All hail the Pax Turcica?
Türkiye’s influence is rising. Yet this is not simply Türkiye: it is Erdogan’s Türkiye. That Türkiye has engaged in struggles both domestically and internationally. It considers secularism an enemy; it aspires to become the dominant player in the Middle East; and, thus, it considers Israel an enemy.
A battle that started at home
The rise of President Recep Tayyip Erdogan in Türkiye and his remarkable staying power are quite impressive. For more than twenty years he has remained at the helm of Türkiye, winning election after election. He has preserved Turkish democracy and survived a military coup in a country where military coups occurred rather frequently since the founding of the Turkish republic by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. But is he really that popular? Does his impressive string of victories truly prove that he represents the “national will”? In my opinion, only one answer is possible: no.
Jenny White, an expert on Turkish politics, describes the current political system dominated by Erdogan’s AKP as an example of competitive authoritarianism. In other words, Turkish elections are contested, as other parties can compete – the secular CHP, for example – yet the playing field is not level. In addition, she argues that the AKP is a display of spindle autocracy. This means that loyalty to Erdogan eclipses merit and institutional integrity. Erdogan has managed to hollow out Turkish democracy effectively, by slowly entrenching the AKP in all sectors of society – the judiciary, business, media – in a bid to ensure that losing an election becomes nearly impossible. Yet, he has not abolished democracy altogether, because Turkish voters cherish their participation in the country’s political system. In other words, that would be too extreme.
As White goes on to explain, Erdogan did not initiate this process. For many decades conservative religious Turks were sidelined and discriminated against by Kemalist authoritarian rulers, who upheld the republic’s secular values and, on many occasions, were themselves the products of military coups. When Erdogan emerged, he initially gave a voice to these sidelined voters and would start his political career by becoming mayor of Istanbul. Already then, however, Erdogan made his positions clear. In 1994, during a televised debate with Turkish writer Aziz Nesin, Erdogan claimed that he followed Islamic law. Nesin, an atheist, answered that there was nothing wrong with Erdogan following Islamic law, except for the fact that it ran counter to the Turkish constitution, which states that Türkiye is a secular country. But this was already a sign of more to come.
In his book What is Populism?, expert Jan-Werner Müller offers a concise but very helpful analysis of what populism entails, that it is not exclusively right-wing – he uses Hugo Chávez as a prime example – and that one of its hallmarks is that it represents the “real” people. It considers itself to be the voice of the nation, the true representative of the people, the advocate of the national will. In democracies, however, the people are diverse and often have competing interests. Of course, every political leader will claim to speak for the people, yet most will acknowledge the legitimacy of opponents in the political arena. Populists, however, consider themselves the sole representatives of the nation. Not surprisingly, Müller uses Erdogan as an example of a populist in his book.
For instance, in 2014 Erdogan attended the wedding of the son of businessman Mustafa Kefeli. Back then, Erdogan railed against contraception, as he is a proponent of family values and prefers Turks to have at least three children. How did he hammer his point home? He simply called contraception “treason to the nation,” a devious scheme launched by “those” – i.e., seculars – who were trying to dry up future Turkish generations. This statement neatly defines the populist strategy. Everything that Erdogan disapproves of is not simply criticized, nay, it is immediately treason to the country. Thus, it does not reflect the national will and those who do use contraceptives are immediately traitors. There are many more examples of statements made by Erdogan, but this clearly shows his line of thinking. Yet, rhetoric alone is not enough to stay in power.
Ensuring victory
Another example Müller provides, is that when populists are in power, they will not stop and act like other political parties do. They will try to enforce control within the democratic framework, by trying to alter that framework, so it reflects their ideas about what they believe people truly want. That means that laws can be amended, courts can be packed with loyalists, and constitutions can be changed as well. In the case of Türkiye, Erdogan’s AKP embarked on a long mission of altering the country’s institutions, so they will align with his party’s needs – presented as the genuine wish of the people, of course.
In 2025, Freedom House scored Türkiye a disappointing score of 33/100, labeling it “not-free.” For a democracy, that sounds surprising, yet Freedom House concluded that Erdogan’s AKP has consolidated its power through constitutional changes, the imprisonment of political opponents, independent journalists, and members of civil society. It continued by stating that the AKP continues to limit public discourse and suppress dissent.
While Türkiye has many different media outlets, the problem is that nearly 90 percent of those outlets are controlled by pro-government businesses. Take newspapers, for instance. Among the most widely circulated newspapers four are owned by the Demirören Group – Hürriyet, Posta, Milliyet, and Fanatik, which focuses on sports. The Demirören Group is a family-owned business that enjoys close ties with Erdogan. Then you have Sabah – an Erdoganist newspaper – and Fotomaç, which focuses on sports. Both are owned by the Turkuvaz Media Group, whose CEO is a brother of a former AKP cabinet minister. Except for the fourth largest newspaper, Sözcü, which is centre-left, all other newspapers are right-wing, Islamist or openly pro-AKP.
Television media are similar. From public broadcaster TRT World – which should not be compared to Israel’s Kan, where criticism of the Israeli government can be seen frequently – to such outlets as Habertürk or CNNTürk, all exhibit a pro-government bias. White comments that this is clearly visible during elections, when the media are flooded with AKP representatives, while opposition politicians tend to receive a morsel of attention. The bias is clear, as was exhibited in past events that could damage the AKP’s image. Take the Gezi Park protests in 2013 in Istanbul. When police started clashing with protesters, broadcasters did their best to ignore the events by offering their viewers cooking shows and even documentaries about Adolf Hitler or penguins. Indeed, journalists and media companies have endured numerous government crackdowns in the past, all part of a strategy to make sure that dissent remains limited. This, of course, is combined with vilification of the AKP’s political opponents. Several journalists have gone into exile, examples being the Sweden-based Nordic Monitor and the Germany-based Turkish Minute. Considering the state of press freedom in Türkiye, it remains odd that Gideon Levy, a staunch critic of the Israeli government, seems to have no qualms giving frequent interviews to TRT World. By now, Erdogan is moving into the world of social media as well, promoting a “patriotic” Turkish app called Next Sosyal. The app just happens to have been developed by his son-in-law Selçuk Bayraktar – who co-owns the military drone company Baykar as well. Bayraktar calls the Turkish app an example of “national values” and proclaims that it is free, transparent and, of course, patriotic. Yet critics warn that it is an attempt to monitor citizens. Considering what has happened to regular media, I am inclined to agree with them.
What else has more than twenty years of AKP rule brought Türkiye? Well, next to prosperity for businesses and politicians loyal to or aligned with the government, not the kind of success that Erdogan had promised. For instance, in the latest global corruption index, Türkiye was listed as 107th, with a meagre score of 34. By contrast, Israel was ranked as 30th, with a score of 64. And in terms of organized crime, Türkiye remains a top-ten country on a global scale. That does not mean that the government does not attempt to combat corruption. The only oddity is that this anti-corruption seems to focus on its political enemies.
Despite all the attempts to make sure that the AKP will win every election, it cannot suppress the discontent of roughly half the country’s population. In 2024, Istanbul mayor Ekrem Imamoglu was re-elected and municipal elections were a painful defeat for Erdogan, with many cities electing or re-electing CHP mayors. But this year Imamoglu was suddenly arrested on corruption charges. Since then more members of the CHP have been arrested. Erdogan used his populist agenda again, once massive street protests in solidarity with Imamoglu erupted. The object was simple: paint the protesters as enemies of the people. Once again, he demonized the CHP by accusing them of “provoking” citizens with their “evil” deeds. In addition, the protesters were trying to “terrorize” the streets. By now, the Istanbul prosecutor has made clear what kind of conviction he seeks: a sentence for Imamoglu that exceeds 2,000 years. Moreover, he requested a higher court to consider outlawing the CHP altogether. If you ever wanted to know how to successfully hollow out a democracy, Erdogan continues to show the way.
The home of political Islam: symbols matter
To be fair, as White describes, the CHP in the past has dabbled in toxic rhetoric as well. As White explains, already in the Kemalist era Turkish citizens were taught about all the threats to Turkish unity – which usually were Armenians and Kurds, but could be Jews as well. But while past secular authoritarians leaders were turned inward, Erdogan is quite the opposite. Not only is he obsessed with shutting down opposition in Türkiye, he sponsors Islamists throughout the Middle East, too. Because he uses Islam as a vehicle for the return of Turkish dominance in the region, it is not surprising that he repeatedly indulges himself with Ottoman nostalgia. If there was any doubt left, there are two powerful symbols that have made the agenda crystal clear: the Presidential Palace and the Hagia Sophia.
The first move was to build the lavish Presidential Palace in Ankara. This was a clear nod to the ancient Topkapi Palace, where foreign dignitaries were received by Ottoman sultans. For good measure, each visitor to the Presidential Palace is received by an Ottoman honor guard; the message is subtle. Then he reversed the status of Hagia Sophia, a church built by the Byzantine emperor Justinian I, which was turned into a mosque when the Ottomans conquered Constantinople in 1453 and renamed the city Istanbul. Since the founding of the Turkish republic, the Hagia Sophia had been turned into a museum, in line with the secular values promoted by Atatürk. Erdogan smashed another secular sacred cow, by turning Hagia Sophia into a mosque once more in 2020. Again, the move is loaded with symbolism. It was a nod to Islamists and a sign that Türkiye was claiming the mantle of Muslim leadership. Not surprisingly, all of its Muslim allies throughout the Middle East – the Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas – praised the decision. However, regional voices expressed their dismay and recognized it for what it was: a claim to Turkish regional dominance through religion.
By now, Erdogan has ordered ten legal experts to draft a new constitution. It is not democratic at all, because Turkish voters are not consulted in the process. While Erdogan states that the old constitution needs to be replaced, critics argue that it could become the nail in the coffin of the old constitution’s secular foundation. Abroad, Türkiye hosts, funds, and even arms Islamists. Its relationship with Qatar is strong. Domestically, it provides shelter to Hamas and, although outlawed by Turkish law, allowed the jihadist organization Hizb ut-Tahrir to protest in Ankara, last August. They were not allowed near the Presidential Palace, but the police did allow them to protest in front of the American and Israeli embassies – anti-American and anti-Israel sentiments run high in Türkiye. Protesters shouted “Israel must be wiped out” and “Turkish troops to Gaza.” Which brings me to the final point.
The challenge of the Pax Turcica
I would argue that Erdogan wants to replace the American presence in the Middle East with a “Pax Turcica.” The best example is October 28, 2022. Erdogan hosted an event in Ankara with much fanfare. It was dubbed the “Century of Türkiye,” and praised by its mouthpiece Daily Sabah. Erdogan promised that the AKP’s vision document would bring a “revolution,” as it inaugurated the second century of the Turkish republic. The goal was to make Türkiye one of the largest countries in terms of politics, diplomacy, technology, economy, and the military. Yet the achievements on display were domestically produced military equipment. Again, the message is clear. Erdogan promises peace, but on his terms; this is his vision for the Middle East, the other countries are simply extras in his little play; he promotes Islamic cooperation, yet the aim is a return to Turkish hegemony and the sidelining of all those Muslims who do not subscribe to political Islam. Its effects are already known, as Turkish military bases in Syria and Iraq are becoming a permanent fixture. There is one obstacle to his aspirations: Israel.
Anyone familiar with Erdogan’s anti-Israel rhetoric knows how toxic his message has been for years. He himself called Israel a “goner” in 2023, barely a month after October 7th. Pundits and government officials regularly express their disgust when referring to Israel, but the rhetoric is not simply political grandstanding. Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan is considered by several sources to be even more hostile to Israel than Erdogan. And while Ibrahim Kalin, considered Erdogan’s successor, seems keen on restoring ties with Israel and even cared about the plight of the hostages, he remains a part of Türkiye’s vision for the Middle East. A vision that sees Islamism triumph, while being led by Türkiye. Considering the fact that the Turkish government published a document advising the massive construction of shelters – for what? – and the regular calls by loyal media outlets that war with Israel is coming – and even relishing the thought – make it impossible to ignore Turkish hostility. Therefore, Israel cannot allow Turkish troops on its borders: not in Syria, not in Gaza. Türkiye is an important regional player, but the future of the Middle East should reflect cooperation between countries, not a return to Ottoman hegemony in a different guise. The troubling signs are already there: Turkish aid workers are in Gaza, making their presence known by sporting the Turkish flag whenever they can; now, it is reported that Erdogan has already selected a military brigade to enter Gaza; and recently it emerged that the UAE will not join the ISF, due to the influence of Türkiye and Qatar. Both countries are determined to save Hamas, that much is clear.
Yet this is a question that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu needs to answer. He claimed that no Turkish troops would enter Gaza. Is he capable of preventing this or is he more interested in making sure that he is pardoned, even allowing President Trump to request it?
