Gaza and the Return of Responsibility

For much of the past three decades, international conflict management has been governed by a comforting assumption: that enough process, inclusion and consensus will eventually substitute for authority. Declarations multiplied, mechanisms proliferated and conferences convened, even as outcomes stagnated. Nowhere has this gap between intention and effect been more visible than in Gaza – a territory endlessly discussed, generously funded and persistently ungoverned.

What failed in Gaza was not attention, nor even goodwill. It was the willingness to consolidate responsibility. Too many actors claimed a voice, too few accepted ownership. In that vacuum, process became an end in itself, and stability an ever-receding horizon.

The launch of the Gaza Board of Peace (GPB) at Davos on 22 January marks an attempt to break with that inherited model. Whether one agrees with its design or not, the initiative reflects a growing recognition that Gaza is not primarily a rhetorical or humanitarian challenge, but a structural one. It is an effort – imperfect, controversial, but serious – to replace diffuse management with concentrated authority, and to move from statements to structures capable of enforcing decisions.

For the United Kingdom and the European Union, this shift is not something to observe from a safe distance. Both have invested heavily in Gaza over decades through diplomacy, aid and political capital, yet with steadily diminishing returns. The GPB offers a rare opportunity to convert that long-standing engagement into influence over how authority is exercised, how reconstruction is governed and how stabilisation is linked to credible political horizons.

That is why the Board matters – not only for Gaza, but for Europe’s ability to shape outcomes in an international system that increasingly rewards those who assume responsibility early and decisively.

A Different Kind of Commitment

For much of the past two decades, Gaza existed in a responsibility gap. International organizations delivered aid without enforcement, with the entirely foreseeable result that assistance was frequently diverted, captured or exploited by Hamas and other Palestinian terrorist factions.

States condemned developments from a distance, but stopped short of assuming responsibility. Authority was treated as optional, and enforcement as someone else’s problem, primarily Israel’s. In such conditions, power does not simply dissipate. It is seized – predictably and repeatedly – by actors willing to organize, arm themselves and rule through coercion.

The Board of Peace seeks to reverse that logic by concentrating responsibility rather than dispersing it. Its reported US $1 billion buy-in for permanent seats is not merely a financial hurdle, but a test of seriousness. Those who contribute are not observers. They are stakeholders. And stakeholders, by definition, are accountable.

This is where the United Kingdom and the European Union face a pivotal choice.

Britain has traditionally approached Gaza through the lens of diplomacy and legality. That instinct is not misplaced. Norms matter. Law matters. But norms without enforcement lose credibility, and law without leverage becomes performative. The appointment of Sir Tony Blair to the Board’s executive committee suggests that some in London recognize this tension, and see the possibility of bridging traditional diplomacy with outcome-driven governance.

Foreign Secretary Yvette Cooper’s hesitation – citing Russian participation and the absence of explicit references to Palestinian statehood – reflects legitimate concerns. Yet it also exposes an unresolved strategic question: is the priority procedural purity, or stabilization capable of creating space for politics to resume? The two need not be mutually exclusive, but neither can be deferred indefinitely.

From Observer to Partner

The composition of the GPB reflects a changing global landscape. Gulf capital, regional security actors and Western strategic interests are converging around a blunt but unavoidable proposition: Gaza cannot be rebuilt without order, and order cannot be sustained without authority.

This does not amount to a rejection of values, but an acknowledgement that values require institutions and power if they are to shape reality. Gaza’s geography – sitting astride maritime access points, trade routes and critical regional security corridors – makes it too consequential to be managed through endless mediation alone. Any serious reconstruction effort will depend on ports, logistics, enforcement mechanisms and decisions that cannot be postponed without cost.

Donald Trump’s description of Gaza as a “beautiful piece of property” was widely criticized, but set aside the phrasing and the underlying observation is uncontroversial: improvement follows where order, responsibility and incentives align. Jared Kushner’s emphasis on free-market principles at the GPB launch reflects an understanding that Gaza’s economic potential cannot be realized without investment, trade and predictable rules. Markets alone, however, are insufficient. Sustainable recovery requires economic openness to be paired with a credible commitment to peace, democratic accountability and justice, without which growth cannot endure.

For Europe, this moment represents an opening rather than a threat. France, Norway and Sweden have expressed concern that the Board risks sidelining the United Nations. Those concerns should lead not to disengagement, but to engagement on terms that preserve international standards while improving effectiveness. Institutions retain relevance not by standing apart, but by adapting to changing conditions.

If Europe remains outside the room, decisions will still be taken, contracts will still be awarded and security arrangements will still take shape. The difference is that they will do so without the influence of actors uniquely positioned to contribute legal expertise, regulatory standards, development finance and post-conflict institution-building experience.

Both the EU and the United Kingdom bring assets that are not easily substituted: deep capital markets, credible development agencies, long-standing humanitarian engagement and normative frameworks capable of anchoring reconstruction in transparency and accountability. The question, then, is not whether outcomes will be shaped, but whether European influence is exercised from within the process or quietly forfeited by default.

A Chance to Shape What Comes Next

The Board of Peace is not simply about Gaza. It is a test case for a broader shift in conflict management – one that prioritizes implementation over declarations. Jared Kushner’s assertion that there is no “Plan B” reflects an understanding that endless alternatives often mask an absence of commitment.

The emergence of the GPB does not signal the closure of the system, but its reordering. Its durability will depend not only on its capacity to impose security and coordinate reconstruction, but on whether it can acquire sufficient legitimacy to endure beyond its initial phase. That legitimacy will not emerge automatically. It must be built through legal architecture, credible oversight and the integration of political horizons that extend beyond immediate stabilization.

This is where the United Kingdom and the European Union retain meaningful leverage. Both possess instruments the Board will ultimately require if it is to move from enforcement to consolidation: regulatory credibility, development finance, institutional design expertise and the ability to translate stabilization into longer-term governance. Participation need not imply endorsement of every mechanism or actor. It implies influence at the moment when the framework remains malleable.

The strategic choice facing London and Brussels is therefore temporal rather than moral. Engagement now allows Europe to shape rules, standards and trajectories. Delay ensures these will be set by others, and inherited rather than influenced.

Gaza’s future will not be decided by declarations or alignment statements, but by which actors are prepared to align power with responsibility and remain engaged when outcomes, rather than intentions, are tested. For liberal diplomacy, this is neither an obituary nor a victory lap. It is a stress test – perhaps the most consequential in a generation – of whether it can adapt to a world that increasingly demands results.