Before October 7: What Hamas’s Planning Documents Reveal

The Hamas-led attack on Israel on October 7, 2023, was not a spontaneous outbreak of violence. It was the culmination of extensive preparation involving intelligence gathering, military training, operational planning, and the deliberate exploitation of vulnerabilities along Israel’s border with the Gaza Strip.

More than 1,200 people were killed, and 251 were abducted to Gaza. Entire communities in southern Israel were devastated. The scale and character of the assault raised fundamental questions about Hamas’s intentions, the planning that preceded the attack, and the extent to which its objectives were understood before the massacre.

Documents recovered in Gaza during the subsequent war provide important evidence for understanding these questions. They reveal not only how Hamas prepared its forces but also how its leadership envisioned the strategic consequences of an attack on Israel.

Among the most significant materials are handwritten planning instructions attributed to Yahya al-Sinwar, dated August 24, 2022, together with invasion-planning documents and operational orders prepared for specific Israeli communities.

These materials offer an unusually direct insight into the thinking and preparations behind October 7.

From Strategic Ambition to Operational Planning

Hamas had long advocated Israel’s destruction. For many years, however, that objective remained primarily ideological, while the organization concentrated on strengthening its military capabilities and maintaining control over Gaza.

Documents examined by the Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center indicate that Hamas’s strategic thinking underwent an important development after the May 2021 confrontation with Israel.

Senior Hamas figures increasingly viewed Israel as vulnerable and began considering whether a broader regional confrontation could create conditions for a decisive strategic change.

This thinking was not confined to public declarations. Internal correspondence and planning materials show that Hamas explored different scenarios for a major confrontation, including the possibility of simultaneous military pressure from Gaza, Lebanon, and other fronts.

The documents therefore illustrate a progression from ideological objectives to strategic planning and, ultimately, to preparations for a large-scale military operation.

Yahya al-Sinwar’s August 2022 Instructions

One of the most revealing documents is a handwritten memorandum attributed to Yahya al-Sinwar and dated August 24, 2022, more than 13 months before the October 7 attack.

The document contains instructions concerning the preparation and execution of a major assault on Israel.

Its significance lies in the combination of operational detail and strategic purpose.

The planning involved breaches at multiple points along the Gaza border, the movement of successive waves of fighters into Israeli territory, attacks on military positions and civilian communities, and the rapid expansion of operations before Israeli forces could organize an effective response.

The instructions also addressed command arrangements, communications, coordination between participating forces, and the need to preserve operational secrecy.

Particular attention was given to psychological warfare. The planning envisioned violent actions being documented and disseminated to create fear, undermine Israeli confidence, and magnify the attack’s effects beyond the immediate battlefield.

The importance of this material extends beyond its description of military methods. It demonstrates that the psychological impact of violence against Israelis was contemplated as part of the operation itself.

The document must nevertheless be read carefully. It records intentions and instructions formulated during the planning process. Its significance is strengthened by comparison with other operational documents and the events that subsequently occurred on October 7.

Planning for a Large-Scale Invasion

Additional Hamas planning materials from 2021 and 2022 describe preparations for an invasion involving thousands of fighters.

The documents contemplated simultaneous border breaches, attacks on military installations, the occupation of road junctions, and assaults on Israeli communities.

They also included arrangements for taking hostages and moving captives into Gaza.

A particularly disturbing aspect of the planning concerned the treatment of Israeli residents after the seizure of communities. Certain documents envisioned the removal of women and children and the capture of men within specified age groups.

These were not simply abstract statements about resistance or confrontation. They concerned the practical organization of an invasion into Israeli territory.

The materials also reveal the importance attached to secrecy. Individual fighters were not necessarily to be informed of the full scope of the operation in advance.

Taken together, the documents demonstrate that Hamas had developed a framework for a complex, coordinated assault involving numerous locations and different categories of targets.

The Operational Plan for Kibbutz Mefalsim

An especially revealing example is the Hamas operational plan for Kibbutz Mefalsim, one of the Israeli communities near the Gaza border.

The document, associated with Hamas’s Northern Brigade, contains detailed instructions for the forces assigned to the operation.

Its cover is dated October 2022, while material within the document bears a later date in June 2023.

The plan identifies participating units and their responsibilities, including the deployment of a platoon of approximately 25 fighters, organized into smaller groups with designated functions.

It specifies weapons, motorcycles, communications arrangements, and other operational requirements.

The document illustrates how the broader invasion strategy was translated into instructions for a particular Israeli community.

Rather than treating southern Israel as a single undifferentiated target, Hamas developed plans addressing individual locations, their characteristics, and the forces required to attack them.

The operational planning for Mefalsim should not be confused with a complete account of what happened there on October 7. A planning document establishes what was intended or ordered, while reconstruction of the attack requires additional evidence about what was actually carried out.

Nevertheless, the existence and detail of such instructions demonstrate the degree of advance preparation.

Iran, Hezbollah, and the Regional Dimension

The planning documents also illuminate Hamas’s relationship with Iran and Hezbollah.

For years, Iran had provided Hamas with financial assistance, weapons-related support, training, and military expertise. Hezbollah served as another important partner within the regional network commonly described as the axis of resistance.

Documents examined by the Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center show that Hamas’s leadership discussed scenarios for a large-scale confrontation involving several fronts.

Correspondence from June and July 2022 indicates that senior Hamas representatives presented strategic scenarios to Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah and discussed them through channels involving Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.

These discussions demonstrate that Hamas’s ambitions for a major confrontation with Israel were not merely known to Iran and Hezbollah.

According to internal Hamas correspondence from July 2022, Hassan Nasrallah explicitly supported the proposed large-scale strategic campaign, while a senior representative of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps also expressed support in principle. The discussions thus indicate active endorsement of Hamas’s broader strategic concept, rather than mere awareness or passive acquiescence. Further consultations, particularly with the Iranian leadership, were nevertheless anticipated.

Hamas hoped that a major assault would provoke or facilitate a broader regional confrontation, with other armed organizations participating against Israel.

This ambition was also reflected in the public statements made by Hamas leaders when the attack began on October 7, 2023. In a statement broadcast by Al Jazeera, Ismail Haniyeh, then head of Hamas’s political bureau, called on Palestinians in the West Bank, Israeli Arabs, and the wider nation abroad to join the battle. His appeal demonstrated that Hamas sought to extend the confrontation beyond Gaza by mobilizing additional participants across Israel, the Palestinian territories, and the wider region. The objective was not merely to carry out an assault from Gaza, but to encourage a broader confrontation involving multiple fronts and populations.

The documents also show that Hamas considered scenarios in which it would initiate the fighting without immediate full-scale intervention by its regional allies.

This distinction is important. The strategic discussions establish the existence of regional coordination and awareness of Hamas’s broader intentions. They do not, by themselves, establish that every element of the subsequent operation was jointly planned or directed by all participants.

The October 7 assault ultimately began in Gaza, while Hezbollah’s involvement developed through subsequent fighting along Israel’s northern border.

The distinction between strategic cooperation and operational execution is essential to understanding both the attack itself and the regional conflict that followed.

What the Documents Establish

The importance of these documents lies in their cumulative evidentiary value.

The handwritten instructions attributed to al-Sinwar reveal the leadership’s intentions and planning priorities. The invasion-planning materials describe the envisaged scale and organization of the operation. The Mefalsim plan demonstrates how broader objectives were translated into specific operational instructions.

Together, they establish that the October 7 attack emerged from a sustained planning process rather than an improvised decision.

They also provide evidence that attacks on civilian communities, hostage-taking, and the deliberate creation of fear formed part of the contemplated operation.

These findings are relevant not only to historical analysis but also to the legal examination of October 7. Under international humanitarian law, civilians may not be deliberately targeted, and hostage-taking is prohibited. The existence of advance instructions bearing on these acts is therefore of particular importance when assessing the intentions and responsibilities of those involved.

The documents do not eliminate the need for independent verification, contextual interpretation, or comparison with other evidence. Their provenance, authorship, translation, and relationship to subsequent events must all be considered.

But they substantially deepen our understanding of how Hamas prepared for the assault.

October 7 was a catastrophe for the communities attacked and a turning point in Israel’s history. The documents now available reveal that the operation was preceded by extensive preparations, shaped by ideological objectives, strategic calculations, and detailed military planning.

Understanding those preparations is essential to understanding the events of October 7 and the wider regional confrontation that followed.

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Sources and Documentation

The Amit Terrorism and Intelligence Research Institute
Hamas’ Strategy to Destroy Israel: From Theory into Practice, as Seen in Captured Documents
March 13, 2025
https://www.terrorism-info.org.il/en/hamas-strategy-to-destroy-israel-from-theory-into-practice-as-seen-in-captured-documents/

The Amit Terrorism and Intelligence Research Institute
Yahya Sinwar’s Plan for the Invasion of Israel, as Detailed in a Hamas Document
July 13, 2026
https://www.terrorism-info.org.il/en/yahya-sinwars-plan-for-the-invasion-of-israel-as-detailed-in-a-hamas-document/

The Missing October 7th Files – Organized Evil
Operation Order for the Raid on Kibbutz Mefalsim
 Hamas Operational Planning Document
https://www.october7files.com/preparations-for-the-massacre/operation-order-for-the-raid-on-kibbutz-mefalsim/

The Amit Terrorism and Intelligence Research Institute
Hamas’ Perception of Hezbollah’s Role in the Multi-Arena Hostilities as Reflected in Documents from the Gaza Strip
July 7, 2026
https://www.terrorism-info.org.il/en/hamas-perception-of-hezbollahs-role-in-the-multi-arena-hostilities-as-reflected-in-documents-from-the-gaza-strip/

The Amit Terrorism and Intelligence Research Institute
The Deception Plan Practiced by Hamas before the October 7, 2023 Attack (Including Documents from the Gaza Strip)
June 18, 2026
https://www.terrorism-info.org.il/en/the-deception-plan-practiced-by-hamas-before-the-october-7-2023-attack-including-documents-from-the-gaza-strip/

7 October Parliamentary Commission (APPG UK-Israel)
Report, Second Edition
March 2026
https://www.7octparliamentarycommission.co.uk/second-edition

MEMRI TV
Al-Jazeera Airs Hamas Leader Ismail Haniyeh’s Statement on Hamas’s Invasion of Southern Israel
October 7, 2023
Clip No. 10501
https://www.memri.org/tv/hamas-leader-ismail-haniyeh-statement-jazeera-operation-aqsa-deluge-palestinains-west-bank-israel-abroad-join-battle