From the Sanctions List to the White House Guest List
Donald Trump may be the only politician capable of transforming a former jihadist into a respected statesman faster than the Middle East can produce its next ceasefire.
Consider Ahmed al-Sharaa.
Not long ago, he was better known as Abu Mohammed al-Jolani, the leader of Al-Nusra Front, Al-Qaeda’s affiliate in Syria. The United States designated him a terrorist. Washington accused his organization of orchestrating suicide bombings. He spent years fighting American forces and was regarded as precisely the sort of man Western leaders were not supposed to welcome into polite company.
Then Assad fell.
Iran’s influence in Syria collapsed.
And suddenly Al-Sharaa achieved something arguably more difficult than toppling Assad: he convinced Donald Trump that a former jihadist commander was now part of the solution rather than part of the problem. Within months, the former jihadist was meeting the President of the United States. Trump praised him as a “tough guy” and an “attractive guy.” As recently as the G7 summit, Trump suggested that Syria should be allowed to handle Hezbollah. It was a surreal moment: the President of the United States effectively proposing that a former jihadist leader might be the solution to another jihadist problem.
Yet the truly interesting story is not Al-Sharaa. It is Trump, because this is not the first time the president has performed this political magic trick. Over the years, dictators, strongmen, adversaries, and former enemies have repeatedly entered Trump’s orbit as dangerous threats and emerged as smart people, strong people, rational people, and, above all, people with whom he could make a deal.
Trump possesses a rare diplomatic gift. Whenever he decides to negotiate with an adversary, he often seems to develop an almost immediate affection for them. The people he once described as fanatics become rational. The people he once warned the world about become misunderstood. The people he once condemned become potential partners.
Which brings us to Trump’s latest conversion story: Iran.
For decades, Donald Trump was one of the clearest voices in American politics on the nature of the Iranian regime. Long before many Western leaders were willing to acknowledge it, Trump understood what the Islamic Republic was. He saw it not as a misunderstood regional actor but as a revolutionary regime. He recognized its sponsorship of terrorism, its hostility toward America’s allies, its destabilizing influence across the Middle East, and its determination to project power through proxies and intimidation.
There was little ambiguity about where he stood on Iran. Unlike so many politicians who spoke of moderation just around the corner, Trump appeared immune to the fantasy that the regime merely needed better incentives, more engagement, or another diplomatic reset.
Iran was not misunderstood.
Iran was dangerous.
Iran was not a potential partner.
Iran was a threat.
Fast forward to today, however, and one could be forgiven for wondering whether Trump is discussing the same regime. Following negotiations and understandings between Washington and Tehran, the president began describing Iranian representatives in remarkably warm terms.
They were “strong people.”
They were “smart people.”
They were “nice to deal with.”
One almost expected him to reveal that the ayatollahs had spent their spare time drafting proposals for regional coexistence. The language was familiar because we have heard it before.
Not about Iran. About Al-Sharaa.
The same progression was unfolding. Yesterday’s extremist became today’s pragmatist. Yesterday’s menace became today’s partner. Yesterday’s threat became today’s responsible stakeholder. The only thing that appeared to change was Trump’s assessment. Now, to be clear, there is nothing wrong with negotiating with unpleasant regimes. Every American president eventually discovers that diplomacy often requires speaking to people one would never invite to dinner.
Franklin Roosevelt dealt with Stalin. Richard Nixon dealt with Mao. Diplomacy is not friendship. It is not endorsement. It is not admiration.
The problem begins when negotiation starts to resemble rehabilitation.
Trump’s recurring mistake is not talking to adversaries. His recurring mistake is appearing to believe that the very act of talking to them proves they were never quite as bad as he previously claimed. Somewhere between the first handshake and the second press conference, the villains begin to look remarkably reasonable.
This is where the Al-Sharaa story becomes relevant. Whether Al-Sharaa has genuinely changed is almost beside the point. The remarkable thing was the speed with which Trump appeared willing to conclude that he had.
And now one cannot help noticing a similar dynamic with Iran.
The Islamic Republic’s constitution has not fundamentally changed. The doctrine of clerical rule remains intact. The regime’s hostility toward Israel has hardly vanished. Its revolutionary ideology has not been retired to a museum. Yet one can already glimpse the familiar pattern.
The hardliners become pragmatists.
The revolutionaries become stakeholders.
The fanatics become rational actors.
And anyone who points out the continuity risks being accused of living in the past.
History offers plenty of examples of enemies becoming partners. Germany changed. Japan changed. Egypt changed. Genuine transformations happen. But in every successful case, the transformation occurred first. Recognition followed. Today, the order often appears reversed. The recognition arrives immediately, while the evidence is left wandering somewhere between Damascus and Tehran trying to catch up.
Perhaps Iran’s rulers have genuinely changed. Perhaps the revolutionary regime that spent decades defining itself through hostility toward the West has suddenly discovered moderation. Anything is possible. But before we begin preparing White House photo opportunities for smiling clerics and issuing statements about pragmatic partners, it may be worth remembering how recently Donald Trump was describing these same men as fanatics spreading chaos throughout the Middle East.
After all, if the journey from Abu Mohammed al-Jolani to presidential guest can be completed in a matter of months, then the distance from “regional menace” to “trusted partner” may be shorter than a flight from Tehran to Washington—provided Donald Trump happens to be waiting at the other end of the runway.
