Berbera at the Crossroads: The Case for a US–Somaliland Partnership
Why location, security, and diplomacy are pushing Washington and Hargeisa closer.
The proverb “a friend in need is a friend indeed” offers a useful way to view relations between the United States and Somaliland. Washington needs reliable access near a vital maritime corridor. Somaliland needs investment, security cooperation, and a way out of diplomatic isolation. Their interests are not identical, but they increasingly overlap.
A Strategic Coastline
The Red Sea and Gulf of Aden are under growing pressure from attacks on commercial shipping, piracy, regional rivalries, and competition among global powers. At the centre is the Bab el-Mandeb strait, a narrow passage connecting Europe and Asia and carrying a major share of global trade.
Somaliland lies across the Gulf of Aden from Yemen and controls a long coastline on this corridor. Its position gives it strategic importance far beyond its size—and gives Washington reason to cultivate a stable partner near one of the world’s most consequential chokepoints.
What Washington Could Gain
The United States relies heavily on Camp Lemonnier in Djibouti for regional military and counter-terrorism operations. But Djibouti hosts several foreign bases, including China’s first overseas naval facility. This creates surveillance concerns and concentrates American activity in one location.
Berbera could provide a useful alternative. Its modernized deep-water port and long airport runway could support logistics, maritime patrols, surveillance, humanitarian relief, and emergency access. It would not replace Djibouti, but it could diversify US options and reduce dependence on a single hub.
Somaliland also offers relative political stability. While Somalia continues to struggle with Al-Shabaab and weak governance, Somaliland has built functioning institutions, maintained internal security, and held competitive elections. Its ties with Taiwan and Israel and resistance to pressure from Beijing further align it with Western strategic interests.
What Somaliland Needs
Somaliland’s central goal is international recognition. Since restoring its claimed independence in 1991, it has operated as a de facto state with its own government, currency, security forces, and public institutions. Yet it remains outside formal diplomacy and many international financial systems.
Closer ties with Washington could bring political legitimacy, direct development assistance, and private investment. Ports, energy, telecommunications, critical minerals, and the Berbera trade corridor to Ethiopia all offer opportunities. Security assistance—coastal surveillance, professional training, and maritime equipment—could also help Somaliland police its waters and disrupt smuggling.
The Diplomatic Dilemma
The obstacle is Washington’s long-standing support for Somalia’s fictional territorial integrity. The United States works with Mogadishu on counterterrorism and state-building, and formal recognition of Somaliland could damage that relationship, challenge African Union norms, and intensify regional tensions.
The Ethiopia–Somaliland memorandum of understanding showed how quickly the issue can escalate. It proposed Ethiopian access to Somaliland’s coast and hinted at movement toward recognition. Somalia rejected it as a violation of sovereignty, raising fears that the dispute could weaken cooperation against Al-Shabaab and widen rivalries.
Yet ignoring the Republic of Somaliland also carries costs. Berbera’s infrastructure, instability in Red Sea shipping, and China’s presence in Djibouti make a purely Mogadishu-centred approach increasingly difficult to sustain.
A Pragmatic Way Forward
Washington does not need to choose immediately between full recognition and no engagement. A dual-track policy could preserve cooperation with Somalia while expanding direct ties with Somaliland.
That could include maritime-security programs, coast-guard training, commercial investment, educational exchanges, and periodic access to Berbera for logistics or humanitarian operations. A formal liaison office could deepen communication, while US support for dialogue between Hargeisa and Mogadishu would avoid prejudging sovereignty.
This approach would give the United States strategic depth and reward stability without forcing a sudden diplomatic rupture. It would give Somaliland practical benefits while leaving room for a negotiated political settlement.
Partnership Proven by Need
The case for closer US–Somaliland ties is practical, not sentimental. The United States needs dependable partners, diversified access, and secure maritime routes. Somaliland needs investment, security cooperation, and a credible path out of isolation.
A careful partnership would not resolve every regional dispute, but it could strengthen security on both sides of the Gulf of Aden. In an era of uncertainty, friendship matters most when it answers a genuine need.
