Egypt’s Military Buildup: Historical Lessons from 1967

Egypt’s military buildup seems harmless—until history says otherwise. In 1967, Jordan’s pro-Western king was forced into war. Could El-Sisi face the same fate?

Since the 2013 coup that brought him to power, Abdel Fattah el-Sisi has presided over one of the largest military buildups in Egyptian history, even though the country faces no clear external threats. As the economy and society stagnate, billions have been pumped into the modernization of Egypt’s armed forces, emphasized by a recent $5 billion arms deal with the United States. This rapid militarization raises a crucial question: Why is Egypt investing so heavily in its military when its borders remain largely secure?

Israeli analysts are also keeping an eye on the buildup, yet most of them don’t see much cause for alarm in the near term. The only exception is the possibility of regime collapse, which could put Egypt’s advanced military into the hands of radicals. After all, El-Sisi is a pragmatic leader, aligned with the West, who also heavily depends on the United States for military assistance. These circumstances seem to make war between Egypt and Israel highly unlikely. But could history suggest otherwise?

The 1967 Precedent: When a Pro-Western Leader Went to War

Since taking the throne in 1953, King Hussein continued his grandfather Abdullah I’s pro-Western legacy, positioning Jordan as a counterweight to Soviet-aligned regimes like Syria and later also Iraq. With deep British ties, he sought to maintain stability, but by the 1960s, Pan-Arabism under Nasser had become a dominant force, threatening both Jordan’s monarchy and Israel’s very existence.

Recognizing their shared concerns, Hussein strengthened secret ties with Israel, spending over 1,000 hours in covert talks with leaders like Golda Meir and Shimon Peres. Through backchannels, Jordan and Israel exchanged intelligence and coordinated crackdowns on Palestinian fedayeen guerrillas, whose attacks targeted both nations. Nevertheless, Nasser’s revolutionary ideology took hold in Jordan, sparking anti-Israel protests and unrest, further pressuring Hussein’s rule.

Public Pressure and Survival: Why King Hussein Chose War

By May 1967, with war looming and Egypt’s military buildup in the Sinai, King Hussein faced an impossible dilemma. He knew the Arab armies were unprepared and saw Israel as a counterbalance to radical regimes, but neutrality risked unrest, the possibility of regime change, or even Abdullah’s assassination.

As thousands of Arab nationalists took to Jordan’s streets demanding war, the pressure became unbearable—his legitimacy was at stake. On May 30, in a stunning turn of events, Hussein flew to Cairo and signed a defense pact with Nasser, placing Jordan’s army under Egyptian command.

On June 5, as war erupted, Jordanian artillery bombarded West Jerusalem, prompting an Israeli counteroffensive. Within three days, Jordan was defeated, losing the entire West Bank, including East Jerusalem. Hussein later admitted it was a mistake, but at the time, political survival, not military strategy, had dictated his decision.

Applying the Lesson to Today’s Egypt

Could Sisi—or a future Egyptian leader—face a similar predicament? While he maintains strong ties with Israel, sharing strategic goals like opposing the Muslim Brotherhood and curbing Iranian and, to a lesser extent, Turkish influence, public sentiment in Egypt remains deeply hostile towards Israel. So far, this hostility has been contained during the Israel-Hamas war, but a prolonged conflict, involving other majority Arab states like Syria, with thousands more casualties could dramatically shift the mood of the public.

Beyond the Palestinian issue, Egypt faces increasing economic instability. The Houthi blockade of the Red Sea has cost Egypt $7 billion in lost Suez Canal revenues in 2024 alone, amounting to roughly 2% of its GDP. This crisis adds to an already dire situation, with declining water resources and over 15 million Egyptians suffering from food insecurity.

With growing economic and political pressure, could Sisi resort to threatening Israel to pacify domestic unrest—perhaps through a troop buildup in Sinai? While unlikely, this scenario serves as a reminder that even autocratic regimes are not immune to public pressure—especially in the volatile landscape of the Arab Street.

Conclusion: Beyond Regime Change, There’s a Risk

While Israel benefits from Egypt remaining under strong, stable leadership like El-Sisi’s, it cannot ignore Egyptian public opinion and domestic political pressures. If King Hussein—an ally of the West, a pragmatist, a leader who secretly worked with Israel—was still pulled into war, what does that say about Sisi’s future? Can any leader, no matter how rational, truly resist the weight of history? History is full of leaders who waged war not by choice, but out of political necessity.

Egypt’s continued military buildup is therefore not just a potential threat in the event of a hostile regime takeover. Even under a seemingly friendly government, shifting political dynamics and rising public sentiment could turn military power into a tool for appeasement. In the Arab world, the distinction between “friendly” and “hostile” regimes is often too simplistic, failing to reflect the strategic realities that drive decisions.