From Brussels to Abu Dhabi

Israel Must Shift Its Strategy

For decades, Israel has lived with a strange contradiction. It is located in the Middle East while trying, in many ways, to be accepted as part of Europe. It played in European sports competitions, sang at the Eurovision, traded with European markets, often measured its legitimacy through European eyes, and sought its approval. But the war has exposed the limits of that strategy. Israel should not abandon Europe, but it must stop chasing it. Its future lies in becoming a stronger, more useful, and more deeply rooted Middle Eastern power.

This does not mean Europe is irrelevant. Europe remains one of Israel’s most important economic partners. Israel should continue to trade, cooperate, and innovate with European countries. But there is a huge difference between partnership and dependence. Europe does not share Israel’s geography, its borders, or its immediate security threats. Many European governments can afford to view the Middle East as a moral debate from a distance. Israel cannot. For Israel, the Middle East is not an abstract foreign policy issue. It is home.

For most of Israel’s history, looking away from the region made sense. The Middle East was not a space of opportunity, but one of rejection and danger. Israel faced wars, boycotts, terrorism, hostile borders, and regional isolation. Under those conditions, turning toward Europe was not only a cultural preference; it was a reasonable strategy. Europe offered stability, prosperity, modernity, and access to the global economy. That strategy helped Israel grow. But the next stage of Israeli strength will depend not on escaping the Middle East, but on reshaping it.

The Middle East that Israel once tried to look beyond is changing. Gulf capital, energy politics, infrastructure projects, technological competition, and new trade corridors are reshaping the whole region. The current war has only made this clearer: the situation in the Middle East affects energy prices, shipping routes, inflation fears, and global markets. This shows that the Middle East is one of the most important economic arenas of the coming decades, already home to some of the world’s fastest-growing financial and technological hubs. Israel can either remain an outsider in its own neighborhood, or use these changes to expand its influence and become a serious regional player.

Israel will not become a serious regional player by waiting to be loved. It will become one by becoming useful. The Abraham Accords proved that regional cooperation can grow from interests before it grows from affection. Countries do not need to agree on everything in order to trade, invest, share technology, and cooperate against common threats. But Israel should be clear about where this strategy has the greatest potential. The UAE is already the most advanced example of what normalization can become: not only a diplomatic agreement, but a relationship built around trade, security, investment, technology, and shared concern over Iran. The current war has made this even clearer. Israel and the Gulf may differ on many issues, but Iran and its allies give them a common strategic language.

That does not mean the UAE should be Israel’s only regional partner. It means it should be the model. The region also faces other urgent challenges, including water scarcity, food insecurity, cyber threats, desert agriculture, and more. Israel has experience in many of these fields, and should use its relationship with Abu Dhabi to demonstrate what practical normalization can look like. From there, it can build outward where interests allow.

Just as importantly, Israel should understand that regional cooperation cannot depend only on public diplomatic breakthroughs. Political tensions will come and go, but shared economic, security, and technological interests can keep relationships alive even when formal normalization slows down or has not yet fully emerged. Israel should therefore advance these areas not as separate projects, but as part of one regional strategy. The goal should be to turn normalization from a political headline into a daily reality of cooperation, dependence, and shared interests.

None of this means Israel should romanticize the region. The Middle East remains dangerous, unstable, and often hostile to Israel. Iran, Hamas, Hezbollah, public anger, authoritarian regimes, and the Palestinian issue will continue to shape the region. That is exactly why Israel needs a regional strategy. Integration is not a substitute for security, but rather a part of it. It means building enough shared interests that cooperation becomes more useful than confrontation.

Israel should not abandon Europe. But it should abandon the illusion that its future depends on being accepted as European. The next stage of Israeli power will not come from escaping the Middle East. It will come from becoming a regional power capable of shaping it. Israel is not a guest in this region. It is part of it.