Beyond Modi and Netanyahu: A Lasting Partnership

The Indian interest in an Israeli election goes beyond Israel itself. It starts with the obvious political connection. India has built a close partnership with Israel during Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s tenures in office. But there is a deeper interest behind this political interest. India watches Israel, because in many respects, Israel faces the same issues: terrorism, border security, hostility of neighbors, technological warfare, intelligence failure, civilian resilience, economic growth amid the pressure of security, and the difficult trade-off between security and democracy.

Israel has just held yet another close-fought election. No clear majority is discernible from the results. The bloc of Netanyahu secured 53 of the 120 seats in the Knesset, the opposition, headed by Gadi Eisenkot, has won 48, and the Arab-led parties 19 seats. Turnout has been about 78 percent. The immediate consequence will be more coalition talks, with a risk of yet another election in case no government is formed. For Israelis, this is about their domestic politics. For Indians, it is also a reminder that India’s relationship with Israel cannot be reduced to Netanyahu alone, and that Israel’s relationship with India cannot be reduced to Modi alone.

The citizens matter. Institutions matter more. And increasingly, the strategic partnership matters even more.

Relationships take decades to become routine affairs. India officially recognized Israel in September 1950. But full diplomatic relations came as late as January 1992. It is evident that the current relationship did not happen suddenly. Already in 1953, Israel had a consulate in Mumbai. India and Israel developed close relationships in the 1990s through cooperation in fields such as agriculture, science, and technology as well as business relations. One of the key developments was the 2003 visit to India by Ariel Sharon, who became the first Israeli Prime Minister to visit India. Modi visited Israel in 2017 which made him the first Indian leader to ever visit Israel. This historic visit was later reciprocated when the Israeli Prime Minister, Netanyahu, visited India in 2018.

It is necessary to remember that the current India-Israel relationship is not limited to just Modi and Netanyahu. It did not come out of nowhere or just materialize out of thin air; they have influenced it. Modi and Netanyahu have a strong personal connection with each other and consider each other to be good friends. Underneath the facade of images and rituals lies a larger machine that runs smoothly. Defense Ministries communicate with each other. Intelligence agencies exchange intelligence. Scientists work together. Agriculturalists work together. Specialists in water technology are working together. Cyber security experts are collaborating. Companies are making investments in one another. MPs are building connections. In November 2025, India and Israel agreed on the terms of negotiations on a free-trade agreement. In February 2026, they upgraded their relationship to a Special Strategic Partnership for Peace, Innovation & Prosperity. This new framework includes defense, security, key technologies, cyber, space, agriculture, water, health, education, and trade. It encompasses far more than one prime minister can imagine.

Security is the foundation of the relationship, but it is not its whole content. There is an urge to describe India-Israel ties only through the prism of terrorism. It will be incomplete description. But it would be unrealistic to describe security issues in the India-Israel context as just one item of a diplomatic agenda. India has been living with cross-border terrorism for decades. Israel has been living with terrorism and security threats of another kind. These situations are not identical. India must not pretend that Kashmir is Gaza, Pakistan is Iran, or that its security situation is the same as that of Israel’s.

Yet there is one common point of view which both know very well: terrorist organizations ignore borders, and technology has only worsened the challenge. Indians remember the tragic experience of the Mumbai attacks in November 2008. Citizens of Israel have lost their lives during these attacks, including the Chabad House of Mumbai. Moshe Holtzberg, the young Israeli victim, has become an image of the human connection between the two countries. When Modi addressed the Knesset in February 2026, he equated October 7 and India’s memories of 26/11. Modi told the Israeli parliamentarians that India knows what terrorist attacks mean, and that no cause can justify killing civilians.

Here lies the difference between Indian views on the issue of Israel’s security debate and those of some foreigners. For many Indians, the security debate in Israel is not a theoretical issue. It is a reality. India has learned that intelligence, surveillance, border control, technological superiority, and prompt reaction can mean the difference between a tragedy which takes dozens of lives and a catastrophe with hundreds of victims. Israel has learned similar lessons, often paying a high price for them.

Both countries have learned another lesson: security alone cannot substitute for politics. India watches Israel and learns from it.

The results of this cooperation are not confined to the military sphere. Perhaps the most valuable export of Israel to India is the problem-solving technique. Israel is a small country with around 10 million people with limited resources. India is a larger country with over 1.4 billion people, with significant diversity of geography, climate, and development. Yet Israel’s knowledge and experience is applicable to the areas of Indian activity, where efficiency at a large scale is required.

In agriculture, since 1993, India and Israel have cooperated. Within the framework of several plans, numerous Centres of Excellence have been established in India. By early 2026, there have been 43 centers approved and 35 functioning, covering vegetables, fruits, flowers, and beekeeping.

In water, Israeli expertise in water scarcity, desalination, water recycling, and precise irrigation is relevant to India, suffering from water depletion, rapid urbanization, and changes in rainfall. Formal cooperation in water resources management started in 2016. It developed further due to cooperation of Indian states such as Haryana and Rajasthan, as well as plans to develop Centres of Excellence in water technologies, involving IIT Madras and IIT Roorkee.

This is when the cooperation reaches its interesting level. The lesson India has learned from Israel is not “become Israel.” It is “solve the problem in front of you with the technology, institutions and political courage you have.” India has its own strengths. Israel has its own strengths. A sensible partnership is one when nobody tries to become the other.

Defense cooperation has acquired a more institutional form. The security cooperation has significantly expanded, but now the partnership moves from purchasing equipment to cooperation in development, industrial projects, and technology transfer. It counts. India wants to be an arms manufacturing nation instead of just an arms importer. Israel has very strong capacities in areas such as unmanned systems, sensors, air defense, surveillance, cyber, and battlefield technologies. In November 2025, India and Israel have signed a strategic agreement to enhance defense, industry and technology cooperation. Officials described the relationship as based on shared security interests and mutual trust.

Its scope keeps on expanding. The defense-industrial conference in Israel in February 2026 involved 30 Indian and 26 Israeli defense firms. Such partnership has its strategic significance for India. It is beneficial for Israel as well due to the fact that India has something valuable to offer i.e. scale. India provides a domestic market, an emerging defense industry, and ambitious localization plans, whereas Israel brings cutting-edge technology, a wealth of experience, and a sophisticated defense innovation environment. Very often, such partnership is worth much more than simple commercial deals.

What makes Modi-Netanyahu connection valuable is their personal rapport, which should not be the only reason to continue cooperation. The Modi-Netanyahu tandem established an unusual relationship with symbolism playing a significant role. Modi’s visit to Israel in 2017 marked the end of old tradition and Netanyahu’s visit to India in 2018 set a new course. Ever since Modi and Netanyahu kept in touch in times of regional instability. In October 2026, Netanyahu and Modi exchanged their views once again, pledging to develop the Special Strategic Partnership further. At the same time, Modi reiterated India’s appeal to dialogue, diplomacy, and stability in West Asia. This last point matters.

India can be friends with Israel without becoming Israeli. India can strongly condemn terrorism without abandoning its decades-long stance on negotiation-based solution. India can maintain a strategic partnership with Israel without compromising its relations with the Arab world, Iran, and other West Asian countries.

This is not a contradiction. This is Indian foreign policy. India always seeks a possibility to maneuver. India’s best relationship with Israel is the mature one, and not a symbolic political alliance.

What does the Israeli election mean for India? Probably less than is suggested by headlines. Of course, who will lead Israel will shape its defense policies, regional diplomacy, policy on Gaza, on Iran, and on the Palestinians. This will affect India. India has major economic, energy, diaspora and connectivity interests in West Asia.  Any major regional outbreak of tensions affects the safety of Indian citizens, trade routes, and energy security.

But New Delhi has few reasons to rely entirely on one Israeli political faction. Therefore, India’s relationship with Israel must become more institutionalized. An Israeli government of Netanyahu will probably follow the existing course. An Israeli government of another coalition will modify Israel’s approach to the Palestinian issue, Iran, Gaza, or domestic reform. India will be able to cooperate with either. The opposite is true as well. Israel’s relationship with India should not depend on the result of India’s next general election. Democracies change governments, but strategic interests change slower. This is a lesson for Israel too.

India’s elections should remind Israelis how broad democracy is. The Knesset of Israel consists of 120 representatives. The Lok Sabha of India has 543 elected members. Around 978 million registered voters participated in India’s 2024 general election, with a turnout of 66.10 percent. In Israel, coalitions may become the obsession of nation. In India, coalition formation requires spreadsheet, calculator, and someone who hasn’t slept since Tuesday. Humor apart, this example proves the following: democracy is a messy, disputatious and sometimes exhausting process, producing governments disappointing their supporters and oppositions promising everything to everybody. But the alternative is even worse.

This is why India is observing the Israeli election not only to see who will become the prime minister of Israel. India is observing how a democracy with heavy security burden copes with disagreements without abandoning democratic institutions. Israel too can learn from the Indian experience of holding elections in a highly diverse society. Both countries haven’t perfected their democracies, and both should realize it. That’s why they have much to learn from each other.

The next chapter of the India-Israel story should be about something broader than terrorism. The strategic logic of India-Israel cooperation is expanding. They can cooperate in artificial intelligence, cyber security, water technologies, climate adaptation, agriculture, food security, semiconductors, medical technologies, space, defense manufacturing, and critical infrastructure. India’s large economy and digital system can match Israel’s technological superiority. Israeli technologies of efficient use of water and agricultural technologies can be used in light of Indian resource constraints. India’s manufacturing capabilities can open broader markets for Israeli technologies. Joint research can lift the relationship beyond the government-to-government cooperation.

Proof of this concept is already visible: Israel and India have innovation initiatives which involve a $40 million R&D partnership fund. This helps to develop technology jointly between the businesses from the two nations, while their economic cooperation is moving towards the broader trade framework. This collaboration definitely merits our careful consideration. Not missiles. Not intelligence. Not Netanyahu and Modi. But engineers, farmers, scientists, entrepreneurs, students, doctors, defense manufacturers and policymakers cooperating with each other.

India must take Israel’s side as a partner and peace as an objective. This is often overlooked. India can strongly reject terrorism without necessarily approving everything that the Israeli government does. Israel, on the other hand, can appreciate India as a strategic partner without expecting New Delhi to always approve of Israel’s policies. This is what partnership is all about. This is how India has positioned itself: Rejecting the attack on October 7 and other terrorist acts, but still consistently advocating for dialogue, humanitarian concern, and lasting peace in the region. In his speech at the Knesset in February 2026, Modi combined rejection of terrorism with a plea for peace and stability in the region. This is not a sign of weakness, but of strategic maturity. Partnership between India and Israel should be assessed not by the level of friendship professed by both sides, but by their achievements.

There is now another period of political uncertainty in Israel. And India will certainly watch very closely who takes office, what coalition is formed, and how the problems of Israeli security and politics are solved. But New Delhi’s broader view is unlikely to change significantly. India needs reliable partners in technology, defense, intelligence, innovation and West Asia. Israel needs reliable partners which will understand its security challenges, and also possess economic and diplomatic weight to contribute to regional stability. India can be this partner. And Israel can remain India’s partner, regardless of who will be the Israeli prime minister.

Governments change. Democracies argue. Leaders come and go. Strategic friendships endure when they are institutionalized, based on shared interests, mutual trust, and ability to disagree without parting ways. India and Israel have spent over three decades transforming their cautious relationship into a strategic partnership. The next three decades should be devoted to making this partnership productive not only for fighting terrorism, but for fighting poverty, water issues, technological vulnerabilities, food insecurity, and economic stagnation. Security is important for prosperity. But the purpose of security should be prosperity and peace. This is a common cause for India and Israel.