement of its wartime objectives, even if Washington cannot articulate its own.

At the very least, Israel will keep applying pressure in Lebanon, in spite of the heavy diplomatic costs that would come at the expense of immediate normalization and if only as a means of signaling a shift in its national security outlook. Whilst it is regrettable that it took Israel’s leadership an Iranian upset to address this issue, one can only hope that from now on, necessary wars and strategic successes are not stimmied by a foreign power’s unilateral choices. All the more one led by a partisan of his predecessor’s Madman theory, designed to extricate that country from a similar predicament. And we all know how that debacle ended. Or do we?