Democratic Breakthrough or Status Quo Obstinacy?

There are various legitimate ways to understand Tuesday’s election in Israel. This is being written as the votes are being counted but the general outlines seem clear. A few seats may shift by the time the process is completed – probably by Friday – but big changes are unlikely. Now we must shift to figuring out what can happen next. Here are some preliminary framings:

1. A Repudiation of Netanyahu and his Government

This is true. The Coalition had 67 Knesset seats and the same parties now seem to have 53 seats. It went from a clear majority to an undoubted minority and the former Opposition now has a majority. Moreover, it is highly unlikely that the Coalition can pick off any parties or individuals to build a majority. Unlike Israeli politics until about 20 years ago, there are no uncommitted parties looking for a good offer to join a government.

But context, as always, matters. After the tumultuous and divisive last four years, the Opposition felt it expected and deserved a victory and, moreover, it was seemingly promised, at the very least, a favorable showing by most polls going back at least a year. The reality is worse than expected, but not really outside of the polls’ margin of error. But the government no longer has a majority of Knesset seats, which can’t be denied.

2. A Victory for Democracy

This is a also true. The most unexpected outcome was the size of the vote by Arabs (Palestinians) who are citizens of Israel. They comprise 21% of the population and have never had nearly the representation in the Knesset their numbers would seemingly entitle them to. That is partly because they have, at least in recent decades, voted in substantially fewer numbers than Israeli society as a whole. In 2022, 53% of Israeli Arabs voted, compared with 70% of the general population. Most vote for one of several “Arab parties.” The oddest of these is the Communist Party of Israel, now known as Chadash, which has always included a Jew in a safe seat, though the vast majority of its voters are Arab. Since the raising of the threshold for entering the Knesset to 3.25% in 2015 (a piece of legislation intended by the rightwing majority to eliminate at least some Arab parties), it has generally run with one or several other parties, known as the “Joint List.”

This year the only other Arab party was Ra’am (officially the “United Arab List”), which was part of the “Change Government” of 2021-22 and has worked hard to convince Jewish Israelis that it is a “normal” party that represents one slice of the electorate, as they all do. This was amplified by the inclusion of Yoav Segalovitz, a centrist who has been a high official in the Israeli police force and who defines himself as a Zionist, in the number two position in its list.

The work paid off; the Joint List (12) and Ra’am (7) now seem to hold the key to any attempt to form a governing coalition, temporary or “permanent,” i.e. intending to last a full four years, which few Israeli governments do.

However, the leaders of three of the four “Zionist Opposition” parties have already indicated (or repeatedly promised) NOT top form any coalition with an Arab party. Moreover, current figures show that Ra’am (the more integrationist party) plus the Jewish opposition parties would control only 55 seats, well short of a majority. A coalition with the Joint List would not only be unprecedented, it would involve very significant compromises on all sides, which the Opposition leaders as well the Joint List would almost certainly be unwilling to make.

Thus, while Arab representation has reached unexpected heights, it has generated significant resistance, and the leaders of most Jewish parties would prefer a new election in which more Arabs would stay home. That is not exactly a democratic triumph.

3. A Vote of Confidence in Bibi & Co.

One could argue that a Jewish majority in the Jewish state has shown, despite (or because of) all that has happened in the last four years, that it still trusts Bibi and his same coalition partners to run the government. The last election had only 20,000 more popular votes for the coalition parties; it received 64 seats because of mistakes the anti-Bibi parties made. In fact, if you include the votes still to be counted (including the soldiers’ vote, which leans right) and the two rightwing parties that missed the threshold (one may still conceivably make it) then the current coalition parties might have close to a majority, and unquestionably a Jewish majority. So what’s new? Lots of sound and fury, signifying little?

4. What Will Happen Next?

It’s complicated. But, assuming the coalition parties don’t get an absolute majority of seats, I think all the current Opposition parties will agree to elect a Knesset speaker and possibly a minority government with Eisenkot as PM and pass several crucial laws, especially one setting up a State Commission of Inquiry into the events before and during Oct. 7, 2023. They would probably try to undo some of the judicial modification Likud and partners have been trying desperately to institute, do something about steeply rising organized crime in Arab communities, and perhaps even try to pass a law drafting Haredim, though that is less likely. But a minority government cannot really govern. Its main function will be to try to get a few pieces of legislation passed and to prevent Bibi from remaining as interim PM until the new election, which will probably be held in the spring of 2027. That seems almost inevitable. The Change bloc is likely to do worse as fewer Arabs may vote, given that their vote accomplished little, and fewer expats may fly in to vote. But those are guesses. And under the Israeli voting system, fewer Arab MKs could mean more “Zionist Opposition” MKs.

A theoretical option being pushed by Donald Trump and others is a “unity government” in which Bibi and Eisenkot would rotate as PM. This is a non-starter. Nobody trusts Bibi to rotate.

Of course, Bibi will be interim PM for at least a few weeks, during which a lot could happen; not least a renewal of the Iran war after the US midterms. Trump has already claimed credit for Bibi’s “renewal” and we can be fairly sure he will demand that Bibi remain as PM, in defiance of all norms of international sovereignty. But we’re used to that.

Obviously, I am not a prophet nor the son of a prophet, so the predictions here may be proved unfounded this very week. But please stay tuned for further developments, which I will continue to report and comment on.

Feel free to comment or ask questions in whatever media you see this or at paulscham.substack.com. There are many more options, some of which will happen and most of which won’t, but which I’ll be happy to opine on.

Meanwhile, shalom from Washington, D.C.

Paul