Different
The last few days have been that roller coaster of emotions that comes with the circumstances of being at war. Of course, now that I think about it, we are always on that roller coaster, and that an actual war really only heightens the already present sense of awareness of a threat.
But I digress.
It has been truly exhilarating to watch years of preparation play itself out. Israel’s ability to nullify the Iranian threat has been truly incredible. But not surprising. The threat that Iran poses has been growing and developing for years. We are watching how Israel’s defence against that threat has been keeping pace, all these years.
We have seen this kind of thing before. Most notable might be the elimination of the Egyptian air force at the start of the Six Day War. Three hundred planes were destroyed on the ground. Not in dog fights, not by missile defence. Obviously, this was a different kind of military strategy at work, but there is a consistent pattern of consideration of any and all possibilities of offensive and defensive action.
When it falls apart, it seems to be due to political or diplomatic considerations. In 1973, political infighting in the ruling Labour party blinded us to the surprise attack launched by Egypt and Syria. More recently, the strategy of keeping Hamas at bay in Gaza by ignoring provocations like balloons carrying fire bombs and allowing for the transfer of funds from Qatar was, in part, the result of demands by the opposition – and our “allies” – that Israel not risk the lives of our soldiers, or escalate the situation, when relative quiet could be achieved by cutting a deal. We seem to be at our best to achieve what needs to be done when the military establishment – both overt and covert – take the reins.
We can speculate about how long Operation Rising Lion will last, what will happen to Iran’s Islamic leadership, or its ability to lead, who may take over after its fall. Reducing Iran’s threat may also weaken Hamas’ resolve, or ability, to withstand the military onslaught we continue to exert. The one thing that we have to know – that is a given, that goes without saying – is that WE, the state of Israel, decide on the conditions for peace. There can be no “agreement”, no “armistice” , no “cease fire”. Until now, we have approached our victories over our enemies with an attitude that ostensibly nullified our position as the victor. Our consistent procedure was to treat the enemy not as vanquished, but as a partner for peace. The pressure to continue this is still out there, but is predominantly external, with international calls for “a just settlement”, or “the two-state solution”. Our position needs to be that we, as the victor, maintain the privilege and responsibility to dictate the terms for ending the conflict, because that is the best way to ensure our security.
This principle needs to be applied to the Gaza Strip and Judea Samaria as well. What we decide must be what happens. I have been saying this for decades, and the general response has been, “the Arabs will never go for that”. My response to that has always been, “Who’s asking them?” The loser does not get a say. We cannot allow the “just and lasting peace” that everyone keeps trying to force on us to be the direction we take. This time, it is we who decide. This time it has to be different.
