Sergio Restelli

Asim Munir’s Dangerous Gamble to Redraw Pakistan

Under the pretext of administrative reform, Pakistan’s powerful military chief appears to be preparing a fundamental reorganisation of the country’s political geography. But the proposed division of its provinces raises a far more consequential question. Is Asim Munir attempting to reform Pakistan, or dismantle the political structures that stand between him and absolute power?

Pakistan has spent much of its existence struggling to reconcile the authority of its military with the legitimacy of its civilian institutions. More than seven decades after independence, the country remains trapped in this contradiction. Governments are elected, constitutions amended, political parties compete for power, yet the ultimate authority continues to rest with the army. Field Marshal Asim Munir is now taking this historical imbalance into potentially dangerous territory.

A proposal to divide Pakistan’s four provinces into as many as 12 to 15 smaller administrative units has emerged as one of the most consequential political debates in the country. Presented as an attempt to improve governance, decentralise administration and bring the state closer to its citizens, the initiative could fundamentally alter Pakistan’s federal structure.

The proposal has been linked to Munir, although no formal blueprint bearing his endorsement has been published. The Economist, in an editorial published on October 8, characterised the initiative as an attempt to fragment the political opposition and consolidate the military chief’s authority. The concern is not without foundation. Pakistan’s provincial boundaries are not merely geographical divisions. They represent political constituencies, historical identities, economic interests and, perhaps most importantly, centres of power that have periodically resisted the military establishment.

For Munir, weakening these centres could achieve what decades of military interference have failed to accomplish permanently. It could create a political system in which no civilian institution possesses sufficient territorial, financial or electoral strength to challenge the army.

The implications extend considerably beyond administrative reform.

The politics of dividing a country

Pakistan’s four provinces, Punjab, Sindh, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan, are extraordinarily different in their demographic composition, economic importance and political histories.

Punjab, with approximately 128 million inhabitants, is the country’s demographic and political centre of gravity. It has traditionally been dominated by the Sharif family’s Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz. Sindh, which includes Karachi, Pakistan’s principal commercial centre, remains the political stronghold of the Bhutto-Zardari dynasty and the Pakistan Peoples Party.

Khyber Pakhtunkhwa has become a major centre of support for Imran Khan’s Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf, while Balochistan continues to experience a longstanding insurgency rooted in grievances over political representation, resource distribution and the relationship between the province and Islamabad.

These regional political structures have survived successive military governments precisely because they possess constituencies that cannot easily be controlled from the capital.

Breaking them into smaller provinces could diminish the influence of established political parties while multiplying the number of provincial governments dependent on the federal establishment.

The strategy would not necessarily require abolishing democracy. Elections could continue, provincial assemblies could function and political parties could retain their formal existence. Yet the political weight of each institution would be considerably reduced.

Pakistan would remain a federation on paper while becoming increasingly centralised in practice.

There is an important distinction between decentralising governance and fragmenting political authority. Genuine decentralisation transfers power, resources and accountability closer to citizens. Fragmentation, when orchestrated by an already dominant central authority, can produce precisely the opposite result.

This is the fundamental contradiction at the heart of the proposed reforms.

A military establishment that has outgrown the state

Munir’s political ambitions cannot be examined independently of the extraordinary expansion of military authority under his leadership.

Pakistan’s armed forces have historically exercised influence over foreign policy, national security and relations with India, Afghanistan and the United States. Their economic interests, extending into real estate, agriculture, manufacturing and commercial enterprises, have also made the military an important economic actor.

Under Munir, however, the concentration of authority has acquired an increasingly personal character. The constitutional changes of recent years have strengthened the military leadership’s institutional position while reducing the independence of civilian checks and balances. The creation of a Federal Constitutional Court and changes to the military command structure have contributed to a political environment in which the boundaries between civilian government and military authority have become progressively less meaningful.

Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif presides over an elected government, but his political survival remains closely connected to the military establishment. Interior Minister Mohsin Naqvi, regarded as a close associate of Munir, has emerged as an influential advocate of administrative restructuring.

It was Naqvi who publicly argued in July that Pakistan’s existing governance system was incapable of meeting the country’s challenges and that new administrative units were necessary. By September, Planning Minister Ahsan Iqbal was discussing alternatives involving either 15 provinces or stronger district-level governments. The argument is superficially persuasive. Pakistan’s population has grown enormously, its institutions are frequently inefficient and its provincial governments are hardly models of transparency or competence.

But the question is whether the proposed changes would address these failures or simply redistribute political power in favour of the military.

Pakistan’s governance problems cannot be attributed exclusively to its provincial administrations. Decades of military intervention, distorted institutional priorities and the systematic weakening of civilian authority have played a substantial role in creating the very conditions now being invoked to justify further restructuring.

A military establishment that has repeatedly intervened in the functioning of the state cannot credibly present itself as an entirely external solution to the state’s failures.

The Sharifs, the Bhuttos and the limits of military power

The most immediate political consequences of provincial fragmentation would be felt by the two parties that have dominated Pakistan’s civilian politics for decades.

The Sharif family’s influence rests heavily on Punjab, while the Bhutto-Zardari dynasty has maintained its political relevance through its control of Sindh. Both parties have cooperated with the military establishment when expedient, yet both retain regional power bases that give them a degree of autonomy.

Munir’s proposed restructuring could undermine that autonomy. Dividing Punjab into smaller provinces would potentially weaken the Sharifs’ electoral machinery and create new provincial leaderships with their own ambitions and loyalties. The consequences for the Pakistan Peoples Party could be even more serious.

Sindh provides the PPP with its most reliable political foundation. Karachi, despite its complex political history and limited electoral support for the PPP in parts of the city, remains central to the province’s economic and administrative importance. Any attempt to separate Karachi from Sindh or place it under federal administration would fundamentally alter the balance of power.

The resistance has already begun. On September 3, the Sindh Assembly unanimously adopted a resolution rejecting attempts to divide the province or detach any part of its territory. The assembly invoked Article 239(4) of Pakistan’s Constitution, which requires the approval of two-thirds of the affected provincial assembly before its boundaries can be altered.

This presents Munir with a significant obstacle. Provincial fragmentation cannot legally be imposed through a simple executive decision. Constitutional amendments require substantial parliamentary majorities and the consent of the provinces concerned.

The possibility of a referendum has consequently entered the political debate, although constitutional lawyers have questioned whether such a mechanism could circumvent the protections afforded to the provinces.

The confrontation could become a defining test of whether Pakistan’s civilian institutions retain any meaningful capacity to resist military pressure.

Imran Khan and the unfinished political battle

The proposed restructuring also needs to be understood against the continuing political significance of Imran Khan.

Despite his imprisonment and the restrictions imposed on his political movement, Khan remains a powerful symbol of opposition to the military establishment. His party retains considerable support, particularly in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, and his continued political relevance represents a problem that Munir has been unable to resolve.

Removing a political leader from office is considerably easier than eliminating the constituency that supports him.

The military establishment has previously attempted to manage Pakistan’s political landscape by encouraging defections, influencing electoral alliances and supporting alternative civilian leaderships. Yet these methods have repeatedly failed to produce durable political stability.

Redrawing provincial boundaries could offer another means of weakening opposition networks, particularly where a party’s electoral strength is concentrated geographically.

There is, however, an inherent danger in this strategy.

Fragmenting the established political parties could also destroy the arrangements through which the military currently exercises influence over civilian politics. The Sharifs and the Bhuttos may be inconvenient partners, but they remain partners. A political system in which every significant civilian force has been weakened could leave the military directly responsible for governing a country whose economic and security challenges it cannot resolve alone.

Munir may discover that dismantling political opposition is not the same as establishing political legitimacy.

Balochistan and the danger of territorial fragmentation

Perhaps the greatest danger lies in Balochistan.

Pakistan’s largest province by area has experienced decades of separatist violence, political alienation and disputes over the exploitation of natural resources. Its strategic importance has increased with Chinese investments, particularly those associated with the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor and the port of Gwadar.

For Islamabad, Balochistan is indispensable. For many Baloch nationalists, however, the relationship with the federal government has long been characterised by grievances over political representation, economic exclusion and military operations.

Any attempt to divide the province would therefore take place in an already volatile environment.

Administrative restructuring might be defended as a means of improving governance and distributing resources more equitably. But without political consent, it could be interpreted as another attempt to dilute regional identity and weaken demands for autonomy.

Pakistan has historical reasons to understand the consequences of such an approach.

The separation of East Pakistan in 1971 was not simply the result of external intervention or military defeat. It followed a prolonged failure to accommodate the political aspirations of a population whose democratic mandate had been denied.

The circumstances today are different, and the creation of smaller provinces does not automatically imply national disintegration. Nevertheless, the historical lesson remains relevant. Territorial unity cannot be maintained indefinitely through military authority alone when political grievances are left unresolved.

In Balochistan, where distrust of Islamabad is already deeply entrenched, imposing a new political geography without broad consent could strengthen precisely those forces the military seeks to contain.

Similar sensitivities exist in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, where questions of ethnic identity, tribal integration, security and provincial autonomy remain unresolved.

A policy intended to make Pakistan easier to govern could instead make it more difficult to hold together.

The economic cost of political engineering

There is also the question of whether Pakistan can afford the proposed transformation.

The country continues to struggle with fiscal pressures, debt obligations, limited public resources and the enormous costs of maintaining its existing administrative and security apparatus.

Creating new provinces would require additional assemblies, governors, chief ministers, bureaucracies, judicial institutions and administrative infrastructure.

An October estimate by the Islamabad-based Policy Research Institute of Market Economy suggested that dividing Punjab into three provinces alone could cost between 46.9 billion and 56.2 billion Pakistani rupees annually. A much more extensive restructuring into 30 provinces could raise annual costs to between 609.2 billion and 730.3 billion rupees, excluding several significant establishment expenses.

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The distribution of financial resources would create further complications.

Pakistan’s provinces currently receive 57.5% of the federal divisible pool of taxes. Their respective shares are determined through an established fiscal arrangement that would have to be reconsidered if new provinces were created.

Water distribution would be equally contentious. The Indus River system is central to Pakistan’s agricultural economy, and existing agreements governing water allocation are based on the current provincial structure.

Redrawing boundaries without resolving these questions could generate new disputes over revenue, resources and political representation.

More importantly, administrative fragmentation does not automatically produce better governance.

Pakistan could end up with more governments, more politicians, more bureaucrats and greater expenditure without any corresponding improvement in public services.

For a country already struggling to finance its existing obligations, the economic consequences could be considerable.

A new presidency for Munir?

The most intriguing aspect of the debate concerns Munir’s longer-term political ambitions.

Pakistan has experienced military rulers who eventually sought to transform their authority into a more permanent political arrangement. General Pervez Musharraf, who seized power in 1999, subsequently assumed the presidency and attempted to construct a civilian political order compatible with continued military dominance.

Munir’s accumulation of authority has prompted speculation that he may eventually seek a similarly powerful executive position.

A fragmented provincial structure could facilitate such an arrangement by weakening regional political centres and strengthening the authority of the federal executive.

But this remains a political hypothesis rather than an established plan. There is no publicly confirmed proposal demonstrating that Munir intends to assume the presidency or that provincial restructuring has been designed specifically for that purpose.

What is evident is that the debate is no longer confined to speculation. On November 17, Al Jazeera reported that Defence Minister Khawaja Asif believed new provinces could emerge as early as the beginning of 2027. He acknowledged, however, that he possessed no inside information supporting a definite timetable. No agreed constitutional amendment, number of provinces or final restructuring plan had been made public.

The significance lies in the growing political acceptance of an idea that would have been extraordinarily contentious under a less dominant military leadership.

The question is whether Pakistan’s political parties will eventually accept the fragmentation of their own territorial foundations in exchange for continued participation in government.

Pakistan’s most dangerous contradiction

Munir’s ambitions expose a contradiction that has defined Pakistan since its creation.

The military justifies its political authority by presenting itself as the institution capable of preserving national unity and stability. Yet its repeated interventions have contributed to the weakening of the civilian institutions on which sustainable national unity depends.

The proposed division of Pakistan’s provinces risks perpetuating this cycle.

There is a legitimate argument for administrative reform. Punjab’s enormous population, the concentration of economic resources in Karachi, the governance difficulties of Balochistan and the security challenges of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa all deserve serious institutional attention.

Smaller provinces could, under the right circumstances, improve representation and public administration.

But reforms designed primarily to weaken political opponents are unlikely to strengthen democracy, irrespective of the administrative benefits they promise.

Pakistan’s political parties are hardly innocent participants in this struggle. Dynastic politics, corruption, patronage and institutional incompetence have all contributed to the country’s predicament. Nevertheless, the failures of civilian politicians do not provide an unlimited mandate for military intervention.

A country’s political geography belongs to its citizens, not to the institution that commands its armed forces.

Munir may believe that breaking Pakistan into smaller administrative units will allow him to consolidate authority and overcome the resistance of entrenched political interests. He may even succeed in persuading or pressuring sections of the civilian establishment to support the initiative.

But Pakistan’s history suggests that concentrating authority in the military has rarely produced the stability promised by those who pursue it.

The danger is not simply that Munir could succeed in dividing the provinces. It is that, in attempting to eliminate competing centres of power, he could further weaken the political foundations holding Pakistan together.

Pakistan has already lost one half of its territory because its rulers failed to distinguish between controlling a country and governing its people. The tragedy would be for its military leadership to repeat that mistake while claiming to be saving the nation.

About the Author
Sergio Restelli is an Italian political advisor, author and geopolitical expert. He served in the Craxi government in the 1990's as the special assistant to the deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Justice Martelli and worked closely with anti-mafia magistrates Falcone and Borsellino. Over the past decades he has been involved in peace building and diplomacy efforts in the Middle East and North Africa. He has written for Geopolitica and several Italian online and print media. In 2020 his first fiction "Napoli sta bene" was published.
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