Bangladesh’s Leadership Crisis and Rising Islamist Threats
When Nobel Peace laureate Muhammad Yunus became Chief Adviser of Bangladesh’s interim government, expectations were high that his global reputation would stabilise the country’s fragile politics. Yet recent events in the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) show how far that hope has fallen short. Yunus’s administration now risks not only deepening domestic unrest but also opening the door to ideological extremism that could destabilise South Asia.
In late September 2025, protests in the Khagrachari district turned deadly. Indigenous youths demanding justice after the rape of a schoolgirl were met with live fire; several were killed, and others were wounded. In the aftermath, arson attacks destroyed shops and homes, mostly belonging to Indigenous owners. This violence is part of a long history of militarised repression in the Hill Tracts, where security operations have treated Indigenous grievances as insurgent threats rather than as legitimate calls for justice.
The CHT crisis is more than a local issue. Its location on Bangladesh’s borders with India and Myanmar makes it a regional fault line. Repression there echoes Myanmar’s Rakhine conflict, where domestic violence escalated into a humanitarian crisis with spillover effects across South Asia. If Dhaka continues to securitise Indigenous identity, unrest could spread across borders, straining India’s Northeast and amplifying instability already flowing from Myanmar.
What makes this moment especially precarious is the convergence of repression with the rise of Islamist mobilisation in Bangladesh. Recent years have seen banned groups rally openly in Dhaka for the establishment of an Islamic caliphate, while previously outlawed Islamist parties have been rehabilitated into mainstream politics. These shifts create new political space for radical narratives to grow.
There is no credible evidence that Hamas operates in Bangladesh. But the ideological parallels are striking. Hamas’s stated aim to erase Israel resonates with how some Islamist currents in Bangladesh frame Indigenous peoples of the CHT — not as citizens with rights but as outsiders threatening a Muslim-majority identity. In Bangladesh, public opinion has long been strongly sympathetic toward Hamas and the Palestinian cause, and this sentiment reinforces ideological narratives that equate minority identity with disloyalty. If such narratives gain influence, repression could acquire a theological justification, intensifying both state and non-state violence against minorities.
For India, instability in the CHT has direct strategic implications. Its “Act East” connectivity projects depend on secure borders, yet unrest in the Hill Tracts could fuel separatist movements in the Northeast. Myanmar’s ongoing civil war already burdens Indian border management; a second crisis in Bangladesh would multiply the risks. Pakistan, though geographically distant, could also seek to exploit rising Islamist currents in Bangladesh for ideological or strategic leverage.
Yunus’s predicament highlights the gap between symbolic legitimacy abroad and fragile authority at home. Internationally, he is celebrated as a Nobel laureate. Domestically, his administration faces disillusionment as military repression continues and Islamist groups regain legitimacy. Unless Yunus shifts from symbolic leadership to concrete institutional reform, his Nobel legacy may become a cautionary tale rather than a source of stability.
Bangladesh must act on three fronts. First, accountability for the Khagrachari shootings is essential — an independent investigation must identify responsibility and provide justice. Second, Yunus must prioritise institutional reform over personal prestige, empowering civilian courts, police, and local governance in the CHT. Third, the interim government must draw a firm line against importing ideological justifications for violence, keeping Islamist movements from shaping security policy toward minorities.
The risk is not imminent state collapse but gradual erosion. Repression of Indigenous communities, youth discontent, and ideological radicalisation could accumulate into a tipping point. For South Asia, already destabilised by Myanmar’s war and India–Pakistan rivalry, such an erosion in Bangladesh would be dangerous.
The lesson is clear: acclaim abroad cannot substitute for legitimacy at home. If Bangladesh fails to reconcile Indigenous rights and democratic governance, the Hill Tracts could become a new flashpoint in the contest between secular statehood and religious radicalism. That would endanger not only Indigenous survival but also South Asia’s fragile regional balance.
October 3, 2025
Tokyo, Japan
