Can You Buy a Voter? Ask Academia. Then Ask Israel
Elon Musk discovered that democracy does not issue refunds. Academic elites sometimes enjoy a more convenient arrangement: their interpretations can survive any result. Israel should pay close attention, because the political foundations of its most important strategic partnership are changing in America.
Elon Musk has discovered an unpleasant feature of American democracy: voters do not come with a satisfaction guarantee. After spending approximately $446 million supporting Republican candidates in the 2026 congressional elections, he admitted that he felt “pretty foolish” about the results. One can almost imagine him searching for the customer service department. Unfortunately, democracy does not issue refunds, nor does it guarantee a satisfactory return on investment, even to customers who have purchased the largest megaphone on the market.
The comedy becomes more interesting when we remember that the man who once proudly presented himself as “Dark MAGA” now describes his politics as moderate and insists that he is not MAGA at all. Political identities apparently come with remarkably flexible warranties. When a product fails, the manufacturer can always announce that the customer misunderstood the original specifications. It is a convenient arrangement, particularly when the manufacturer and the customer happen to be the same person.
Israel, however, should resist the temptation to laugh too loudly. Something more important happened in the American elections than the financial disappointment of a billionaire. The results exposed the limits of a political practice in which money, prestige, communication infrastructure, and powerful institutional connections had come to be treated as unusually reliable instruments for securing desired outcomes. A comparable confidence has long informed certain political mechanisms sustaining the American-Israeli partnership. What is changing is not necessarily the existence of those mechanisms, but the political circumstances under which they remain effective.
This does not mean that anyone purchased the American-Israeli alliance. Its foundations run much deeper: security, military cooperation, economic interests, historical commitments, and extensive connections between the two societies. Yet around these foundations developed a formidable infrastructure of influence, supported by lobbying organizations, campaign financing, personal access to political leaders, and a long-established bipartisan consensus. The question now is whether possession of that infrastructure still carries the same political consequences.
Democracy Does Not Issue Refunds
Silicon Valley provides a particularly instructive starting point. Following the elections, Reuters reported sharp changes in the valuations of companies associated with Musk, including Tesla and SpaceX, amid shifting expectations concerning regulation and AI infrastructure. The reported figures included the prospect of hundreds of billions of dollars in combined changes in market valuation. Such figures are not equivalent to realized cash losses, and election results cannot be treated as their sole cause. Nevertheless, the reaction illustrates how rapidly political developments can alter the perceived value of businesses whose prospects have become closely associated with a particular political environment.
The irony is difficult to resist. An industry increasingly confident in its capacity to design humanity’s future encountered people who apparently intended to participate in deciding what that future would look like. Across numerous American communities, residents challenged the expansion of enormous data centers, raising concerns about electricity costs, water consumption, environmental consequences, and the distribution of economic benefits. Local ballot measures revealed substantial opposition to particular projects, even though they did not amount to a nationwide rejection of artificial intelligence.
The distinction matters. A voter does not need a doctoral dissertation on the economics of AI infrastructure to question who will pay for its electricity, who will bear its environmental costs, or whether promised economic benefits justify the proposed development. Nor does local opposition establish that every investment is harmful or every technological promise deceptive. It demonstrates that practical consequences can become politically decisive before experts, investors, and public authorities have reached agreement about their interpretation.
Indeed, voters may change the conditions under which an investment remains feasible while scholars are still explaining why the existing theoretical framework adequately describes public attitudes toward technology. The electorate need not possess a superior scientific explanation to alter political reality. It may simply encounter consequences, organize around them, and use the available procedures to make a different course of action possible.
This is where our second protagonist enters the story: the modern university, an institution with considerable experience in distinguishing truth from authority, at least in principle.
When Academia Cannot Afford to Be Wrong
For generations, universities have insisted that truth cannot be purchased. Quite right. A mathematical proposition does not become valid because its author belongs to Harvard. An experimental result does not become reproducible because it appears in Nature. A philosophical argument does not acquire coherence because its author occupies a distinguished chair. These are elementary distinctions, and scholarly inquiry depends upon preserving them.
Yet contemporary academic life has developed an impressive economy of recognition. Affiliations, grants, rankings, citation metrics, prestigious journals, and professional networks influence which arguments become visible, which receive attention, and whose claims are initially considered worthy of serious examination. Money cannot make a proposition true, but it can influence the circumstances in which that proposition has an opportunity to be assessed. Institutional prestige can provide useful indications of experience and competence, but it cannot substitute for examining the work itself.
The San Francisco Declaration on Research Assessment, known as DORA, explicitly warns against using journal prestige as a substitute for assessing individual research contributions. Its existence is revealing. Academic institutions have long possessed the conceptual resources to distinguish intellectual merit from institutional reputation, yet their own procedures have sometimes encouraged the confusion. The difficulty extends beyond bibliometrics, publishing costs, and professional hierarchies. There is another, potentially more consequential form of institutional dependence.
I have described it elsewhere as the cowardice of academic elites: the temptation to transform political preference into apparent scientific necessity. The mechanism requires neither corruption nor explicit instructions. A scholar learns which interpretations are welcomed in a professional environment, which conclusions secure approval, and which questions may threaten institutional respectability. Gradually, the boundaries of acceptable disagreement can become confused with the boundaries of reason itself.
Consider the interpretation of an election. If the opposition loses, its defeat may be presented as confirmation of a deeply compromised political order. If it wins, that victory may be explained as entirely compatible with the same diagnosis. Either explanation could be justified by independent evidence; complex political structures do not necessarily change because one election produces a different result. The intellectual failure begins when no conceivable observation is allowed to require reconsideration of the original account.
Some academic explanations can therefore acquire a privilege unavailable even to Elon Musk: they never lose. The billionaire at least encounters a publicly visible outcome that disappoints his expectations. A scholar whose interpretation has become immune to correction may receive another citation for demonstrating why the unexpected result confirms the theory after all.
The distinction between the two temptations is instructive. One seeks to purchase the desired conclusion; the other seeks exemption from the obligation to revise it. Both can diminish the independence of judgment, although an electoral result is not a scientific truth and citizens are not required to vote in accordance with expert opinion. The common problem concerns the attempt to control what should remain open to evaluation rather than merely influencing the circumstances in which evaluation takes place.
This criticism must not be mistaken for an indictment of scholarship as such. Researchers have investigated political conformity, financial influence, technological development, and threats to university autonomy. Many academics have publicly resisted governmental pressure. The serious question is whether institutions of knowledge respond to evidence that challenges their established explanations, or whether institutional incentives reward interpretations that can accommodate every possible outcome without substantive revision.
A theory that proves mistaken is not an embarrassment to science. A theory that is institutionally forbidden to prove mistaken is a far more serious problem. And this is where the behaviour of voters becomes philosophically significant: citizens can change what remains politically possible without first obtaining permission from those who claim the authority to explain their behaviour.
Israel and the Changing American Consensus
For decades, the American-Israeli partnership benefited from exceptional continuity across changes of administration. Democrats and Republicans disagreed over settlements, negotiations, military operations, and particular Israeli governments, yet the strategic foundations of cooperation remained comparatively stable. This continuity rested upon military and economic interests, historical commitments, substantial public support, and an extensive network of political and institutional connections.
The elections of November 2026 did not create every tension now affecting that partnership. Some changes in American attitudes toward foreign commitments, military assistance, Israel, and the distribution of domestic political resources have developed over many years. The elections nevertheless made several of those tensions politically visible. They also raised questions about whether the mechanisms that previously sustained bipartisan continuity can be expected to operate with the same effectiveness.
AIPAC provides an important example. The organization retains substantial resources and political influence, and many candidates associated with its electoral activity won their contests. Yet in some races its involvement became a matter of public controversy, while candidates critical of Israeli government policies succeeded despite campaigns financed against them. This does not establish the end of pro-Israel advocacy in American politics. It demonstrates that significant financial and organizational resources do not invariably produce the political consequences their sponsors seek.
Questions about the relationship are also being raised within the Republican political environment. Vice President JD Vance has publicly discussed the need to reconsider aspects of America’s relationship with Israel, while Trump has made statements concerning future military assistance that have generated uncertainty about the direction of American policy. Such declarations must be distinguished from enacted policy and from existing commitments, including the memorandum of understanding extending through fiscal year 2028. But uncertainty at this level is itself significant for a country whose strategic planning depends upon the continuity of American cooperation.
The United States has not ceased to be Israel’s ally. Military, intelligence, diplomatic, and economic cooperation still possesses substantial foundations. Yet an established alliance can preserve its institutions, procedures, and agreements while the political assumptions that previously made their operation predictable begin to change. Counting supportive members of Congress is therefore not enough. It is also necessary to understand what is changing among the citizens who elect them.
The American Jewish diaspora is particularly important to this question. Post-election surveys conducted for the Jewish Electorate Institute and J Street reported substantial Democratic support among Jewish voters, while documenting a wider diversity of views on Israel, antisemitism, American domestic politics, and foreign policy. Survey findings cannot be treated as a single collective declaration. They nevertheless undermine any attempt to identify American Jewish political judgment with the position of one Israeli government, one American party, or one lobbying organization.
Supporting Israel’s existence and security is not identical to supporting Netanyahu. Criticizing an Israeli government does not automatically mean rejecting Israel, just as Jewish identity does not determine party affiliation. American Jews are citizens participating in American political life, with competing priorities and differing understandings of their responsibilities. Their political judgments cannot be inferred simply from the positions of organizations claiming to represent them.
A people is not a political action committee. That distinction is not an inconvenience for Jewish political life; it is one of the conditions under which its plurality can be taken seriously. No organization, however well funded or politically influential, can substitute its own conclusions for the independent judgments of an entire community.
For Israeli politics, the implications extend beyond electoral arithmetic. American Jewish communities are not a reserve of political consent that can be activated through institutional appeals, personal connections, or invocations of shared historical experience. Fidelity to Jewish tradition may itself provide reasons for questioning the decisions of an Israeli government. Recognizing such criticism as a possible expression of Jewish responsibility rather than automatically treating it as disloyalty is essential to understanding the diaspora’s political independence.
This is where the problem of academic explanation returns. How many accounts of American-Israeli political influence still assume a degree of uniformity that current evidence does not support? How often are institutional resources confused with political consent, or the persistence of an organization mistaken for the permanence of its effectiveness? Most importantly, what observations would require established models of the partnership to be revised?
Political scientists cannot reasonably be expected to predict every election. They can, however, be expected to identify what their explanations failed to accommodate and to examine whether new evidence requires different concepts. A model that cannot be corrected may preserve the appearance of intellectual authority while gradually losing its capacity to explain political developments.
Nor is Netanyahu the only Israeli leader who should confront these questions. Every future government will need to distinguish maintaining contacts with an American administration from understanding changes within American society. The former is a task of diplomacy. The latter requires attention to shifting political expectations that no personal relationship with a president can permanently neutralize.
The Bear Built to the Scale of Our Capabilities
There is a Polish film that most American and Israeli readers have probably never seen, but whose central joke now seems remarkably international. In Stanisław Bareja’s 1981 satire Teddy Bear, known in Polish as Miś, an enormous straw bear becomes a monument to institutional absurdity. Its promoters take pride in the scale of the undertaking and present the spectacle itself as evidence of what their system can accomplish.
The brilliance of Bareja’s comedy lies in the fact that the bear is not merely an unsuccessful project. Its absurdity has an institutional function. Procedures, explanations, professional responsibilities, and financial arrangements can operate with impressive efficiency even when the purpose of the undertaking has become almost impossible to defend. The monument no longer needs to make sense; its size and the machinery sustaining it begin to serve as their own justification.
An American edition might arrive with a Pentagon procurement contract, facial recognition software, a security clearance, and its own social media platform. The bear could announce a technological revolution, attract venture capital, and deliver a keynote address on the future of civilization. If one of its eyes fell off, the defect could probably be repaired with glue. Restoring an institution’s capacity for independent judgment would be considerably more difficult.
Bareja understood something that elaborate political forecasts can occasionally overlook: the grandeur of a project and its actual usefulness are not necessarily proportional. Institutional machinery may continue operating successfully even after those responsible have lost the ability to distinguish the original purpose from the prestige associated with completing it. When the absurdity becomes visible, the organization does not necessarily reconsider the undertaking. It may simply request funds for a larger bear.
This is the darker connection between Silicon Valley’s political expenditures, academic conformity, and established systems of international influence. The problem is not that all large projects are absurd or that every institution protects its own interests at the expense of truth. It arises when failure no longer prompts examination of the instruments being used, but is interpreted primarily as a demand for more resources and stronger institutional control.
The billionaire asks for greater influence, the university for additional funding, the politician for a stronger mandate, and the lobbying organization for a larger budget. Each request may have legitimate grounds. Yet none is sufficient evidence that the institution understands why its previous efforts failed or whether the conditions under which they once succeeded still exist.
Reality, unfortunately, has no contractual obligation to satisfy the expectations of those who claim to be managing its future.
An Alliance Is Not an Insurance Policy
For Israel, the warning is more serious than the personal political preferences of any American president. The established model of American-Israeli cooperation developed under political circumstances whose continuation cannot simply be assumed. The institutions of the alliance remain powerful, but parts of the social and bipartisan consensus that helped make them predictable are being contested.
This does not mean the alliance is ending. It means that its continued strength cannot be established merely by referring to its past durability. An institution may remain intact while its practical capacity changes. An organization may retain resources while losing some of its former political advantages. A theory may preserve its prestige while explaining less than it once did. The persistence of an instrument is not proof of the persistence of the conditions that made it effective.
Musk can afford to spend hundreds of millions of dollars and describe the experience as a costly lesson. Universities can organize conferences devoted to explaining why their established interpretations remain adequate despite unexpected evidence. But Israel’s strategic planning cannot afford to treat changing American political expectations as a temporary inconvenience that will necessarily disappear with another campaign, another personal agreement, or another allocation of resources.
The most consequential danger is not simply losing a political argument in Washington. It is continuing to act as though the argument had already been settled permanently while the people upon whom its future depends are beginning to ask different questions. Financial resources can purchase access to power, institutional prestige can provide extraordinary visibility, and established organizations can preserve the appearance of continuity for a very long time. None can guarantee that future political judgments will reproduce yesterday’s assumptions.
There are two especially destructive temptations in institutional life: to believe that sufficient money can purchase the desired conclusion, and to believe that inconvenient evidence can be abandoned when it threatens an established position. Their defenders may look very different. One controls companies, another possesses academic credentials, and another occupies political office. Yet all may confuse authority over an institution with authority over the reality that institution was created to confront.
Democracy does not issue refunds, and truth recognizes no academic immunity. Israel should remember that even the most enduring alliance is not an insurance policy against political reality. The bear may be repaired, repainted, equipped with better technology, and displayed once again as proof of institutional greatness. The question worth asking is whether anyone has examined what it was supposed to accomplish in the first place.
Yochanan Schimmelpfennig
