Calibrating Israel’s Attack on Iran

Almost all geopolitical and international studies experts agree that sooner or later, Israel will launch a surprise attack on Iran. The main reason is the same as the two similar attacks that Israel carried out on Iraq in 1981 (Osirak) and Syria (Alkibar) in 2007, namely destroying nuclear weapons installations in the target countries. What is uncertain is when exactly the attack will be launched.

And on Friday morning, June 13, 2025, its form was finally visible. Two hundred Israeli fighter jets, consisting of F35s, F15s, and F16s (all made in US) along with hundreds of drones launched into Iranian soil. The airstrike targeted Iran’s hypersonic missile warehouse, one nuclear installation, a port, and several military bases. In addition, the attack also killed several high-ranking Revolutionary Guards (reportedly one with the rank of general and two with the rank of major general) and six Iranian nuclear scientists.

However, the attack was not completely clueless. The attack took place a day after the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) announced that Iran is no longer complying with the IAEA’s rules, especially those contained in the 2015 nuclear deal (JCPOA) which was canceled by Donald Trump in 2017. So the agency stated that they could no longer be sure whether Iran’s nuclear weapons were still safe or not.

Data from US intelligence (CIA), Israel (Mossad) and several other world strategic research institutions show that Iran’s nuclear weapons progress has reached a level of 60 percent enrichment of “U-235 content”, with a volume of approximately 604 kilograms of Uranium. It is also reported that this acceleration can also be achieved thanks to Russian assistance, after Iran began actively providing suicide drones for Russia in the Russia-Ukraine war. It is estimated that at that level, Iran can produce ten of nuclear weapons, even more, when the process has reached a level of 90 percent enrichment. In this context, of course Israel’s position is very understandable.

On the other hand, the attack also occurred before further talks on stopping Iran’s nuclear weapons enrichment on June 15, 2025, which are planned to be held in Oman. So, it is likely that further talks will not take place in the near future, or the schedule that has been planned in Oman will be canceled. However, if it was canceled or postponed, Iran’s position no longer had many options, except to stop further talks on the one hand and continue its nuclear weapons enrichment efforts on the other, which actually made the situation even more frightening.

Donald Trump’s reaction after the attack, implicitly, indicated that US was in a position where it could not “prohibit”. Not being able to prohibit means that it does not mean that US does not know. As usual, especially if we look at the Israeli airstrikes on Osirak, Iraq, in 1981, and Alkibar, Syria, in 2007, Israel informed US in advance shortly before the attack was launched. Thus, US’s position was made tight. Knowing, but the time gap was very short to reject or negotiate.

Moreover, Donald Trump has not had a clear platform for resolving the Iranian nuclear crisis so far, after the cancellation of the JCPOA in 2017. All “the Donald” could do after the cancellation was “threaten and threaten Iran”. Then in this second period, the Trump administration actually found it increasingly difficult to get a second door of entry so that a new agreement could be agreed upon. And when the door began to open, Israel decided to carry out a preemptive strike. As a result, in Trump’s latest tweet regarding a surprise Israeli attack on June 13, 2025, Trump wrote a status that was a mix of threats and calls for further dialogue on Iran’s nuclear future. Nothing more

In addition to the two moments that mediated the attack, in terms of geopolitics and geostrategy, Iran is indeed at its lowest point. In my opinion, this condition is actually Israel’s main consideration in choosing the “timing” of the attack. Just look, two Iranian proxies that are geographically close to Israel or those that can attack Israel directly, both Hezbollah and Hamas, have been categorized as almost completely paralyzed. Last year, Syria, which was one of Iran’s superstrategic partners, was actually taken over by the proxy Turkiye. So that Syria today is much more “tolerant” and “cooperative” regarding Israeli issues.

Internally, Iran is increasingly not doing well, both after the massive demonstration some time ago and after the helicopter accident that killed its president not long ago. So domestically, Tehran is not yet very consolidated. In economics term, the sanctions that Iran has been receiving, make it increasingly difficult for this country to finance its weapons strengthening programs. Billions of dollars earned from illegal oil trade via shadow ships have proven insufficient to finance Iran’s ambitions in the Middle East.

This means that Iran’s counterattack is estimated to be quite calibrated today, namely it will be quite limited. First, of course, the distance factor. The distance of more than 700 miles between Iran and Israel, via Iraq, Syria, and Jordan, makes Iran’s retaliation capabilities very minimal. Second, the distance then makes military options very limited, considering that Iran’s military capabilities are also in a position and capacity that is no longer adequate for major aggressions. The remaining options are estimated to be only two, namely missiles and drones, both of which unfortunately have also proven to be able to be overcome by Israel’s Iron Dome.

However, Iran still has one trump card that is rather frightening, namely withdrawing completely from the 1968 Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which became the basis for the birth of the JCPOA in 2015 between Iran and the Obama administration. With Iran’s withdrawal from the NPT, the development of Iran’s nuclear weapons in the future will be increasingly difficult to monitor, rather than stop. Israel will also most likely find it increasingly difficult to destroy it, because it is deep underground.

This could happen because the effects of the Israeli attack are expected to be very different from Iraq in 1981 and Syria in 2007. In general, after Israel destroyed Iraq’s nuclear installation in Osirak in 1981, Iraq was seen to no longer have the ambition to make nuclear weapons, although the narrative was continuously echoed by George W Bush in 2003 when US invaded Iraq. And it was proven, after US successfully occupied Iraq, it turned out that Iraq no longer had them. Likewise with Syria in 2007. Both from official and intelligence data, Syria, which was assisted by North Korea at that time, was seen to no longer develop its nuclear installations after Israeli fighter jets hit the Alkibar Nuclear installation.

However, in the case of Iran, the impact is believed to be very different. It is very likely that Iran’s nuclear enrichment project will continue and will be increasingly covert, so that in the future it will be increasingly difficult for Israel to detect its existence, rather than its development. This has been proven so far. Iran is able to survive with its isolated position. Even China and Russia will certainly never leave Iran alone. Support and assistance from these two countries will continue to flow, both covertly and openly, where US and Israel have also proven that they will not be able to refuse it.

What Israel can do in the future are strike operations to kill Iranian nuclear scientists, as has often been done, on the one hand and cyberattacks on Iran’s vital military installations on the other. And unfortunately, such attacks are only to slow down, not to stop. Only regime change can make Iran stop enriching its nuclear weapons. Even that is not easy. Again, Russia and China certainly will not remain silent.

In addition, Iran still has other technical options, namely attacking the nearest US military bases in the Middle East and closing the sea transportation route in Hormuz. The first technical option also has a fairly limited impact. In addition to these locations being only military bases, not US per se, Iran’s ability to damage US military bases in the Middle East has also been relatively limited so far. Meanwhile, closing the sea route in Hormuz has a very large economic risk, which has the potential to make global oil prices go crazy again. The reason is, this route is one of the busiest oil routes in the world, which can choke oil supplies to China, India, Southeast Asia, East Asia, and others. In other words, unless it is in a “real” war situation, Iran is unlikely to take such steps.

In short, an Israeli attack on Iran, in the short and medium term, will certainly provide certainty to Israel that the development of nuclear enrichment for nuclear weapons in Iran will slow down. That, of course, according to Israel, will be very good for Israel because the threat will temporarily weaken. However, in the long term, this attack will actually create more uncertainty for the world, because Iran will most likely be increasingly difficult to bring to the negotiating table, just like Russia which almost no longer gives Zelenski a chance after the Ukrainian drone attack destroyed no less than 7 billion dollars of Russian military assets the other day.