Could the US–Iran war reshape relations between Israel and Lebanon?
As the conflict from US and Israeli strikes on Iran continues, most attention has rightfully focused on the future of Iranian leadership, the risk of further regional escalation, and the ongoing volatility in the Strait of Hormuz. However, while the future of Iran is under scrutiny, a quieter yet potentially significant long-term development may be emerging in Lebanon.
For the first time in decades, the governments of Israel and Lebanon are addressing a shared adversary.
In a series of unprecedented steps, Lebanese Prime Minister Nawaf Salam sharply criticised Hezbollah’s recent escalation against Israel, describing the group’s actions as “irresponsible” and harmful to Lebanon’s national interests. More significantly, on March 2, the Lebanese government announced a ban on all Hezbollah military activities, ordering the group to cease armed operations and hand its weapons over to the state.
The government has also moved to curtail Iranian influence with authorities imposing restrictions on IRGC activities, tightened entry requirements for Iranian nationals, and ordered the deportation of individuals suspected of links to Iranian security networks.
While the effectiveness of these measures remains to be seen, their symbolic significance is notable. For decades, Hezbollah has operated not only as a dominant political force within Lebanese politics but also as Iran’s most capable and entrenched proxy in the region.
Hezbollah’s military strength and ideological commitment to confrontation with Israel have long been a key sticking point preventing any serious considerations in both Israel and Lebanon about the viability of formal diplomatic normalization between the neighboring states. Since the end of the Lebanese Civil War, Hezbollah has justified its continued armed presence largely through its role as a resistance movement against Israel.
But the context is now shifting.
With the Iranian regime increasingly consumed by confrontation with the United States and Israel, in addition to mounting internal pressures, its ability to maintain tight control over its network of proxy forces may be weakening. Across the region, Iranian-aligned groups are increasingly focused on their own survival rather than projecting power on Tehran’s behalf, as we have seen with the Houthis in Yemen staying relatively inactive throughout the conflict.
This moment presents a rare strategic opportunity that both the US and the wider international community should seize.
Even modest reductions in cross-border hostility could create space for incremental progress. These could include cooperation on joint security, intelligence sharing, maritime and energy cooperation, and revived economic engagement. Unlike other disputes with its neighbors, Israel and Lebanon, the two countries do not face the same scale of unresolved land claims that complicate normalization efforts in countries like Syria.
This would, though, require significant concessions from both sides, with both designating the other as hostile powers, and Lebanon placing restrictions on Israelis entering Lebanese territory. These institutional barriers would need to be overcome therefore, but the support of a third country, likely the US, could serve as a convening entity. This was seen in the Maritime Border Agreement of 2022, where a diplomatic solution also led to economic cooperation.
Full normalization and Lebanon joining the Abraham Accords though, remain unlikely in the near term. Lebanon’s political system remains deeply fragmented, and Hezbollah continues to wield considerable influence within both the political sphere and Lebanese society, even within the context of reduced military capabilities. Israel, therefore, would approach any opportunity with understandable caution. There is also the unknown question of timelines, with Israel hinting that this conflict may go on longer than that with Iran, and Lebanese government officials urging for negotiations and deescalation, the next few days and weeks could prove significant.
It may, though, only take one small domino for a gradual shift in relations to begin taking place.
If the current war diminishes Hezbollah’s dominance over Lebanon’s security policy, it could remove one of the most significant barriers to incremental normalization between Israel and Lebanon. In that case, one of the most consequential outcomes of the US–Iran war may not ultimately emerge from Tehran, but from a slow and cautious recalibration of Israel-Lebanon relations.
