Are India-Israel Ties Bigger Than Gaza?
For us as Indians, the relationship with Palestine is not a recent or distant issue. Since India’s independence in 1947, the Palestinian question has occupied an important place in the country’s foreign-policy consciousness. Successive Indian governments, from Jawaharlal Nehru to Indira Gandhi and later Atal Bihari Vajpayee, expressed strong support for Palestinian rights and for the establishment of an independent Palestinian state. India’s position was shaped not only by its post-colonial experience but also by its broader commitment to anti-colonialism, self-determination and the principles of the Non-Aligned Movement.
For decades, India’s engagement with Palestine was therefore deeply connected to its own understanding of the post-colonial world. The political language of that period was one of solidarity between peoples who had experienced colonial rule and struggled for self-determination.
But India’s foreign policy began to change significantly after the economic reforms of 1991. As India opened its economy, expanded its global engagement and increasingly defined its foreign policy through the lens of national interest, its relationship with Israel also began to acquire a new strategic importance.
India formally established diplomatic relations with Israel in 1992. What followed was a remarkable expansion of cooperation — particularly in defence, counterterrorism, agriculture, technology, water management and innovation.
The logic was increasingly straightforward: India had interests, Israel had capabilities, and the two countries discovered that their interests could complement each other.
Israel’s own experience with terrorism also resonated strongly in India, a country that has faced terrorism for decades. Israel’s willingness and ability to cooperate with India on security and defence made it an increasingly valuable partner.
Over time, this relationship moved beyond governments and strategic establishments. Israel began to develop a degree of familiarity and goodwill among sections of the Indian public as well. The image of Israel in India increasingly became associated not only with military strength but also with technological innovation, agriculture, entrepreneurship and resilience.
After 2014: A Relationship Becomes Strategic
The relationship gained another significant dimension after 2014.
Under the government of Prime Minister Narendra Modi, India-Israel relations became more visible and politically open. High-level visits increased, defence cooperation deepened, and collaboration expanded into intelligence, agriculture, water, technology and innovation.
Perhaps most importantly, the relationship became increasingly multidimensional.
India did not simply see Israel as a country from which it could purchase defence equipment. Israel increasingly became a partner with expertise that India could use for its own development and security requirements.
Agriculture is one example. Israel’s experience in drip irrigation, water conservation and agricultural technology has particular relevance for India. Cooperation in these areas demonstrates that the relationship is not simply about military hardware; it is also about adapting Israeli expertise to Indian developmental challenges.
The same can be said of technology, cybersecurity, innovation and research.
People-to-people relations have also become increasingly important. As Indians have travelled to Israel for education, employment, tourism and business, and as Israelis have engaged more closely with India, the relationship has developed a social dimension that did not exist at the same scale in previous decades.
This is an important transformation.
A relationship that once existed largely between governments is increasingly becoming a relationship between societies.
The I2U2 Dimension
The changing nature of the India-Israel relationship can also be understood through India’s participation in new regional and international frameworks.
The I2U2 grouping — India, Israel, the United Arab Emirates and the United States — represents one such development.
For India, this framework is significant because it brings together four countries with substantial economic, technological and strategic capabilities. Cooperation in areas such as food security, energy, water, transportation and technology reflects an increasingly interconnected approach to the Middle East.
The significance of I2U2 extends beyond any individual project.
India has traditionally maintained relationships with multiple competing powers and regional actors. Its participation in a framework involving Israel, the United States and the UAE demonstrates how New Delhi is increasingly willing to build new forms of strategic and economic cooperation without abandoning its principle of strategic autonomy.
This is particularly relevant in an era of growing Chinese influence across Asia and the Middle East.
For India, partnerships that strengthen connectivity, technology, economic resilience and security cooperation can contribute to protecting its own strategic interests.
Israel and India’s National Interest
This brings us to a fundamental point: foreign policy is ultimately about national interest.
India can support Palestinian statehood and simultaneously maintain a strong relationship with Israel because these positions do not necessarily contradict each other.
India’s foreign policy has never been entirely static. The country that emerged from independence in 1947 had different priorities from the India of the 1990s. And the India of the twenty-first century operates in an international system that is radically different from the Cold War era.
The growth of India-Israel relations reflects this transformation.
Israel is a relatively small country geographically, but its technological, military and intelligence capabilities give it significance far beyond its size. For India, this makes Israel an important strategic partner.
And the relationship is increasingly reciprocal.
The changing role of Indian workers in Israel provides an interesting example.
Following the October 7 attacks and the subsequent disruption of the Israeli labour market, India and Israel expanded cooperation on the recruitment of Indian workers for Israel’s construction sector. Thousands of Indian workers have travelled to Israel to fill labour shortages, particularly in construction.
This development is significant because it demonstrates that bilateral relations are no longer confined to diplomats, defence officials and government agreements.
They increasingly involve ordinary citizens.
An Indian worker building a home or infrastructure project in Israel is participating, in a very practical way, in the economic relationship between the two countries.
For Israel, India represents a large and increasingly important source of skilled and semi-skilled labour, technology, investment and economic cooperation. For India, Israel represents access to expertise, technology, employment opportunities and strategic cooperation.
That is the nature of modern international relations: countries cooperate where their interests meet.
But What About Palestine?
None of this means that India’s support for Palestine has disappeared.
It has not.
India continues to support a two-state solution and has repeatedly emphasized the need for a negotiated political settlement to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. New Delhi has also continued providing humanitarian assistance to Palestinians.
India can therefore recognize Palestinian aspirations while maintaining a strong strategic relationship with Israel.
This balancing act is not necessarily hypocrisy. It reflects India’s attempt to preserve diplomatic space.
India has relationships with Israel, the Gulf countries, Iran, the United States and Russia. It has economic interests in the Arab world, energy interests in the Gulf, security interests with Israel and broader geopolitical interests involving the United States and Russia.
A country aspiring to become a major global power cannot afford to reduce its foreign policy to a single binary choice.
October 7 and the Gaza War
The Gaza war has nevertheless changed the political environment surrounding India-Israel relations.
India was among the countries that strongly condemned the October 7, 2023 attacks by Hamas. For New Delhi, the killing and targeting of civilians could not simply be ignored because of the broader political context.
At the same time, India has continued to speak about Palestinian humanitarian concerns and the need for a two-state solution.
India does not have to choose between acknowledging Palestinian suffering and recognizing Israel’s security concerns.
The tragedy of Gaza should not erase the tragedy of October 7. And recognition of the horrors of October 7 should not require indifference toward Palestinian civilians.
A mature foreign policy must be capable of holding both realities at once.
Bigger Than One War
The India-Israel relationship should therefore not be measured solely through the Gaza war.
It is the product of more than three decades of diplomatic relations and decades of gradual engagement before that. It encompasses defence, intelligence, agriculture, water, technology, innovation, trade, employment and people-to-people connections.
India’s relationship with Palestine remains important.
India’s relationship with Israel is also important.
There is no inherent contradiction in acknowledging both.
For India, the Middle East is not simply a theatre of conflict. It is increasingly a region of economic opportunity, technological cooperation, connectivity and strategic competition.
Israel occupies an important place within that larger picture.
Perhaps the most important lesson is that international relationships cannot be frozen in the politics of a single moment.
Governments change. Wars begin and end. Regional alliances evolve. National interests, however, often remain.
India’s relationship with Israel has evolved because India’s understanding of its own national interest has evolved.
The Gaza war is undoubtedly an important chapter in that relationship.
But it is not the whole book.
And if India wants to play a larger role in shaping the future of the Middle East, it will need to continue engaging with Israel, Palestine and the wider region — not by choosing one relationship over another, but by pursuing peace, development and its own national interests simultaneously.
