Do I want a Palestinian state more than the Palestinians do?

For many Palestinians, the desire to destroy Israel is stronger than the wish to build their own State. Not only is this bad news for Israel, but it’s bad news for the Palestinians too.
The first person to reach out to me on October 7, 2023, to inquire about the safety of my family and me was a Palestinian friend. This moment has stayed with me, and I have clung to it as a sign of hope that, perhaps, change is possible.
I know many Palestinians, and I can attest that they are good and decent people. While we may disagree on various issues, such differences do not preclude mutual respect, or the discovery of common ground based on shared values.
However, I am not naïve. There are also many Palestinians who would prefer that, as both a Jew and an Israeli, I would no longer have a place in the Middle East—or worse. I did not need the events of October 7, 2023, to recognize this reality. I have encountered such individuals personally, and some have stated their views openly to my face.
I have visited places where, had my true identity been revealed, it is doubtful whether I would have returned home to my family unharmed.
In late December 2018, I sat in the office of Dr. Saeb Erekat, then Secretary-General of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), in Jericho. I was leading a multinational group of graduate students from a prominent Ivy League institution.
During our meeting, Erekat explained that the Palestinians had always been ready for peace, that they had never rejected a peace offer, and that the failure to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict rested entirely on Israel’s shoulders. A cursory review of the historical record would cast doubt on these assertions, but I chose nonetheless to remain silent and listen.
Erekat went on to make a significant claim. He argued that the only viable solution to the conflict was a two-state solution: a State of Palestine alongside a State of Israel. He elaborated that Palestinians were ready for the immediate implementation of such a solution and that Israel alone bore full responsibility for its failure. He then proceeded to outline his vision of how this solution might be implemented.
First, he declared, there must be a resolution to the status of Jerusalem, which he stated should be divided or shared between Israelis and Palestinians.
Second, the final borders must be drawn based on the 1949 Armistice lines, which had left the West Bank under Jordanian occupation and annexation, and Gaza under Egyptian occupation. Erekat acknowledged that while the Green Line (the de facto border between Israeli-controlled territory and that held by Egypt and Jordan from 1948 to 1967) should serve as a foundation for any agreement, the exact course of the border could be modified based on “facts on the ground.” This meant, according to Erekat, that parts of the West Bank could be annexed to Israel, on the condition that equivalent areas of Israeli territory would be annexed to the new Palestinian state.
The conversation then turned to Israeli settlements. Erekat described them as a major obstacle to peace, yet, critically, he also asserted that they were not an insurmountable one. He explained that, because the largest Israeli settlement blocs were near or adjacent to the Green Line, these settlements could remain in place, together with their residents, with the Green Line adjusted to incorporate these towns and villages into Israel. In exchange, equivalent areas of Israeli territory would become part of the Palestinian state. Erekat further noted that only a minority of the Israeli settlers, those living deep within the West Bank, would need to be removed from their homes and relocated within Israel’s borders.
As Erekat spoke, I was struck by the significance of his position. Here was the Secretary-General of the PLO and the chief negotiator for the Palestinians in Oslo, calmly explaining that contrary to the claims of anti-Israel activists, Israeli settlements were not an insurmountable barrier to peace, and that most Israeli settlers could remain in their homes as part of a two-state solution.
Erekat’s statement that no Jews could remain in the new Palestinian state seemed problematic to me. After all, if more than 20% of Israel’s citizens are Arab-Muslim, surely a small Jewish minority could live within a Palestinian state, especially if such an arrangement would pave the way for the creation of the state itself.
Despite these reservations, I was genuinely encouraged by Erekat’s words and was interested in what else he would say about overcoming barriers to a 2-State solution. However, he declined to elaborate further and instead concluded his words by reiterating that he had now demonstrated conclusively that the Palestinians were ready for peace and that if Israel would only come to the negotiating table with the same intentions, peace would follow immediately.
As members of the group began to ask questions about what he had said, I deliberated whether to ask Erekat a question about something that he had chosen not to say. On the one hand, I was weary, as an Israeli and as the group leader, of being perceived to be challenging the speaker. I also wanted to allow members of the group to reach their own conclusions. However, there was one burning issue that I felt needed to be addressed directly in order for the group to fully assess Erekat’s position.
So, I asked:
“Dr. Erekat, thank you for speaking with us today. I am an Israeli accompanying this group, and as an advocate of a two-state solution, I was encouraged by your remarks. However, I do have a question about something I didn’t quite understand. I believe four key pillars must be addressed to achieve a two-state solution. You have addressed three of them: you’ve acknowledged the need to divide or share Jerusalem, the necessity of establishing final borders based on the 1949 Armistice lines, and demonstrated the possibility of resolving the settlement issue. However, you haven’t addressed the fourth pillar—the issue of Palestinian refugees.”
I continued: “After 1948, approximately 750,000 Palestinian Arab refugees were displaced from the area that became Israel and relocated to Gaza, the West Bank, and surrounding Arab states. Today, there are over 5 million individuals who are classified as Palestinian refugees, and that number continues to grow as, contrary to all other groups of refugees worldwide, UNRWA allows refugee status to be passed down through generations. A core element of Palestinian identity is the belief that all Palestinian refugees should have the right to return to Israel, thus undermining the Jewish character of the state. You surely know that no Israeli government would ever accept such a massive influx of Palestinian refugees. Given that, how do you propose to resolve this issue as part of a peaceful two-state solution?”
I posed this question because I wanted Erekat to address for the students the core issue that has, for decades, stood in the way of peace: the Palestinian demand for a “right of return” for refugees. The nature of his response to the question would shed light on the sincerity of his claim that Palestinians are ready for peace.
Erekat’s response was brief and unsatisfactory: “Most Palestinian refugees would likely choose not to come to Israel or adopt Israeli citizenship.”
I pressed gently: “That may be true, but Israel could never agree to a deal based on the assumption that refugees would voluntarily forgo their right to return. You’ve outlined how Palestinians are ready for peace and how you plan to address three major obstacles, but the refugee issue remains the final barrier. How do you resolve it?”
His answer was even shorter: “I cannot decide on behalf of the Palestinians to give up their right of return.”
And that was the end of the conversation.
I left the meeting profoundly disappointed. Erekat was regarded as one of the more dovish figures within Palestinian politics. As the Secretary-General of the PLO and a key negotiator during the Oslo process, he was considered a credible representative of the Palestinian people. Yet, in his office that day, he demonstrated why peace remains elusive.
Jerusalem, borders, and settlements are contentious issues requiring compromise from both sides. Erekat acknowledged that Palestinians would need to make concessions on all three. However, when it came to the refugee issue, the Palestinians’ insistence, without compromise, on the right of return is a deal-breaker.
This demand, which would effectively dismantle Israel as a Jewish state, remains the principal obstacle to peace, and Erekat, despite being positioned as a moderate, was unwilling to engage with this issue.
I do not place the blame for the failure to reach a peaceful resolution in the region solely on the Palestinians, I am deeply critical of certain elements within Israeli society as well. Many Israeli leaders have failed to pursue policies in the country’s best interests. Were a visionary peace-seeking leader to emerge in the Palestinian territories tomorrow, something that seems unlikely in the extreme, I am skeptical whether they would be met with a similar counterpart in Israel.
The events of October 7, 2023, have made many Israelis, even those with more dovish views, even more skeptical of Palestinian intentions, and understandably so.
The fundamental issue remains the same today as it was in 2018 in Erekat’s office, and as it was in 2000 when Yasser Arafat rejected an opportunity for peace and chose instead to resume violence.
The refugee question is not just a matter of practical policy; it symbolizes a deeper issue: the belief, held by many Palestinians and their supporters that the eventual resolution of the conflict must involve the dismantling of Israel, rather than the creation of a Palestinian state alongside it. It is this principle that is at the heart of Hamas’ ideology.
Sadly, as long as the destruction of Israel remains a higher priority for Palestinians than the establishment of a Palestinian state, peace will remain out of reach.
Around the world, we have witnessed demonstrations that have gone far beyond legitimate solidarity with Palestinian victims of the ongoing conflict. These protests have degenerated into overt support for Islamist terrorist organizations, the vilification of Israelis and Jews, and explicit calls for the dissolution of Israel. Moreover, those Palestinians who do not share these extremist views have often been marginalized and silenced, by those claiming to speak on their behalf, all under the guise of human rights rhetoric.
Prominent international bodies—such as UNRWA, the United Nations, Amnesty International, and the International Court of Justice—institutions that should possess greater moral clarity, continue to propagate a narrative that fuels the flames of those who frame the dissolution of Israel as a feasible objective, and, in many cases, places this goal above the establishment of a Palestinian state.
By behaving in this way, these individuals and organizations are failing those of us—both Israelis and Palestinians—who genuinely seek peaceful coexistence. Rather than fostering dialogue, they empower extremists on both sides, deepening divisions and jeopardizing the prospects for a lasting resolution that could benefit everyone.
With a ceasefire agreement now in place, the sight of the first Israeli hostages reunited with their families offers a moment of relief and humanity. Still, even this does not obscure the grim reality of Hamas once more parading its weapons through the streets of Gaza, asserting its continued dominance over the territory and its people. I feel deep despair for Israel, but my sorrow is equally, if not more, profound for those Palestinians who long for a different future. As long as the entrenched narratives of violence and hatred remain prevalent in Palestinian society and remain unchallenged or even supported by those claiming to stand in solidarity with Palestinians – the future will remain one of conflict and suffering.