Goodbye, Boehler

I feel as if recently I’ve written the name ‘Adam Boehler’ more often than my own. His choice on Friday to withdraw his nomination as US Special Presidential Envoy for Hostage Affairs is more than merely his latest erratic political move: It acts, instead, as a glaring sign of the increasingly large separation in terms of strategy between Washington and Jerusalem over how to handle Hamas. And, while the official line from the White House may be that Boehler will ‘continue to manage the file’ from a lower-level assignment that does not require a Senate confirmation, let’s not kid ourselves: this is, pure and simple, damage control. His resignation, which he reportedly decided upon before holding direct talks with Hamas, is a political statement: the White House is unwilling to risk any further political fallout. His negotiations, the same ones he knew would profoundly anger his Israeli colleagues, aimed principally to secure the release of the remains of four US nationals declared dead in Gaza, along with Edan Alexander, a dual US-Israeli citizen and a man Boehler referred to by his father’s name, Adi, on more than one occasion. It was not Boehler’s efforts to return them home that infuriated Israel; rather, it was that he did so without first discussing or involving the Israeli authorities.

After weeks of growing annoyance in the Holy Land following the US’ first direct talks with Hamas since 1997 – which were, allegedly, coordinated with US Mideast envoy Steve Witkoff but carried the teeny-tiny, supposedly unintended consequence of completely blindsiding Israel – Boehler withdrew, most likely in response to Israel’s leak. What does it say about the strength of the US-Israel relationship if the US has elected to deal with a terrorist outfit without first properly alerting Israel, one of its closest allies and the nation it represents?

These discussions were always going to be seen as a confrontational strategy – if one may call it ‘strategy’ at all, rather than a brazen attempt to place the interests of the US above those of the country it speaks on behalf of; Boehler admitted this himself in his ‘We’re the United States. We’re not an agent of Israel. We have specific interests at play’ declaration – by the US. Israel’s long-established approach has now been directly challenged by a US relationship with Hamas – a terrorist organisation that, let’s not forget, remains fully dedicated to the destruction of the State of Israel – despite Israel and the US being on the same side. Boehler’s later defence of the discussions in a series of interviews in the aftermath only helped to further demonstrate the fundamental divergence between Washington and Jerusalem, rather than reassuring the latter. The later, more underground endeavour by Israeli Strategic Affairs Minister Ron Dermer to discredit Boehler only serves to accentuate how deeply Israeli leadership disagrees with his participation in an area the American has, frankly, little to no experience in; why Dermer might personally object to Boehler’s involvement, I haven’t the faintest: On Channel 13 recently, Boehler said of Dermer’s anger over his dialogue with Hamas, ‘I don’t really care about that that much — no offense to Dermer. If it was a big deal every time Dermer got a little bit upset… Ron might have a lot of big deals every day.’

This latest episode of American foolishness places the spotlight on an even deeper problem: the long shadow of Biden’s foreign policy failures. The former President’s administration’s weakness in handling Middle Eastern affairs created the conditions for this crisis, and Trump’s administration – by no means a collection of Tzadikim – is left to pick up the pieces of what could have been a war ended before any further soldiers were killed. Biden’s disastrous withdrawal from Afghanistan, the failure to hold Iran accountable, and the mixed signals on Israeli security all contributed to an environment wherein Hamas believed themselves to be emboldened to take hostages and dictate terms.

The political fallout from this debacle will be significant: Boehler will continue to manage the hostage affairs portfolio as a ‘Special government employee’ – a lower-level position that allows Trump’s administration to retain Boehler while avoiding a protracted confirmation battle in the Senate. But the damage has been done. Israel’s trust in US negotiators has been shaken, and the broader question of how to deal with Hamas remains unsolved.