After a year of Houthi attacks, Israel needs an ambitious approach
It has been one year since the Houthis opened fire on Israel. During that time, the terror group in control of northern Yemen has launched over 1,000 projectiles at Israel, at international shipping in the Red Sea, and at the Western coalition seeking to defend both Israel and the shipping. Despite the fact that this threat shows no sign of relenting, Israel lacks a clearly defined and coherent strategy for dealing with the Houthi threat.
Given the threats along its borders, emanating from Hamas in Gaza, Lebanese Hezbollah, and Iran-backed militias in Syria, it is understandable that Israel is preoccupied with the challenges in its direct line of sight. Still, one cannot help but ask if this “out of sight out of mind” approach is what enabled the Houthis to catch Israel by surprise to begin with. The Houthi threat was, after all, hiding in plain sight.
In July 2024, after a Houthi drone strike penetrated Israeli air defenses and killed a civilian living in Tel Aviv, Israel finally struck back. Jerusalem’s strategy appeared almost biblical in its “eye for an eye” (or in this case a port for a port) targeting of the Houthi’s Hodeida port lifeline; it was symbolic in the sense that the most significant damage the Houthis have caused to Israel thus far has been from cutting off the Eilat port’s Red Sea lifeline. The attack on Hodeidah caused a brief lull in Houthi attacks on Israel, but any deterrence Israel achieved eroded within a few months and the Houthis began to try their luck once more. Israel struck again, expanding its targets to include the Houthi port of Ras Issa as well, but the Iran-backed rebels in Yemen remain determined to continue attacks on Israel.
By inflicting painful damage on key regime assets, Israel seeks to convince the Houthis that it is in their own best interest to halt the attacks. In essence, Israel’s aim is to instill deterrence. This aim is possible to achieve to a degree: the Houthis are a religious extremist organization and a collection of ruthless thugs, but they are rational actors that seek to enjoy the fruits of their rule rather than commit collective suicide. The rationality of the regime means that they will seek to avoid provoking strikes that hit their pain points or place their rule at risk, but the radicalism within the regime means that any respite will be temporary as they cannot forfeit their stated aims of “death to America, death to Israel.”
Deterrence vis-à-vis the Houthis, if Israel can instill it, will have some important immediate benefits (ending the groups missile and drone fire on southern and central Israel as well as re-opening Eilat’s port for business) but will be as potentially fleeting as it was with respect to Hamas and Hezbollah. If the global and regional collective of anti-Houthi forces fail to press their advantage over the Houthis as the Iran-led axis of resistance experiences a moment weakness, then deterring the group amounts to kicking the can down the road. If the regime is allowed to remain in place and continue to build up its military power and entrench its control over the population, future confrontations will be at the time and place of Sanaa’s choosing – presumably at the worst possible time for Israel.
Therefore, while Israeli strikes on Houthi assets are a necessary step to halt the fighting, they do not constitute a comprehensive approach to the strategic problem. At the same time, any Israeli effort to resolve the Houthi challenge must set realistic aims for the extent to which it can reshape Yemen’s strategic environment or remake its political order.
What Israel ought to do with respect to the Houthis is exploit “situations of strength” that erode the pillars holding up the radical regime and enabling its military buildup. Jerusalem must determine what the Houthi regime’s weak points are and seek to exploit them in systematic ways over the long term. These weak points could relate to how the regime finances its rule and its war machine, how the regime dominates 20 million Yemenis (many of whom are dissatisfied with the abysmal conditions under the Houthis), which leaders occupy personalized posts essential to the movement’s function, and what capabilities enable the Houthis to threaten and extort their neighbors. If the Israeli approach remains focused on deterrence as the be all and end all of its Houthi policy, which is tactically achievable but strategically ineffective, then Israel and the entire Middle East will be faced with a North Korea on the Red Sea for many years to come.