Hamas’s Strategies for Surviving the Ceasefire
Looking at the twenty-point ceasefire plan, it would seem that Hamas has no future. According to the agreement, Hamas released the living hostages and will both disarm and destroy all their infrastructure. They agreed they would “not have any role in the governance of Gaza, directly, indirectly, or in any form” and better still, there will be an international force in place to enforce all of the provisions. Yet, Hamas is not about to give up its fight – so it would not have agreed to the ceasefire unless it thought it could live through it. Hamas’s current operations and history and suggest there are several strategies that Hamas might try as part of their attempt to not only survive but eventually thrive through the ceasefire.
All of Hamas’s strategies are built on two fundamental assumptions. The first is that the US and international community have a strong desire for the war to be over. The second is that the international communities’ willpower to enforce the ceasefire may not be significant, and even if its motivation is strong now, it will dissipate before too long. This is not a bad assumption as there are plenty of examples such as that of UNIFIL II to support their case, and for all that countries have said about caring about the future of Gaza, there is a gap between their rhetoric and their actions – there is not a long line wrapping around the block to make a meaningful military contribution to the international security force (ISF). This means that one of the goals of any Hamas strategy will be to further this tendency by signaling to the international community that the cost of confronting Hamas may be higher than any country is willing to pay in terms of lives, money, and time.
Indirect Confrontation:
Hamas may use either allied militant groups such as the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), create a new spin off organization, or even just use “more radical elements” within Hamas to attacks Israeli forces or the ISF. Such an approach has several positives for Hamas. It allows Hamas to test the tolerance the international community has for Israeli retaliatory actions in Gaza while keeping a distance from the initial attacks. This approach also helps reinforce to countries thinking about contributing to the ISF that they will lose soldiers in Gaza, making them less likely to join the mission. Should the ISF deploy to Gaza, these operations will allow Hamas to attempt to sap ISF will by causing casualties, but with plausible deniability to protect it from retaliation. At its most effective, this strategy could allow Hamas to appear as a moderate option – willing to help the ISF restrain the more radical elements in exchange for the ISF at least tacitly allowing Hamas retaining some capabilities and power.
How do we know Hamas may try this strategy? Because they already are. This was precisely what Hamas did in attacking Israeli soldiers in Rafah and then blaming it on a lack of communications with local operatives. It is not far different from what Hamas did in 2022 by standing back while PIJ attacked Israel and what the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) did for years with various “dissident groups” and the Black September Organization.
Corruption:
Hamas may choose to avoid confronting the ISF. Instead, it may try to rebuild its power and reconstitute its forces and infrastructure while the ISF is in place. This will allow Hamas to resume operations at a time of its choosing once it has recovered from the last two years. To do this, Hamas will need to be able to siphon off the resources from economic activity, humanitarian aid, and reconstruction efforts and prevent any other local powers from rising in its place. Where possible, they will make use of friendly international organizations but will need a solution for when those aid organizations are unwilling to cooperate.
In the past, Hamas has been reluctant to confront international organizations, but instead will seek to coerce the local population on whom the international organizations rely. This means showing the local population that regardless of a ceasefire or international pressure, Hamas can get to anyone or their family with impunity. Hamas is already in the process of doing this. By murdering people in the streets and killing the families of its enemies, Hamas is reminding the population of the cost of non-compliance and that regardless of any setback, it will reach them. Finally, this strategy returns Gaza to a situation in which no matter how well intentioned an international aid or reconstruction organization is, it will have no choice but to cooperate with Hamas in the regions where Hamas has influence.
Hamas hopes that approach will force the ISF to an uncomfortable choice. It can choose to maintain the ceasefire and allow Hamas to regain its strength returning to a pre-October 7th like situation. Alternatively, the ISF could choose to confront Hamas in which case it will eventually have to operate in Hamas’s strongholds or deploy enough forces to secure much of the population of Gaza – either of which will be costly. This is not far different from the approach that Hezbollah successfully adapted when UNIFIL II first deployed to Lebanon in the wake of the Second Lebanon War.
Discrediting the Force:
Hamas may seek to discredit the ISF in the eyes of Israelis and Palestinians alike. It has several ways to do so. If the ISF cannot protect Israel from attack, then it will rapidly lose credibility in the eyes of Israel. One of the easiest ways for Hamas to do this will be to use its remaining rocket supply to fire over the heads of the ISF and into Israel. Hamas can either do this directly or use proxies. In either case, they would anticipate that this will force the ISF to either lose credibility by failing to stop the rockets or to strike into Hamas’s strongholds to hunt the rockets and their launchers. Depending on the results of such operations, this may make the ISF lose credibility to the international community and the Palestinians alike. Alternatively, the ISF could allow Israel to retaliate, which might make the ISF appear to Palestinians to be an arm of Israel or at least unable to maintain the ceasefire. Hamas may also seek to discredit the ISF by staging a provocation such as they did against Israel with the “March of Return” in which they would hope to force the ISF to chose between force protection or appearing to kill Palestinian civilians. Either of these will greatly reduce the efficacy, legitimacy, and credibility of the ISF and sap the will of the international community to continue the more aggressive aspects of the ISF mission.
Confrontation:
Ultimately, while Hamas is diminished, it still has significant military capabilities and the subterranean infrastructure to support it. The very presence of these capabilities provides the threat of direct confrontation with the ISF. This threat is bound to loom large in the heads of the countries debating sending their forces to Gaza. Hamas can still try to cause these countries significant casualties and potentially draw them into the type of urban warfare Israel just experienced. This is not something in which any country would be anxious to take part and may deter them from joining the ISF to begin with. This threat underlies all of the other approaches Hamas may take. Hamas has reason to believe that this will provide a successful backstop – after all it worked well for their ally Hezbollah after 2006 (and may still be helping them survive in Lebanon today).
None of these strategies are exclusive, Hamas has already begun to lay the groundwork to employ all of them in consort. While these strategies have precedence and have succeeded at various times in the past, they are by no means foolproof and with sufficient international will, the international community and the ISF it builds can liberate Gaza from Hamas and perhaps even end the cycle of violence.
“The views, facts, opinions, and conclusions expressed herein are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, U.S. Army, U.S. Army War College, or any other government agency. (References to this presentation should include the foregoing statement.)”
