Gaza after October 7: A Regional Earthquake
We will remember October 7, 2023, as one of the most dramatic and important days in the history of the Middle East. Hamas thought it was carrying out a military and symbolic coup against Israel, an act of “resistance” meant to throw off the balance in the area. Two years later, the observation is without appeal: this attack, as spectacular as it is barbaric, may have marked the beginning of the end of the Islamist movement. What was supposed to be a show of force turned into a major geopolitical defeat—political, diplomatic, and ideological.
Hamas had based its action on three hypotheses: undermining Israel’s confidence in its security, reigniting the Palestinian cause, and instigating a regional shift.
On the psychological level, the shock was immense. The massacres of 7 October—1,200 dead, civilians kidnapped, entire villages annihilated—exposed the flaws of Israeli intelligence and shattered the country’s sense of invulnerability. Hamas believed it could sustainably exploit this collective trauma, convinced that Israel would sink into panic and humiliation.
However, this seemingly instant “win” had far-reaching consequences. Instead of crumbling, the Hebrew state mobilized in a way never seen before. Despite the wide divisions that existed in Israeli society before Bruxelles on October 7, a consensus emerged: the elimination of Hamas became an essential task. And on the military level, despite the losses and controversies, Israel has achieved the essential of its objectives: to dismantle the structures of the movement in Gaza, neutralize its infrastructure, and isolate its leadership. On the regional level, Hamas’s calculation also failed. It hoped for a widespread explosion on the Arab front. At this point, no country cut ties with Israel. Some of the most important cities, like Amman and Cairo, chose to be mediators. Regarding the Abraham Accords, they remained steadfast and resilient. The Arab world did not follow Hamas—proof that the era of Palestinian revolutionary romanticism is over.
For a few weeks, Hamas thought it had won the narrative battle. The Palestinian cause, marginalized since the Israeli-Arab normalization, was back on the front pages of the world press. Massive demonstrations were breaking out in London, Paris, Brussels, or New York.
But this media attention turned against him as the atrocities of October 7 were documented. The scale of the massacres, the rapes, the kidnappings, and the cruelty of the scenes has shattered the moral legitimacy of the movement. What was supposed to be the revenge of the oppressed has become the most archaic image of terrorism.
From that point on, Hamas diplomacy found itself in a state of impasse. Neither Qatar nor Turkey—its two major political backers—has been able to break its isolation. The negotiations for hostages, ceasefires, or humanitarian aid took place without him as a central interlocutor. The Arab states, Egypt and Saudi Arabia, have chosen to deal directly with Israel and Washington, relegating Hamas to the role of a cumbersome spectator. Thus, what was supposed to be a demonstration of influence led to the total marginalization of the movement. Hamas has lost the war of representation, that is to say, the power to speak on behalf of the Palestinian people.
Hamas’ greatest defeat is not a military one, but an ideological one. The movement has been presenting itself as the repository of Islamic resistance and the rival of secularized Fatah since it was founded in 1987. The purpose of October 7 was to celebrate this legitimacy. Hamas’s destruction of the moral border that prevented national struggle from nihilistic terror by massacring Israeli civilians, turning Gaza into a permanent battlefield, and sacrificing its own residents resulted in the destruction of the moral barrier. Disillusion is widespread in the Palestinian camps. More and more voices, even in Gaza, are denouncing the human cost of this strategy. Hamas is no longer a future project but a past of ideology and destruction. Palestinian jihadism, in its most radical expression, seems to have reached its historical limit. It is no longer a model of inspiration but a warning: that of an ideology that has led to the self-destruction of its people.
On the geopolitical level, it also marked the day Palestinian jihadism seems to have reached its historical limit. It is no longer an inspiration but a warning: an ideology that led to the “self-destruction” of its people. Israel, although morally weakened, strengthened its strategic position. Its security cooperation with the Gulf countries has been consolidated. Saudi Arabia, despite an official pause, continues its discussions with the United States on a comprehensive regional security agreement including Israel. The post-Hamas is already in preparation. The US, Egypt, Qatar, and Turkey are working on a post-conflict scheme: a demilitarized Gaza, under international supervision, administered by a renewed Palestinian Authority or an Arab transitional body. This model, if it materializes, would mean the definitive disappearance of Hamas from the Palestinian political landscape.
The events of October 7, 2023, will be remembered as a pivotal moment. Israel emerged from the conflict bruised but resilient; the Arab world remained cautious yet pragmatic; and Hamas, once victorious, is now facing a prolonged period of decline. The movement has shown all its destructive power but also its structural weakness: the inability to transform violence into a political vision.
October 7 marked the political death of Hamas and the end of jihadism as the central engine of Palestinian nationalism. What will emerge from its ruins remains to be written, but a chapter has indeed turned—that of a movement that, believing in rekindling the war, signed its disappearance from history.
